Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1967

Melville: Sceptic
Mary Dominic Stevens
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Stevens, Mary Dominic, "Melville: Sceptic" (1967). Dissertations. 880.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/880

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1967 Mary Dominic Stevens

KlLVlLLl: SCIPTIC

by
Siater Mary Doaialc Steveae, o.P.

A Di••ert.tion Suhaltted to the r.calty of the Or....t. SChool
of Loyola Ualyeraity ia P.rti.l rulfl1t.eat of
the ltequireM1lta for the Dearee of
Doctor of Phl1oaophy
rebra.17
1961

PUJ'ACB
Meldlle ... cn artiat, .ot a philoaoph.r.

lat h. v .. an artiet with

a peraiat..t tat.reat ta phil_aphy, ..eI tid.. tat.reat coloreel all the th. . .
ad • •y of the ta.... of hia aajor worb.

III cODDection rith M.l.1lle, the

t.XII "philoaophy" is .eel ia ita "icleat COIlIlotatioaa .. a broad patt.na of
iat.rrelat.d ael queri.d cemcepta.
It ia aot Mc:uaary to prove that Hel.ille " .. a aceptic.
ciaa h.. b... recopi... for • ceatury.

Ii. acepti-

Se. .ral of lI.l.ill.·. fuad __ tally

_taph,..ical probleaa h ..... ncei. .d ext..... tuatlMat alone ad in .aU relat.. ,:roup.; ....rthel••• , little att..,t hu h... JUde to clefi•• what hia
sceptici_ . .tails .. scepticiaia, that is, u a fairly co1ler_t, relate. . .el
.equential a.t of philosophical .ttitudea ... qa•• U ....
0.. or aother of MalYill.'s .ceptic aouree. hu reeei... atteatiem ia

relatiem to hia .cepticia, bat acholal'8hip h.. y.t to brillS toa.ther the
rather aarpriaillS a.h.r of eaineat sceptic writ.rs that COIltd'nat.4I to the
aaar.,ate sceptici_ that v .. his.
writ.r ia thia stuely .... aot • .,••d

'!'be _ouat of ..,hasi. ,i... each sceptic
OR

hi. presti,e ia the fi.ld of philosophy

bat em the proporti_ of hia .iscerubl.

01'

probable iafl...c.

OR

Meldll••

MODtaipe i. th.refore couid.red ia . . . detail, bec.... HelYiU. pUl'chu.ct
hta woru, show.ct ."i...ca, of harlaa re.d h1a car.fuUy, :lacerporatecl hia
thoasht iato hi. wom, aaiatal••cl a

ab1.:I.Da iatereat :In Ilta, ..d Moatalp.

s."ed .. _eator to __,. ph11_oph.r. who likewi•• :lalla. .oed MalYill.,
11
.,"

particularly Pierre Bayle. probably Hume.

The inclusion of Descartes and Kant

under Melville's sceptic sources by no .eana tap1ie. they were intentionally
sceptics.

On

the contrary, they labored to solve doubts raised byscepticisa.

In a restricted sense, however, they may be included under a consideration of
scepticism, since, for many. the questions they raised, and the problems they
trested, proved more powerful than any answers given.
No two problems, nor attitudes toward them, are precisely the saae in
any two philosophers; nevertheless, a certain ..oeboid core of common e1ementa
and underlying questions emerges from the writings of these sceptically philosophic writers who represent a common heritage of influence and philosophical
inbreeding.

This is not a study in minute, direct borrowings.

The selected

quotations from these sceptic writers offered at the beginning of sections of
this study suggest the sources from which Melville derived the terms and direction of his own arguaents and questions and his sceptic attitude toward thea.
It is said of the Petrarchan ideal man that he may be indebted to others for
ideas but never for style.

In like manner, this study suggests that many of

Melville's sceptic ideas are derivative but clothed in his own artistic
rhetoric.
The present approach to Melville may be neither philosophic enough
for the philosopher nor literary enough for the literati, but its intended
value lies in showing the bearing of the former upon the latter.

This is one

approach to MelVille _ong many and should be recognized as such, but it is an
importan tone.
In their introduction to History of Political Philosophy (Chicago,
iii

1963), editors Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey observe:

"The great intellectual

revolution of the seventeenth century which brought to light modern natural
science was a revolution of a new philosophy

~

science against traditional

(chiefly Aristotelian) philosophy H. science." Much of modern thought, in
fact, had its stimulus as a reaction to "traditional (chiefly Aristotelian)"
thought.

Because positions are often better seen in juxtaposition, certain

passages from Aristotle and a pre-Renaissance Aristotelian philosopher and
theologian, Thomas Aquinas, have been introduced as a representative type of
the thought against which mueb of scepticism militated.
I have not specifically entered into the debate over Melville's spokes-

man.

When views from Melville's works are offered as Melville's own, they

are generally based on accumulative evidence, tone, or substantiation in more
directly personal sources such as journals or letters.
The format of the study follows Kate L. Turabian's manual for writers.
I

have not standardized spellings:

my own preference is "sceptic, U but the

spelling "skeptic" has been left in sources which use it.

A variation for

"Pyrrhonian,,-nPyrrhonean"-also occurs.
I

once heard Vernon Louis Parrington praised for announcing his own

personal stance before offering his thought; this he did so that any bias,
however unintentional, might not be insinuated into his audience but honestly
appraised.

Such honesty deserves imitation, and I shall try to follow his

good example by declaring that I am a Christian writing of a non-Christian.
do not alway. agree with the direction or stress of Melville's arguments, but
I

have endeavored to present his arg_ents, not my own.
iv

It is not necessary

I

to be in full agreement with Melville, however, to feel a deep empathy with
the struggle that was his.

v
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PART I

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUNDS

or

SCEPTICISM:

A SKELETAL HISTORY

"The skeleton of the whale furnishes but little
clue to the shape of his fully invested body"
Moby-Dick.
Reasons for a skeletal history
In his discussion of the whale' a ake1eton in Moby-Dick, Herman
Melville dec1area:
I could not but be struck anew with the circumstance, so variously
repeated in this book, that the skeleton of the whale is by no means
the mould of his invested form. • • •
How vain and foolish, then, thought 1, for t11lid untrave11ed man to
try to comprehend aright this wondrous whale, by merely poring over his
dead attenuated skeleton.

.The. skeleton
. . . . .of. the
. . whale
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
furnishes but little clue to the shape of his
fully invested body.1
Although the preceding extracts might well stand as epigraphs for the present
study in its entirety, they are offered--with an admittedly bounding synaptic
1

The Works of Herman Melville (16 vo1s.; London: Constable & Co.,
Ltd., 1922-1924), II, chap. ciii, 217, 218; chap. civ, 221. The project
leading toward a definitive edition of Melville's works under the general
editorship of Professor Harrison Hayford of Northwestern University began
official operation July 1, 1965; therefore, no volumes were yet available
for tha present study. Tbe Hendricks House edition, which was to have
superseded the Constable edition, remains, as yet, incomplete. The Standard Edition, at this time, is the Constable edition, and, unless otherwise
stated, in all references to and citations from Melville's writings the
Constable edition will be used. Notes will include the commonly used short
titles, the volume number of the novel (not the novel's number in the set)
only if the work occupies two volumes of the Constable edition, the chapter
number (to facilitate the location of citationa in other editions), and page;
in addition, Pierre will also be cited by book.
1

2

application--as a point of reference for the more immediate concerns of this,
the beginning, chapter, because it may likewise be maintained, perhaps complained, that neither, of course, can the "monstrous whale" of scepticism be
comprehended in an attenuated skeletal history; yet, even as Melville found
it eminently useful for his purpose to devote two chapters to a particular
discussion of his whale's skeleton, so an initial chapter will be ventured
here on a "skeleton of scepticis." on the grounds that it. too, is useful to
the present purpose--that of placing Melville in his epistemological context
and providing a background and basis for understanding the significance of
the reading, much of it early, which .ixed with mind to form the matrix of
his philosophical writings.

But this history, highly selective as it is and

emphasizing names found in Melville's reading or works, does incorporate a
surprising number of outstanding names in the annals of sceptical thought and
demonstrates a develapaent of iaplication and intensity which had reached a
certain degree of culmination by the time of Melville in the nineteenth
century.
The kinds of scepticism
Scepticism has become something of a generic term comprehending many
kinds of sceptieisms.
posed to dogmatism.

In its broadest context scepticism denotes doubt as opHowever, with its revival during the renaissance, partiCU-

larly during the refol'DlDticn, scepticiSDl was employed to bolster bith:

the

efficacy of the senses and of the reason was depreciated in an effort to establish faith as the sole trustworthy repository of confidence.

In this sense,

scepticism was not opposed to but subservient to the interests of be1ief--but
it was belief, not knowledge:

this is, generally, the fideist position.

3

In the kaleidoscopic confusion that accompanied the reforaation, man
was no longer faced with .!. faith but !h!. faiths.

Reactions differed:

some

chose one of nthe faiths"; SODle chose not to choose and turned the batteries
of scepticism on faith itself and became unbelievers, so that another scepticism arose synonomous with unbelief.

Finally, since man as ethical and moral

agent acts according to his criterions of belief or knowledge, and since these
props of morality had buckled for many sceptics, scepticism, for some, devolved to libertinisa and depravity.

Scepticism, then, affects the spheres

of religion and philosophy--epistemology and ethics--man's believing, knowing,
and doing:

a man can profess to have faith and morality without (demonstrable)

knowledge; or a man can be sans faith and knowledge but maintain a blind drive
for morality--often based on feeling; or he can be void of any definitively
professed stand on faith, knowledge, and morality, which is, unfortunately,
the malaise of modern man and a prime symptom of the decline of western
civilization--man's comaitBent to nothingness.
Origins in Greek thought
Scepticism as a philosophical position, or, paradoxically, the profession of a lack of one, orginated in ancient Greek thought.

In the

"Apology for Raimond Sebond" in Hazlitt's edition of Montaigne's works, which
Melville owned, a footnote offers the following comment on a particular
passage:

"There are three general methods of philosoph1s[i)ng, the one dog-

matic, the other academic, and the other sceptic.

The first affirm they have

found the truth, the next declare it to be above our comprehension, and the
others are still in quest of it." 1 The academic position, although one of
lThe Complete Works of Michael De Montaigne; Comprising; The Essays

4

the two types of classical scepticism, is also a type of negative dogmatism,
since it knows that it does not know: l

negative dogmatism or academic scepti-

cism, "formulated in the Platonic Academy in the third century, b.c.,
developed from the Socratic observation, 'All I know is that I know nothing.'
Its theoretical formulation is attributed to Arcesilas, c. 315-241 b.c., and
Carneades, c. 213-129 b.c.,,2 The arguments of academic scepticism have come
down to us through Cicero's Academica and

~

Natura Deorua, through their

refutation in St. Augustine's Contra Academicos, and in the summary given by
Diogenes Laertius, who also summarizes Pyrrhonistic scepticism.
Sceptical thought moved from the Academy to the school of the
Pyrrhonian sceptics, so-called because, as a movement, it supposedly began
with the legendary figure of Pyrrho of Elis, c. 360-275

B.e~

The Pyrrhonist

questions the reliability of sense knowledge and hence of the reason and disciplines Which depend upon that knowledge; because of the deceptive and limited
nature of his knowledge, he consequently holds suspect the common. everyday
belief in the phenomenal world.

Again. because of his cognitive It-itations,

the Pyrrhonist does not feel justified in proclaiming impregnable conclusions;
(Translated by Cotton); The Letters; The Journey into Germany and Italy;
Now First Translated; A Life. by the Edttor; Notes from All the Comaentators;
The Critical Qpinions of Eminent Authors on Montaisne; The Elog.s of MM. Jay
and Villemainj A Bibliographical Notice of All the Editions. and CopiOUS
Indexes, ed. William Hazlitt (London: John Templeman, 1842), Bk. II, chap.
xii, p. 231, n. 1. Hereafter cited as Montaigne. The three methods of
philosophizing, as Hazlitt rightly states in the footnote, Montaigne borrows
from the opening remarks of Sextus Empiricus and may be seen in hil Outlines
of Pyrrhonism, trans. Rev. R. G. Bury (New York: G. P. Putnaml.s Sons, 1933).
I, 3.
1

Sextus Empiricus. I, xxxviii.

2

Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Eras.us to
Descartes (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Co., N. V., 1960), p. ix.

5

rather, he considers, weighs, evaluates, questions, and doubts.

Of necessity,

the Pyrrhonist must make some proximate, if still doubtful, judgments, but he
suspends ultimate judgment: he is sensitive to antinomies, to the pros and
cons of a question, and what sometimes appears to be a categorical conclusion
or judgment, when traced far enough, reveals itself as one of an opposing pair
of "conclusions," for Pyrrhonistic scepticism is dialectical, the argUJllent
often being a aelf-argument rather than that between two opponents.

FrequentlYl

it is this self-argument of an active, probing mind that accounts for apparent
contradictions, though neither contra-diction of the argument is completely
and finally sanctioned:

hence, the sceptical element in Emeraon--by no

means negligible--caused him to aay, in his easay on self-reliance, that a
fooliah consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, and Melville's
Babbalanja finds his consistency in the sum of his inconsistencies. 1 The
final abnegation of both extreme pOSitions results in a neutral or "neuter"
position--relative to the suspension of judgment and conducive to an aura of
ambiguity--with the eye of the intellect still open to regard both; further,
the sceptical problem may be compounded by the presence of out-and-out
diversity rather than two nicely juxtaposed polarities.
Pyrrhonistic scepticism is an open mental attitude rather than a
closed philosophical system:

although a purpose of this study will be to

show that a certain philosophical pattern, a logical and sequential drive
toward nihilism, can be traced in Melville, it nevertheless remains more the
reasoning toward a possibility, perhaps the catharsis of a fear, rather than
an irrefragable conclusion, for, without in any way obliterating the far

~ardi, II, chap. xxxix, 160.

6

heavier element of negation, the affiraative side has a way of bobbing up
like a persistent though wave-swamped buoy in a heavy stora--it's simply
there, and, though sometimes, like the buoy, it's not more prominent than a
dot on an oceanic vastness, it can't be ignored without ignoring the total
Melville.

The procedure and final emphasis of this study will be more clearly

perceived if it is remembered that, while the main current of the argument
seems to be following an unimpeded path toward nihilism, the injection of
contradictions and questions is intentional, because they are Melville's and
show that in the end, despite a sharp veering into darker waters, final questions are left open, and Melville's position more closely approximates that
of the Pyrrhonistic sceptic.

One senses Melville's courageous effort to

comprehend, to accept, if need be, the direst possible view of reality if this
is what is, but the

it remains as well as an always pendent question mark.

As the previously cited footnote in the Hazlitt edition of Montaigne claims,
borrowing from Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonistic scepticism is a quest:

truth,

like a beautiful woman, often aloof and elusive, surrenders itself little by
little only on the condition of being continuously courted, may then become
incomprehensively withdrawn, 1s often desirable in proportion to the very
degree of its mysteriousness and, alas, is never completely possessed in
this mundane sphere.

This unending while earthbound process that is scapti-

cism 1s called, in Margaret Wiley's study, the "spirit of inquiry" and the
sceptic the "philosophical inquirer. 1t 1

~argaret L. Wiley, The Subtle Knot: Creative Scepticism in Seventeenth-Century England (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), pp. 19, 17.
Wiley is quoting, respectively, from William Mitchell, "The Meaning of
Scepticism, tI The Arena, XL (1908), 395, and John Owen's preface to The Religious Aspects of Scepticism (London, 1891), no pagination in preface. All

7

Because Pyrrhonism searches, doubts, and questions everything, it neither
claims something can be known (positive dogmatism) or cannot he known (riegative dogmatism or academic scepticism) but suspends judgment on this issue as
well and is not even sure i f something can be known.
the more severe type of scepticism:

Pyrrhonism is therefore

it doubts even its own doubt.

The Pyrrhonian movement continued to the time of Sextus Empirieus (c.
A.D. 160-210), whose writings, the Hypotyposes (Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and
Adversus Mathematicos, are the only extant works of a Greek Pyrrhonian and,
therefore, provide the principal source of information.

Pyrrhonism gradually

receded into the shadows of antiquity; occasional outcroppings in certain
anti-rational theologians kept it from suffering a complete demise, but it was
not well known in the west until its reappearance in the sixteenth century.
Renaissance rediscovery
The rediscovery of Pyrrhonism, as professor Popkin demonstrates in
his thesis, could not have occurred at a more propitious moment in history for
effecting the greatest impact, since it reappeared during the intellectual
crisis of the reformation.

The central quarrel of the reformation was over

Uthe rule of faith 1t or the proper standard of religious knowledge, which,
consequently, raised one of the classical problems of the Greek Pyrrhonists,
"the problem of the criterion of truth":
With the rediscovery in the sixteenth century of writings of the Greek
Pyrrhonist, Sextus Empiricus, the arguments and views of the Greek
sceptics became part of the philosophical core of the religious struggles
then taking place. The problem of finding a criterion of truth, first
philosophy has and is a "spirit of inquiry," but scepticism is such in a more
limited sense, because it never rests in stable truths, conclusions, or dogmas.

8

raised in theological disputes, was then later raised with regard to
natural knowledge, leading to the crise pyrrhonienne of the early
seventeenth century.l
popkin goes on to explain that against the standard of truth authorized.by
Church tradition, Pope and Councils, Luther asserted another criterion--the
individual conscience.

The sceptical argument asserts that in order to deter-

mine which alternative criterion is now correct, a third criterion against
which each must be measured is required.

But what about the correctness of

the third criterion?--against what is its correctness to be measured?--and so
the problem goes ad infinitum.

As Popkin observes, Luther opened a Pandora's

box in the intellectual realm. 2
Rabelais
The most famous presentation of Pyrrhonism in the early sixteenth
century occurs in the characterization of the Pyrrhonian philosopher Trouillogan in Rabelais's Cargantua and Pantagruel, Book III, chapter xxxvi:

itA Con-

tinuation of the Answer of the Ephectic and Pyrrhonian Philosopher Trouillogan.
Rabelais's source, however, is apparently Diogenes Laertius rather than Sextus
Empiricus. 3 Rabelais's comic satire of this sceptic Pyrrhonian philosopher,
a satire which he directs at the whole human situation, might cause some

~opkin, p. 12

.!.!!!.!!.,

p. 15 •

3Popkin writes: "The terminology, however, seems to come from
Diogenes I.aertius's discussion of Pyrrho," and he comments in a footnote:
"Pyrrhonian scepticism is briefly described by the humanist, Guillaume Bude,
(with whom Rabelais corresponded), in his De Asse, (Paris 1541), p. cxxii,
a.pparently based on Diogenes Laertius" (ibid., p. 22). Popkin might have
added the textual evidence of the occurr~ of Diogenes Laertius's name in
Rabelais's work: see, e.g., Bk. III, chap. x and Bk. V, chap. xix.

I

9

readers, because of the apparent ridicule, to miss the pervading and final
scepticism of his own work, a scepticism which seems to have had a notable
influence on Melville's writing in conjunction with other sources, like Montaigne, who were more indebted to Sextus Empiricus than to Diogenes Laertius.
Calvin
There appears, however, between Rabelais (14941-1553) and the 1562
publication of Sextus Empiricus's works a major figure whose doctrines had an
abrasive and lifetime influence on Melville because of his childhood indoctrination in the tenets of the Dutch Reform Church; this figure is the French
Protestant John Calvin (1509-1564).

Scepticism is inherent in the Augustinian

bias of his teaching, which stresses the fallen nature of man and the consequent darkness of the intellect:

in his Dictionary, Pierre Bayle sees such

implications in a quotation from Calvin concerning the liturgy of baptism, in
which Calvin asserts that regeneration consists in "DENYING
REASON."l

~

follow OUR OWN

Calvin would not have admitted to scepticism, however, and he

attempts to establish a criterion of truth on inner persuasion--a certain compe1ling illumination through the Holy Spirit.

Unfortunately, he is caught in

a vicious circle which merely further substantiates the sceptical position:
"The guarantee of the authenticity of inner persuasion is that it is caused
by God, and this we are assured of by our inner persuasion."

1

2

A General Dictionary. Historical and Critical (10 vols.; London:
Vol. I Printed and Sold by J. Roberts; Vols. II-X Printed by James Bettenhaa,
1734-1741), VIII, 598.
2
Popkin, p. 9.

10
Montaigne
When Calvin died in 1564, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) was approaching the height of his powers.

Two years earlier, in 1562, Henri Eetienne

translated into Latin and first published Sextus's Hypotyposes or Outlines of
Pyrrhonism; Gentian Hervet later translated the Adversus Mathematicos and the
complete works were published in 1569.

Diogenes Laertius had summarized the

Pyrrhonian position, but Sextus offered an extended and formulated presentation whose percussive effects upon Montaigne are still broadening and reverberating in our own day.

After studying the writings of Sextus, Montaigne

composed his most philosophical essay, the "Apology for Raimond Sebond," an
essay which gives evidence of his own meditations on Pyrrhonism.
In the "Critical Opinions" section of the Hazl1tt-Cotton edition of
Montaigne, the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart complains:

"To Montaigne's

merits, indeed, as a lively and amusing essayist, ample justice has been done;
but his influence on the subsequent habits of thinking, among his countrymen,
remains still to be illustrated."l

In the same edition, in Hazlitt's short

"Life of Montaigne lt he writes of the essays that "edition after edition was
called for, and the Essays of Montaigne were to be found on the table of every
gentleman in France that could read aught beyond his other breviary, and, ere
long, became known, by the medium of translations, in Italy, England, and
other countries. tt2

Montaigne, then, whose Essais were widely read and fre-

quently reprinted, was the great popularizer of scepticism, and Popkin argues

~ontaigne, p. xxxviii.
2

.!lli.,

p. xv.

11
that it was through Montaigne that "Renaissance scepticism became crucial in
the formation of modern philosophy, contrary to the view that it was only a
transitional moment in the history of thought."l

The importance of Montaigne

in the dissemination of Pyrrhonistic scepticism can hardly be exaggerated.
Scepticism became a leading philosophical movement only after the publication
of Sextus's works and their adaptation by Montaigne, his disciples, and the
thinkers he influenced.
Descartes
A leading figure in modern philosophy's quest for certainty who was
influenced by Montaigne and by Montaigne's disciple Pierre Charron is Rene
Descartes (1596-1650).

Montaigne presented the problem, Descartes proposed an

Descartes did not doubt in order to suspend judgment; he doubted in

answer.

order to achieve certainty.

Ironically, the very propositions Descartes set

forth to refute scepticism have been interpreted by some as offering the most
irrefutable substantiation of it, and the greatest opponent of scepticism has
been called sceptigue malgre

191.

Descartes proposed a method of universal doubt--doubt of everything
until everything was stripped away but that which could not be doubted, his
cosito

ergo~.

Many of his doubts were but a reiteration of former ones,

doubt of the reliability of the senses, difficulty of distinguishing real
experience from dream experience (previously suggested by Montaigne), but his
original and, as some view it,
1

Popkin, p. 43.

2

Ibid., see p. 190 f.

2

his most disastrous hypothesis was the demon

12
hypothesis found in the first Meditation:
I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the
fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who 1s at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I
will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, figures, sounds,
and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams,
by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity.l
Descartes' method, if not Descartes, does, however, question the
notion of a benevolent or "sovereignly good" God, a question that Melville was
to turn into a tenacious inquisition.

Descartes writes:

If • • • it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me
subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to
his goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is
clear that this is permitted. 2
And in Meditation IV Descartes discusses the possibility of God being the
deceiver.

The created knowing subject and the created knowable object had

been questioned previously, but in challenging the Creator Himself by asking,
in effect, "Is God the Devi!?" the ultimate sceptical query had been put.
Descartes seems to have answered these difficulties to his own satisfaction,
but whatever his intentions were, he bequeathed to a great part of posterity
only a legacy of irrevocable doubt in everything but his cosito

ergo~,

tbe

basis for modern traumas of alienation and isolation, the lonely, solipsistic
realization of only one's own existence--and tbis existence without apparent
meaning.
~.

Hume, bowever, was to cast serious doubts even on the cosito ergo

Actually, Descartes doubted less than his theoretical universal doubt

would imply:

be trusted and used reason.

1

If his own theory is used against

,
Rane Descartes, The Method. Meditations, and Selections from the
Principles of Descartes, trans. John Veitch (9th ed.; Edinburgh and London:
William Blackwood and Sons, 1887), pp. 102-103.
2

~.,

p. 101.

13
him, however, it may be &sserted that this universal doubt should embrace
reason, and, therefore, be can no longer reason to anything, for to do so
would be to beg the question by assuming the validity of reason before proving
it and being unable to prove it without reasoning.

Further, Descartes' theory

of clear and distinct ideas cannot help him to truth:

because meaning lies

in relationship, Descartes' ideas remain meaningless, since he cannot relate
them to actually existing external objects.

Although resolved personally,

Descartes' most devastating question, reiterated by Pierre Bayle and seriously
considered by Melville, was that concerning a deceptive Deity.

The acceptance

of the idea of a deceiving Deity leaves the epistemological case of the universe in a complete cosmic bind.
Sir Thomas Browne
Before considering two additional French sceptics, chronology demands
a departure from the first four--Rabe1ai8, Calvin, Montaigne, and Descartes-for a trip across the channel to England and the English Anglican doctor Sir
Thomas Browne (1605-1682), whose fideistic and sceptic writings emit a
strange mixture of certitude and doubt.

Although anti-rationalistic scepti-

ciam led many Frenchmen into a position of fideism, the English Anglican
Church, as Louis I.Bredvold observes, was not easily given to this position,
since it was, in fact, becoming more and more rationalistic at this time:

to

find Browne writing on the subject of Christian scepticism is therefore an
occasion for surprise. ttl

1Louis I. Bredvold, "Chapter II: The Traditions of Skepticism," The
Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden: Studies in Seae Aapects of SeventeenthCentury Thought (3rd printing of Ann Arbor Paperback; Ann Arbor: The Oniverste,
of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 40.
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For some time, there was thought to be a direct indebtedness to Montaigne in Browne's writings; Simon Wilkin, Browne's editor, quotes Mr. Keck's
comment on a passage from "Religio Medici":

"I cannot think but, in this ex-

pression, the author had respect to that of that excellent French writer,
Monsieur Montai8ne, in whom I often trace him. ,,1 Wilkin, however, offers
evidence to the contrary in a statement written by Browne himself.
In a piece of mine, published long ago, the learned annotator hath
parallelled many passages with others in Montai8ne's Essays; whereas,
to deal clearly, when I penned that piece I had never read these
leaves in that author, and scarce any more ever since. 2
If we waive the possibility of mendacity on the part of the good doctor, the
parallels may be explained by a common source:

Browne, like Montaigne, knew

his Sextus Empiricus, whose works he owned in the 1621 folio. 3 As scattered
entries in the catalogue show, Browne owned several other books connected
with sceptical thought, works by Diogene. Laertius, Cicero, Descartes
(several volumes), Hobbes, Herbert of Cherbury, and Pascal.

There is also the

possibility of indirect indebtedness to Montaigne through his disciple Pierre
Charron (1541-1603), since one of the Brownes, father or son. owned the
English translation by Samson Lennard of Charron's Of Wisdom; unfortunately,
no date is 8iven for this entry in the catalogus, so it is not possible to tell
if it might have been an early influence on Browne's writing.

The works of

lSir Thomas Browne's Works: Includins His Life and Correspondence,
ed. Simon Wilkin (4 vols.; London: William Pickering, 1835-1836), II, 8-9.
2

ill!t., II. 10.

3CataloBue of the Libraries of the Learned Sir Thomas Brown and Dr.
Edward Brown. His Son (ri1m copy, nesative. from the original in the British
Museum, of the sales catalogue for the auction of the Brownes' libraries;
London: Thomas Ballard, 1710), p. 7, No. 62.
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Browne give evidence of the growing cosmopolitan dimensions of scepticism.
Pascal
In France, at this time, a new element in sceptical thought may be
traced:

in place of the suave scepticism of Montaigne and the undaunted quest

for certainty in Descartes, there appears the chafed and agitated scepticism
of Pascal.

Montaigne worked upon Pascal as a powerful provocative; in fact,

Montaigne must be credited for inspiring--perhaps "incitingft--many of the
Pensees:

besides some fifteen direct mentions of Montaigne in the Pensees,

close to seventy borrowings or close parallels have been traced. l

E.

w.

Patchett has remarked that "the sceptical arguments taken over from Montaigne
• • • [are) so numerous that a running commentary on the Pensees reads almost
like a re-edition of the Essais in many parts.,,2

Pascal reacted strongly

against what he called Montaigne's "rather free and licentious opinions on
some relations of life" and his suggested "indifference about sa1vation,,,3
but he shared the realization of the quandary of doubt.

In an anguished con-

sideration of man's uncertain state, Pascal wrote of the misery of man without
God and, accordingly, found his own greatest consolation in his faith.
Bayle
'The scepticism that had been a "soft pillow of doubt" for Montaigne
1

I

See, e.g., notes to the Pensees, trans. W. F. Trotter (New York:
E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc •• 1931). This edition is the reference for those
Pensees noted by number throughout this study.
2

E. W. Patchett, "Pascal and Scepticism," in Speculum Re1isdon1s:
Being Essays and Studies in Religion and Literature from Plato to Von HUgel
(Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1929), p. 153.
3
/
Pensees, 63.

16
became a bed of briars for Pascal and finally agitated the almost militant
reaction of Pierre Bayle '(1647-1106) and the Scottish philosopher whom he
profoundly influenced--David Hurne (1711-1776).
to Hontaigne:

Bayle's scepticism owes much

in the "Preface to the first French Edition" of his DictionarY,

Bayle felt obUged to prepare his more "Grave and Severe" readers for his
citations from Montaigne.

1

In Bayle and Hume, scepticism began to be drawn

out to its full implications; although both Bayle and Hume were reacting
against Calvinism, their scepticism was not so much aimed, as it was in the
earlier reformation dispute, at one or the other sect of Christianity, but,
at least through implication, at Christianity itself with its claims of
rational proof for the existence of God, its concepts of revelation, providence, and a benevolent God.

Many of the earlier sceptics, in their doubt,

were willing to give God the benefit of the doubt, but Bayle and Hume in their
sceptical arguments, admittedly probable though they were, because of the
presence of the power of evil in the world, came to have a less exalted image
of God and moved from the negatively insinuative arguments of Bayle to the
philosophically structured indifference of Hume.
Pierre Bayle remains a slippery writer:

even philosophers like James

Collins, who predominantly tend to regard Bayle as a sceptical fideist,
note that Bayle 1s sometimes otherwise interpreted.

2

Collins explains that:

To a Voltaire and a Diderot, fideism could not be a seriously held
position; it was only a convenient dodge in the game with the censor

~ierre Bayle t An Historical and C.ri tical Dictionary (4 vols.;
London: Printed for C. Harper, [etc.], 1710), no page number.
2

God in Modern PhilosophI (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959). p.

133.

make
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and the consistory.1 Hence they took a purely ironical view of Bayle's
frequent juxtaposition of the critical findings of reason and the nonrational certitudes of faith. 2
Collins goes on to explain, however, that "to a man nour:1.shed on Hontaigne,
alarron, and the Calvinistic divines, supernatural faith could well remain
intact amidst the destructions wrought by a critical reason";

3

if Bayle was

a f1deist, and, because of his final sceptical position of not knowing, he
could sustain his fideism against a conflicting--but limited--reason, the
point still to be made is that the "destructions wrought by a critical
reason" became more virulent.

Bayle's faith was, indeed, Bayle's faith:

a

subjective faith, it stood, if such it did, without his acceptance of any
objectively organized philosophical or theological structure; rather, Bayle
encouraged the antagonistic combat between faith and reason.

Bayle, in fact,

seemed to nourish the prospective undertakers of his own faith; by placing
faith in an anti-rationalistic position and divorcing ethics, as he does,
from religion, there is precious little left for faith:

man's manner of know-

ing and acting are peculiarly his own, springing from his human nature, a
nature that strives toward ultimate unity through the perception of relationships and therefore meaning, but by making faith not only unrelated to but
unreconcilable with, disparate, and antagonistic to reason, Bayle, in a certain
sense, renders faith not only above our nature, super-natural, but
1
Howard Robinson in Bayle the Sceptic (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1931), p. 200, shows that Rayle was arraigned before the Walloon
Consistory at Rotterdam where it was insisted that he not weaken the value
"of believing in a God, in Providence, and in the future life."
2

Colltns, p. 128.

3Ibid •
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contranatural.
Disturbed by the problems of predestination. Bayle, reacting against
Calvinism like Hume--and like Melville--does not argue in a Christian context
that man has sinned and needs a redeemer--Chr1st, but that man is sinned
against by God (whether Bayle's Manichean God of Evil or a unique supreme God
is not altogether clear), a God who has placed man in his impossible human
predicament.

Bayle asks:

"Why then does he [St. Basil] say so coldly, That

we must not search for Evil but in the Soul of Man?
A few pages later Bayle recalls the statement that

But who put it there?"l
'~en

are wicked, and that

God is Good; which gave Occasion to this other Question, How comes it that
God being Good, Men are wicked'l,,2
Bayle was not satisfied with the solution offered of the "giftt! of
free will:
For if a Goodness so bounded as that of Earthly Fathers does necessarily
require, that they should prevent 88 much as is possible, the bad use
their Children might make of the good Things they give them; much more
will an Infinite and AbRighty Goodness prevent the ill Effects of his
Gifts.)
In his article on the "Paulicians," Bayle again argues:
Those who say that God peraitted Sin. because he could not hinder it
without destroying Free-w1ll. which he had given to Man, and which was
the best Present he had made ht.. expose themselves very much. • • •
There is no good Mother who having given leave [freedom] to her Daughters
to go to a Ball, but would revoke that leave. if she were sure thft they
would yield to Enticement, and leave their Virginity behind them.
1Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2487.
2
)

Ibid. , p. 2498.

!l!!!. , III, 1152.

4

1!'!!!. , IV, 2488.
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To the argument that Adam's fall and the subsequent sins of man were permitted
and give occasion for God's justice and mercy to become manifest, Bayle
counters that "this is to compare the Deity to a Father who should·suffer his
Children to break their Legs on purpose to show to all the City his great Art
in setting their Broken Bones. tt 1
At the nub of Bayle's problem is the question of evil, physical as
well as moral:

as the Dictionary gives ample evidence, Bayle is at times

obsessed with "the Difficulties about the Origin of Evi1.,,2

Because evil

seems incompatible with the notion of a benevolent God, Bayle argues, at
least ostensibly, for the Manichean position of two necessary principles, one
good and one evi1--he asks:
Evil?

"If that only Principle be Good, whence comes

If it be Bad, whence comes Good?,,3 Bayle se..iugly endorses the idea

of this duality of principles in his argument against orthodox belief in one
God; he challenges the orthodox:
You must therefore say that God is the Author of the Devi1's Malice, that
he himself produced it such as it is, or sowed the Seeds of it in the
Soil that he created; which is a thousand times more dishonourab1e t~ God,
than to say that he is not the only necessary and independent Being.
On the question of evil, the likelihood that Bayle is an ironist and is
obliquely posing the possibility of a non-benevolent (one) God is, of course,
a probability and will be developed further in the next chapter on Melville's
knowledge of sceptic sources.
lIbido
2

~.,

3

~.,

4

III, 1167.
IV, 2794.

!lU:.t. p. 2493.
I

Further, writing on the mixture of 11fe's
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adversity and prosperity, Bayle says of the Hanichean hypothesis of a good
and evil principle:

"These are things which lead us to suppose, that the two

Principles made an Agreeaent which reciprocally limits their Operation. ,,1 In
these two last citations may be 8een the grounds for what Collins calls
"Bayle's famous dilemma that, in the face of evil, we must conclude either
that God is omnipotent and hence malevolent or e18e that He is benevolent
and hence limited in power.,,2

Either concept of God i8 far removed from the

traditional Christian view, and a subsequent question arises concerning the
sincerity of Bayle's positive claims for reve1ation--for what is the degree
of dependability, or how much credence should be placed in the revelation of
either a malevolent or a limited God?

In Bayle the Sceptic, Howard Robinson

shows in his eighth chapter, "The Dictionary--Mirac1es and the Bible," how
Bayle takes delight in covert gibes at discrepancies in the Biblical text, and
he claims that with Bayle only "lip service was paid to an inspired Bible. tt 3
When Bayle claims in "Explanation III, tf which follows the Dictionary. that
"the most precious faith is that which, on the divine testimony, embraces
the truths most opposed to reason," Collins comments:
Whether this declaration be taken ironically or fideistica11y, the
upshot is that on the prob1ea of evil and all other natural issues
involving God, the probabilities of rational argumentation will always
lean in the favor of unbe1ievers. 4
1Ibid., p. 2487.

Underlining mine.

2Co11ius. pp. 292-293.
3Robinson, p. 156.
4Co11ins, p. 131. The passage commented on by Collins he takes
from Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique (4 vo1s.; 3rd ed.; Rotterdam:
Bobm, 1720), IV, 3005.
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The point might be made that Bayle's rational dil...as do not matter
in the long run anyway, given Bayle's fideistic position; they aerely show to
what impossible ends the inextricable entanalements of reason lead and apotlight the fact that man should place his final confidence in faith alone.
Such an answer would se.. fairly simple if Bayle hi.elf did not confuse the
issue by the tone, stress, and example of his writings-he writes:
You must necessarily make an Option betwixt Philosophy and the Gospel: If
you will belie"e nothing but what is e"ident and agreeable to COllllOD
Notions, choose Philosophy: If you'll be1ie"e the incoaprebensible Mysteries of Religion, taka Christianity and 1ea"e Phi10sopby; for to poss.ss
E"idence and Incomprebensibility together is a tbing impossib1e. 1
For one who advocates cboosing eitber evidence (phi1osopby and reason) or incoaprehensibi1ity (the gospel and faitb), the professedly fideistic Bayle's
ex..ple offers a strong case for the side of e"idence as against Christianity:
bis Dictionary piles authority upon autbority for different questions; he
laaents the fact that certain great philosopher. did not argue on a certain
side of a question, but without hesitation, be, Bayle, hastens to supply the
deficiency and argues at length "as they would have argued. "-But, then ..ain,
evidence, for Bayle, was a relati"e quality.

In the conundrum that is Bayle,

perhaps the safest conclusion, if not the most accurate, is that of Ludwig
'euerbach who states that Bayle is "in contradiction with himself" for accepting both subjecti"e faith and an antagonistic critical reason. 2 This critical
reasOD and specu1ati". sceptici.. challenged established noras and "iews of
Christianity and was apparently more widely adopted by Bayle's discipl.s than
1

Bayle, 1710 ed., in ''Explanation III" following Dictionary, IV,

!xxi.

2Co11ins is quoting. on p. 425, from Feuerbach's Pierre Bayle
(Slmatliche Werte [10 "018.; Leipzig: Wigand, 1844-1866], VI, 158-159).

22

his questionably-intentioned claims for revelation.
For those who see Bayle as a fideist--though still inimical to any
rationally supported faith--his manner of arguing in the same style as the
Calvinist divines, though to far different conclusions, merely exemplifies
his efforts to shaw the futility of such argumentation in establishing any
philosophical and theological defense of religious faith and the necessity of
accepting faith as faith.

For those who see Bayle as an ironist saying one

thing and showing another and giving only feigned deference to faith (perhaps
because of pressures from the consistory), while, at the same time, placing
faith in a ridiculous and untenable position, his arguments become particularly barbed and inimical to Christianity.

The present purpose is not to

solve the problem of Bayle's intentions, but to exemplify the fact that his
intentions are hard to solve; because they are, there is the possibility of
more than one reading; Collins and Robinson have been cited since they divergently stress the two--fideistic and ironistic--views of Bayle respectively.

More important to our purpose is the fact that, whether right or

wrong in his reading, MelVille, from the evidence of his works, and probably
frOlll a literary man!.s sensitiveness to nuances of rhetoric, most likely interpreted Bayle in the ironist view.

Though Bayle revelled in philosophizing, he was not a systematic
philosopher; many of hi. suggestive questionings, however, found their way
into a system when they were incorporated by David Hume.
was an ultra sceptic:

Logically, Hume

however, though Hume thought Pyrrhonism irrefutable,

he reasoned that man was psychologically unable to sustain such a complete
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scepticism--neither was it practical.

He therefore advocated a mitigated

scepticism in which men could believe, reason, and act, even though they could
never discover foundations for these actions.

He questioned the certitude

of the cognitive faculties and, failing to find a bridge from mental to extramental reality, he questioned the existence of the latter, and, by this doubting of the existence of the external world, cancelled (according to his own
limited system) the possibility of reasoning a posteriori to God's existence
or attributes.

Hume not only questioned the possibility of making any exis-

tential demonstration (demonstrative reasoning, for Hume, is nonexistentia1),
but he further questioned causal relationships, upon which proofs for the
existence of God are based:

Hume claims that because events are contiguous

a habit of association is set up, so that the mind has a compulsion when it
sees one thing to expect the other; nevertheless, necessitation is not in
things or events but in the habituated mind.

God becomes an unimportant

vague possibility; in his reaction to Calvinism and religious practices and
controls over reason and ethics, Hume not only removes God from the field of
demonstrable knowledge but, consequently, from the field of practical ethics
as well, since moral decisions can scarcely be influenced by a remote and
incomprehensible deity that might or might not exist.
Further, Hume--raising serious problems of personal identity--c1aims
that the mind is not a substance or organ that has ideas:

ideas, memories,

etc., are actually separate or occur in a series--they

the mind in

~

SO

much as there is one, but there is no entity of "mind" or soul sub-standing
thea.

The existence of an immaterial mind and, henee, of free will (matter

is determined--on1y the immaterial or spiritual can be "free") and an immortal
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soul are held in doubt.

Hume goes beyond questioning God's ways to man--the

very concepts of "God" and "man" come under scrutiny.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), like Descartes, rejected scepticism.
endeavored to describe the bounds of valid knowledge.

Be

Kant's failure to

provide the grounds for valid knowledge, however, inspired some readers to
see his philosophy as containing an implicit if wholly unintentional scepticiam.

""
Emile
Saisset, a contemporary of Melville's, has written of Kant:

Ce serait se former de Kant une idee fausse que de le confondre avec les
interpretes cons acres du scepticisme, les Pyrrhon, les Montaigne, les
Bayle. Si sa philosophie, prise a la riguer, recele le scepticisme, sa
grande ime en fut toujours exempte. Comme le dix-huitieme siecle, Kant
a una foi. l
Kant had faith; for some, unfortunately, he could not reconcile it with fact
nor could he prove a powerful enough antidote for the objections of a Bayle
and Hume.

It may be argued that Kant simply assumed in the second Critique

what he had shown to be undemonstrable in the first, i.e., any valid knowledge
on the three great problems of metaphysics:

God, freedom, and immortality.

Such a brief consideration of Kant as this, of course, does not give an
adequate idea of his intention nor of the complexity of his philosophy.

It

is all that seems justified in the present study, however, since Melville is
numbered among those who did not find a solution to their sceptical quandaries
in the system proposed by Kant.

In fact, contrary to Kant '. intention, his

answers, susceptible to rejection as they are, were capable, through their
1"Emile Edmond Saisset, La scepticisme: AEnesideme--Pasca1--Kant:
"
,
etudes pour servir a l'histoire critique du scepticisme ancien et mode me
(Paris: Didier et cie, 1865), p. 352.
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failure, of nurturing rather than alleviating the very problems they attempted
to solve--such seems to be Melville's case.
Melville's general affiliation with sceptic figures
Melville shared in all the accumulated intensity of the tide of scepticism.

Though he rejected the carefree scepticis. of Rabelais and admired, 1

but never quite attained, the serene scepticism of Montaigne, he shared their
doubt.

With Pascal, he felt the excoriating impact of scepticism and the

misery of man without God:

"Without a God, 'tis woet" 2 But Pascal, through

faith, was not "without God": Melville could place faith in no orthodox creed.
Melville was torn between the beauty of part of the Christian message and what
he felt to be Christianity's impracticability and even deception and came to
argue against Christianity and Christianity's God with the same inimical
scepticism as that of Bayle and Hume.

Finally, he numbered with those who

glimpsed the possibilities of a deeper despair following a ruptured hope in
the period's las t formidable contender against scepticism, Immanuel Kant.
Melville's despair, however, was not unremitting; he willed--as he wrote of
Hunilla in "The Encantadas"--a "hope against hope.,,3

~elville's admiration for the self-poised sceptic emanates from his
portrait of Rolfe in Clarel and from his praise for the attitude of such
minor but unforgettable figures as "the easy, indifferent Hautboy" in "The
Fiddler": "It was plain that while Hautboy saw the world pretty much as it
was, yet he did not theoretically espouse its bright side nor its dark side.
Rejecting all solutions, he but acknowledged facts"--quoted from Billy Budd
and Other Prose Pieces, pp. 222-223, of the Standard Edition.
2Herman Melville, Clarel: A Poem and Pilgrimage in the Holy Land,
ed. Walter E. Bezanson (New York: Hendricks House. Inc., 1960), Pt. IV,
canto xx, 1. 136. Bezanson's edition, used in this study, will hereafter
be cited as Clarel.
3The Piazza Tales, p. 226; from Rom. 4:18.
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Without in any way claiming to exhaust the question of sources and
influences, it is, nevertheless, significant to this brief history of scepticism to point out that Montaigne knew the works of Rabelais;l Descartes had
read Montaigne and his disciple Charron; Browne shared a common source with
Montaigne in Sextus Empiricus and may have been indirectly influenced by
Montaigne through Charron; Pascal knew Descartes and was profoundly influenced
by Montaigne; Bayle is familiar with Charron, Descartes, and Pascal and has
been called "the mouthpiece of Montaigne";
enced by Bayle and Montaigne:

2

Hume, in turn, was deeply influ-

in most matters "Hume was congenially minded

with Bayle, as with their common master, Montaigne,,;3 Kant's debt to Hume can
hardly be exaggerated--though he discovered the critical problem of epistemology, the problem of the conformity of thought and things, independently,
his later reading in Hume confirmed and strengthened the development of his
own thesis.

These relations are significant because they show the great

amount of philosophical inbreeding with a fairly consistent and common strain
being, in many casu,,: Montaigne.

Melville, too, was greatly influenced by

Montaigne, particularly Montaigne's Pyrrhonistic nApology for Raimood Sebond"
where most of the major critical problems that became those of subsequent
modern philosophers, and Melville's, are present, particularly the ontological problem--the problem of the nature of reality, and questions on God,
freedom, and immortality--all of which depend upon the fulcrum, for whatever

~ontaigne, Bk. I, chap. xxiv, p. 53 and Bk. II, chap. x, p. 187.
2

Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (New York: St.
Martins Press, 1960), p. 325.
3

!lli..,

p. 285.
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it proves to be, of the epistemological, critical problem of the conformity
between thought and things, man's ability, therefore, to know with certainty
things as they are, since man must reason from the known to the unknown.
This skeletal survey, cursory as it is, nevertbeless provides a
coherent backdrop against which to investigate Melville's knowledge of sceptic
sources.

CHAPTER 11

MRLVILLE'S KNOWLEDGE OF SCEPTIC SOURCES
"The truth is that we are all sons, grandsons,
or nephews or great-nephews of those who go
before us. No one is his own sire.--"
Letter to Duyckinck,
3 March 1849.
"Shakespeare had his fathers too"
Pierre.
Statement of problem
Certain strands of information about Melville's sceptic sources are
clearly defined; other facts, e.g., particular editions of books, remain
elusive, and in some cases it is not known whether Melville made the acquaintance of certain authors through primary or secondary sources, though textual
evidence establishes the acquaintance.
Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus
At some time during the year 1846 Melville's uncle Herman gave his
namesake a copy of Ephraim Chambers' two-volume Cyclopaedia: Or, an Universal
Dictionary of Arts and Sciences. l

If Melville cared to investigate, he

could have found articles on ttAcademicks," "Pyrrhonians," "Scepticism," and
"Scepticka"--articles in which the names of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus are
in evidence.

Melville met both Pyrrhonists and their philosophical tendencies

1 (London: Printed for James and John Knapton, [etc.), 1728).
28
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again with his 1848 acquisition of the works of Montaigne and in Bayle's
Dictionary, which he purchased in 1849.
borrowed the volume of

Fran~ois

After mid-February 1848,1 Melville

Rabelais's works which contained the sceptic

meanderings of the "Ephectic and Pyrrhonian Philosopher Trouillogan,,,2 and
he later found a sympathetic treatment of Pyrrho in the 1853 edition of
Diogenes Laertius' The Lives and 0Rinions of Eminent PhilosoRhers. 3
Pyrrho's name appears in proximity to Montaigne's in Mardi, where
Melville mentions "the sneer of Pyrrho" and names Plato as being of his
counsel. 4 As the over-all and final evidence of Mardi attests, Melville's
rejection of the "sneer" of Pyrrho, did not necessarily include a rejection
of Pyrrhonic doubt:

in Clarel, he also rejects those who, vaunting their

doubt, sneer, "mock," and "scorn" the Holy Sepulcher. but he adds:
But how of some which still deplore
Yet share the doubt?5
Further, Plato may not have been introduced to cancel the element of sceptic
doubt, since Chambers' CycloRaedia, though leaning toward the dogmatic interpretation of Plato, explains that

ua

great Controversy" raged among the

ancients themselves whether Plato was a sceptic or a dogmatist; 6 and Montaigne,

~erton M. Sealts, Jr., personal letter of 8 November 1965.
2

The Works of Francis Rabelais: Translated from the French: With
EKRlanatory Notes by Duchat. Ozell. and Others (4 vols.; London: John Russell
Smith and John Miller, 1844), III, Bk. III, chap. xxxvi, SO.
3

Trans. C. D. Yonge (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853).

4

Mardi. II. chap. xv, 54.

SClarel, Pt. I, canto iii, 11. 153-166. The writings of Melville's
middle, darker period are not without their gibes, however.
6

Chambers, II, 31.

30

in his "Apology," says:
88

"Some have looked upon Plato aa a dogmatist, others

a doubter, other. in some things the one, and in other things the other •

• • • 'Tis said that ten several sects sprung from Plato."l Helville owned
both Chambers' Cyclopaedia and the works of Montaigne at the time he was
writing Mardi.
A few paragraphs beyond the reference to "the sneer of Pyrrho," and
probably with the thought still in mind, Melville has Media warn against the
"brutality of indiscriminate scepticism":

2

The term "scepticism," as briefly

explained in the opening chapter of this study, included several kinds of
scepticisms, and it had acquired pejorative overtones because of its
ciation not only with disbelief but with depravity.

89S0-

Because of his intense

moral preoccupation, Melville would have objected to the

sug~estion

of de-

pravity, but he would not have objected so much to the connotations of disbelief, since he himself felt he could not accept the Christian credenda--in
a large measure, in fact, he rejected organized Christianity because he
personally failed to see that it offered a realistic and practicable moral
code, more, that it could actually be a responsible cause leading toward depravity.

Like some sceptics before him, including Bayle, Melville questioned

Christianity on the compatibility of its moral creed with a moral life.
Literature of the period, while often predominantly defending religion, pointed up the "corrupting" influences of scepticism.

The American

Magazine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge in the glowing article on
"Locke and Newton" felt obliged in its peroration to admonish "the young to

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. '213.
~ardi, 11, chap. xvi, 57.
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avoid the corrupting speculations of illiterate skeptics • • • If who "would
deserve some credit, if they would inquire, with candid minds • • • into the
nature, character, and doctrines of our holy religion [which one is not
stated]; instead of perverting its obvious meaning."l

As a tangential obser-

vat ion , it may be wondered if such superficially hortative and unsubstantiated
writing of the period did not repel the masculinely robust and probing mind of
Melville and perhaps inadvertently increase his sceptical and argumentative
attitude.
There had also occurred between 1828-1831 a heated debate between the
editors (particularly Robert Dale Owen) of a New York weekly bearing the
sceptic title The Free Enquirer and their opponent William Gibbons.

In the

first number of The Free Enguirer, in an article called "Our Title," the
editors claim:

"It speaks of doubts and changes; it savors of infidelity and

independence.

It prognosticates hard questions and unwelcome discoveries; and

the orthodox and the loyal like it not." 2

The weekly ran favorable articles

on such topics as "Atheism" and "The Advantages of Scepticism" and wrote an
eloquent defense of the Devil; the article "On the Existence and Character of
Jesus of Nazareth" ends by questioning both, and the weekly includes such
1

(Boston: John L. Sibley and Benjamin H. Greene, 1837), 1, 366. For
other passages indicating period concepts of scepticism as anti-religious see
in this same source "lnfidel Philosophers," I, 464 and "Skepticism," 11, 127.
Although Hawthorne was editor of and contributed articles to the American
Magazine for six numbers beginning with the March, 1836 issue, none of the
articles opposed to scepticism are his.
2

R. L. Jennings, William OWen, Robert Dale Owen, and Frances Wright
(eds.), The Free Enquirer (weekly; 2nd series; 3 vols.; New York: Vol. I
Printed at the Office of the Free Enquirer, 1829; Vol. 11 Published by Wright
& OWen, 1830; Vol. 111 Printed at the Office of the Free Enquirer, 1831), 1,
6. Orestes A. Brownson was Corresponding Editor for several issues of the
second volume.
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deceptively entitled articles as "Of the Coldness and Heartlessness of Sceptidsm.," which is actually a defense of scepticism. and an accusation of Christianityas cold and heartless.

In "Bible Selections," Robert Dale Owen points

to the "cruel, obscene and im.m.oral stories in the Bible," and in an article
on "Byron's Cain" that would have interested Melville, if it ever came to his
attention, Owen sanctions the assertion that "the arguments against orthodoxy
are frankly acknowledged to be unanswerable," and ridicules "implicit faith."
The weekly dips into "moral heresy," as the editors call it, with their
attacks on religion and articles advocating divorce and free love--an article
on "Bonaparte and Josephine" appeared that was enough to set any Victorian's
teeth on edge, since alliances of mere affection (also changes of alliance
based on something of the psychology behind a Russian treaty) were condoned.
William Gibbons wrote a rebuttal, An Exposition of Modern Scepticism. in a
Letter, Addressed to the Editors of

t~e

Free Enquirer, in which he connects

sceptics with those who curse and deny God, and he shows the sceptic as a
"subverter of morals" and one who exalts "profligacy • • • and vice. ,,1
Gibbons further accuses the weekly of saying that God is full of m.alice, envy,
and hatred.

2

The issue of The Free Enguirer for 16 January 1830 contains a

rebuttal to the rebuttal and the argument continues for several issues.
Questions that arose during the weekly's publication and debate include the
problems of doubt, reliability of sense perceptions, possibility of an "unjust
Deity," supposed failures of revelation and orthodoxy, the nature of Providence,
1(3rd ed. corrected and enlarged; Wilmington, Del.: Printed and Sold
by R. Porter and Son, 1829), pp. 4-5. 7, 25.
2

Ibid., p. 27.
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questions of chance or design, freedom or necessity,
or annihilation, problems of morality--all issues wh
in Melville's works.
By the end of its first volume, .;:.Th.:;.;.e;:;...;F;;.;r:;.;e:;.;e::;...;;=-==.:::.
teen states and six agents in New York itself, and Gibbon's Exposition of
Modern Scepticism had gone into a third "corrected and enlarged" edition in
1829, all of which seems to indicate that the problems of scepticism, as well
as contemporary associations of scepticism with depravity, were not strictly
esoteric or relegated to the philosophy text of a verging Victorian and
vestigially Puritanic America, but found their way to a certain segment of the
popular, contemporary audience--especially in New York in the case of The Free
Enguirer.

On the question of scepticism leading to corruption, Melville con-

versely showed the possibility of Christianity becoming a vehicle for corruption, particularly in the cases of the often self-aggrandizing and hypocritical missionaries and ministers.
Melville, like Eaterson, rejected that type of scepticism found "where
there is depravityl1 and "a slaughter-house style of thinking. ,,1 but 11ke
Emerson in his appraisal of Montaigne, only tending to a darker view of existence than Emerson (the two compressed into one, in fact, might have made
the ideal sceptic), Melville was also deeply impressed by the cogency of the
sceptic's pendulous position in a consciously cultivated state of equipollence.
By the time of Moby-Dick, Pyrrho is even forgiven his sneer, or
1

"On Immorta11 ty. II The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, with
a biographical introduction and notes by Edward Waldo Emerson, and a general
index (Centenary Edition; 12 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Printed at the Riverside Press, 1903-1904), VIII, 332.
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perhaps it recedes to the background in favor of his ponderous and "deep
thoughts":
And I am convinced that from the heads of all ponderous profound beings,
such as Plato, Pyrrho, the Devil, Jupiter, Dante, and 80 on, there always goes up a certain semi-visible steam, while in the act of thinking
deep thoughts. 1
Finally, in Clare1, for what weight of significance it may have, Rolfe, whom
Bezanson calls the "best-rounded temper_ent of the group" and in whom he
sees a general parallel to Melville, even a "self-projection, ,,2 is called a
"Pyrrhonist.,,3
But Melville, in all probability, did not resort to the stark, bare
bones of the Greek Bypotyposes or Outlines of Scepticism, but obtained his
classic scepticism fleshed out in the "roast-beef done rare" adaptation of
the French sceptics, labelais, Montaigne, and Bayle, and Swigged it down in
the subtle English ale of the sonorous Sir Thomas Browne, Knight.
labe1ais
Melville may well have approached Rabe1ais in a spirit of social selfdefense, in an effort to be as knowledgeable as the literary "in-groups," the
Knickerbocker set and their ilk:

Perry Miller takes as much delight in ex-

plaining New York's mid-nineteenth-century contemporary notions of
"labelaisian"--"an adjective which they [New Yorkers] took particular pride

~ObY-Dick, II, chap. lxxxv, 116.
2Clarel, pp. 545, lxxxvii, !xxxiv respectively.
3Ibid., Pt. II, canto xxi, 1. 32.
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in applying to themselves, in order to prove (most of all when they had come
originally from New England) that they were not Bostonian prudes"l--as New
Yorkers did in appraising themselves such.

Whatever hi. reasons, Melville

borrowed from Evert Duyckinck in January or February of 1848 t volume II of
Rabelais's Works, and sometime after mid-February 1848 he returned for volumes
III and IV.

The exact edition is not known, although Sealts gives as a

queried entry the London edition of 1844 which is being used in this study.2
If Whitney Hastings Wells is correct in his assumption that Melville knew
Book I, chapter x of the Works, "Of That Which is Signified by the Colours
White and Blue, ,,3 then Melville was fai1iar with the first volume as well.
Rabelais seems to have functioned in complicity with other sources of
the late 1840's to help Melville toward some kind of "artistic liberation,"
and Merrell R. Davis haa shown how Melville turned to Rabe1ais for the framework of his travelogue-satire in Mardi as well as for devices of burlesque of
legal documents and gatherings of odd curios, books, and manuscripts of a
misplaced antiquarianism.

Mr. Davis also suggests that the numerous refer-

ences to devils in Rabelais may have inspired the invisible spirits described
lThe Raven and the Whale: The War of Words and Wits in the Era of
Poe and Melville (A Harvest Book Paperback; New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc., 1956), p. 17.

~erton M. Sea1ts, Jr., '~e1vi11e's Reading: A Check-List of Books
Owned and Borrowed," Harvard Library Bulletin, II (Spring, 1948), 141-163;
II (Autumn, 1948), 378-392; III (Winter, 1949), 119-130; III (Spring, 1949),
268-277; III (Autumn, 1949), 407-421; IV (Winter, 1950), 98-109; '~e1vi11e's
Reading: A Supplementary List of Books Owned and Borrowed," !!!&, VI (Spring,
1952), 239-247. No. 417.
3

''Moby Dick and Rabelais," !:!y!, XXXVIII (February, 1923), 123.
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in Mardi.

1

Most often, it is the jovial, wine-advocating, "Drink-with-unbuttonedbellies" Rabelai. that comes to Melville' s mind:
"shake sides with fat Rabelais";

2

in heaven, Dante will

in his full-moon madne.s Babbalanja declares:

"All sages have laughed,-let us; Bardiaua laughed,--let us; Daorkriti
laughed,--let us; Amoree laughed,--let us; Rabeelee roared,--let us,,;3 in
addition to borrowing one of the extracts in MobY-Dick from Rabelais's Book
IV, chapter xxxiii, Melville mentions hta again when he later rejects the
passing wisdOll of "jolly" Rabelais for that of .olean and "unchristian Solo.on's wisdom"; 4 again from Rabelais, the inscription "In wine, truth"

OIl

the portal of the temple of the holy bottle appears in the confidence-aan's
If

In vino veritas,,,5_-the Latin version being given in the notes to the 1844
6

edition --and the bachelor later affirms that "Rabelais '. pro-vine Koran [is]
no more trustworthy than MahOllet's anti-wine one.,,7 Finally trustworthy or
not, however, wine becomes symbolically c01l1lected with truth throughout l!!!.
Confidence-Man:

when the aerchant gives his dicttD on the "cold cave of

~rrell R. Davis, Melville's Mardi: A Chartless Voyage (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 76-77, 153-154, 167 n. 4.

~rdi, I, chap. iii, 14.
3~•• II, chap. lxxix, 350.

~obY-DiCk, II, chap. xcvi, 182.
5The Confidence-Msn, chap. xi:l1, p. 87.
6I.abelai•• III, 166. The "Explanatory Remarks" in IV, 122 likewise
aaintain that "the Greek text of the New Test_ent • • • gives the n_e of
wine to truth."
7Tbe Confidence-Man. chap. xxiv, p. 181.
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truth," it is only after several gluses of "wine seemed to shoot to his heart,
and begin sooth-saying there,,;l and u

long as the two confidence-men, the

boon companions "Prank" and "Charlie," abstain from drinking their wine, they
are able to maintain their reciprocated prevarication. 2
Even more significant than examples of form and literary device was
Rabelais's presentation, through the pilgrimage to the oracle, of an ineffectual search for final and absolute truth.

Despite sOlIe slighting allusions,

Melville never completely rejected the lusty humor of Rabelais, and the
Prencluaan's racy bawdiness is present in his own covert "Rabelaisiani_s, "-and his not so covert ones over a glus of good port vith a friend 3--but
such humor was outweighed When he caae to consider seriously man's existential dilemma, and Melville's predOlllinant, if not sole, attitude toward life was

"Man,' poor player,' succeeds better in life' s tragedy than comedy. ,,4

traaic:
Montaiee

DefeBae of the importance of Montai8ne's sceptical influenca.-Melville' s readina vaa of a "varied scope • • • randOlllly acquired"; 5 as this
study attempts to show by the inclusion of several names connected with his
1

~.,

chap. xiii, p. 87.

2

lk!!t., chap. xxix, p. 214ft.

3In The Raven and the Whale, p. 18, e.g., Miller quotes a New
Orleans reporter who describes an evenina at the hOllle of Dr. Prancis in
l8S0: after paying proper attention to the Doctor, Tuckerman, Grisvold,
and n,ayckinck, in that order, he remarks: ''Melville (when in town) is
taciturn, but genial, and when wamed-up, capitally racy and pungent."
4

Israel Potter, chap. xxv, p. 212.

SAa Melville says of his hero in Pierre, Ik. XXI, chap. i, p. 394.
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penchant for sceptical thought, it would be a narrow and falsifying perspective to isolate a sole source; nevertheless, if it is a question of stress,
Michel de Montaigne, whose works Melville valued enough to purchase for himself, aay well be one of the aost significant sources of influence both
directly and indirectly (certainly through Bayle) on Melville's sceptical
thought.

This influence began early and is evident in the scepticism of

Mardi, where Montaigne is first aentioned.

In the index to Mr. Lawrance

Thompson's Melville's Quarrel with God there appears an entry referring to
"1:JM's Changing Responses To" Montaigne, which reads:

Itln Mardi, St. Paul

represented as overcoming doubts raised in BM's aind by Montaigne. 1t 1 This
interpretation is, however. an apparent misreading of the brief statement in
Mardi:

"I list to St. Paul who argues the doubts of Montaigne."

2

Thompson

evidently interprets the aeaning as "argues against U ; a reading of the
"Apology," however, reveals the aeaning as "argues for" or "along with."

Of

the some fourteen references from St. Paul throughout the Essays, ten are in
the "Apology"; of the remaining four, only one pertains to doubt and it substantiates a sceptical position:

"The Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise,

that they are vain ... 3 In the "Apology," which Melville seems certainly to have
been reading during the writing of Mardi, there appears the Pauline text which,
4
as Popkin observes, was to be the favorite Scriptural text of the nouveaux
l(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 468.

~rdi, II, chap. xv, 54.
31 Cor. 3:20 as quoted in Montaigne, Bk. III, chap. ix, p. 458.
4

Popkin, p. 48.
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E.xrrhoniens:
I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the
understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe?
Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the
wisdom of this world? For after tha~, in the wisdom of God, the world
knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save
them that believe. l
Mr. Thompson recognizes Montaigne's presiding eletaent of doubt but seemingly
misinterprets the use of Pauline texts to confirm that scepticism and, therefore, downplays ita probable tmpact on Melville, who vas exquisitely sensitive
to darkly ambiguous passages from Scripture.
Another work, however, seems to have completely missed the prevalence
of Montaigne t S Pyrrhonistic sceptici.. , much of which was tran81llitted to
Melville:

the Mansfield-Vincent edition of Moby-Dlck offers selected quota-

tiona to show that Montaigne ''made numerous disparaging comments on him
[Pyrrho] and his followers, particularly in Book 2, chap. 12, 'An Apologie of
RaY!lond Sebond. II.

2

In the Mansfield-Vincent note preceding the above cita-

tion Pyrrho is described as a "Greek philosopher • • • who maintained the
impossibility of knowing things in their own nature"--this is, however, the
11 Cor. 1:19 as quoted in Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 230. Other
anti-rational texts in the "Apology" borrowed by Montaigne from Paul are
Col. 2:8:
'That our wisdom is but folly in the sight of God: that the vainest of
all vanities is man: that the man who presumes upon his wisdom does not
yet know what wisdom is; and that man, vho is nothing, if he thinks
himself to be anything, does seduce and deceive htmselt' (Bk. II, chap.
xii, p. 205).
Rom. 1:22 "Men • • • professing themselves to be vise, they become fools"
(Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 245). Col. 2:8 and I Cor. 1:19 are again quoted in
the essay (Bk. II, chap. xii, pp. 224 and 257-258).
2"Explanatory Notes" to Melville's Moby-Dick or, the Whale, ed.
Luther S. Mansfield and Howard P. Vincent (New York: Hendricks House, 1952),
pp. 783-784. Hereafter cited as Hendricks House Moby-Dick.
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crux of the argument in the

II

Apology, tt the limi tation of man t s reason, man's

inability to "know what things truly are in themselves,,,l his inability to
communicate with being,

2

his incertitude about the congruity of "resemblances"

conveyed to the soul by the senses and the thing "resembled.,,3

This argument,

in turn, becomes the spinal column upon which all the "business" of the great
leviathan Moby-Dick converges--that the nature of the universe is problematic.
One of the so-called "disparaging comments" quoted in the Hendricks
House edition is the following:
The Philosopher Pyrrho being at Sea, and by reason of
in great danger of being cast away, presented nothing
with him in the ship, to imitate but the securitie of
aboard, who nothing at all dismaied, seemed to behold
tempest. 4

a violent storme
to those that were
an Hog which was
and outs tare the

The word "nothing" may be the misleading word in the above quotation; however,
sceptics advocated suspension of judgment, which was supposed to result in
serenity, imperturbability, or indifference and repose called by the sceptics

~taraxia:

when Pyrrho points out the calmness of the pig during a

raging storm, he is, in effect, giving the pig credit for having more wisdom
and dignity than man exhibits in his uncontrolled perturbation--an example of
animal sagacity which would have pleased Montaigne mightily, especially since
his lengthy comparison of man and animals, much to the detriment of mankind,
occurs in the same essay.
It is true, as Mansfield and Vincent quote, that Montaigne writes of

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 281.

2l.!?.!S.
3Ibid •
4Hendricks House Moby-Dick, pp. 783-784.
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the Pyrrhonians:

"The profession of the Phyrronians [s1c] is ever to waver,

to doubt and to enquire, never to be assured of any thing, not to take any
warrant of himse1f,,;1 taken out of context, this description lIlay be read as
a disparaging one; read in context, however, it implies something far different
for it is sanctioned by Montaigne and is a preparation for his condemnation of
an unwarranted dogmatic position.

Montaigne goes on to explain this wavering

and doubting as leading to a suspension of judgment and writes:
Is it not mueh better to suspend one's persuasion than to intermeddle
with these wrangling and seditious divisions: "What shall I choose?"
"What you please, provided you will choose. 1f A very foolish answer; but
such a one, nevertheless, as all dogmatism seems to point at, and by which
we are not permitted to be ignorant of what we are ignorant of.2
With that wonderful candor for which Melville praises Montaigne in B1lly Budd, 3
the Gascon argues against the arbitrary assumption of an "assured" position
when we are, in fact, ignorant.
Montaigne's Pyrrhonism is widely recognized and it may seem to be
laboring the obvious to argue further; yet, because this misunderstanding
occurs in a very significant piece of Melville scholarship,
1

~.,

4

it may not be out

p. 784.

~ontaigne. Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 232.
3Herman Melville, Billy Budd. Sailor (An Inside Narrative), reading
text and genetic text, edited from the manuscript with introduction and notes
by Harrison Hayford and Merton Sealts, Jr., (2nd impression; Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1963), leaf 83, [po 62]. Hereafter cited as
Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts.
4The one difference treated here is not meant to detract from the
over-all value of the Mansfield-Vincent edition--neither, of course, is it
meant to depreciate in toto Mr. Lawrence Thompson's study. Mr. Thompson's
rhetoric has sparke~O;;-Combative reactions because of its note of condescension to the reader of Melville; nevertheless, with a daring thesis,
he had the courage to lay his brains on the line.
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of place to offer these more obvious affirmative passages on Pyrrho and
Pyrrhonism from the "Apology." Montaigne writes of Pyrrho:
He would never make hiluself a stock or a stone, he would show himself
a living man, discoursing, reasoning, enjoying all reasonable conveniences and pleasures, employing and making use of all his corporal and
spiritual faculties in rule and reason. The fantastic, imaginary, and
false privileges that man had usurped of lording it, ordaining, and
establishing, he has utterly quitted and renounced. l
Montaigne says of Pyrrhonism:

"There is nothing in human invention that

carries so great a show of likelihood and utility as this, .. 2 and in a canparison of the Academics and Pyrrhonians, he writes that Itthe Pyrrhonian opinion
is more bold, and also somewhat more likely"3_-he then continues his description of the human situation in Pyrrhonian terms.
taigne asserts that the idea of the Pyrrhonians is
by interrogation:

Earlier in the essay, Mon'~ore

certainly understood

'What do I know?' as 1 bear it, with the emblem of a

balance,,4-by declaring that the question "What do I know," Montaigne's
famous Que

s~ay-je?,

is the motto that he bears inscribed over a pair of

scales, Montaigne reveals his own Pyrrhonistic position.

Numerous other

Pyrrhonian expressions were inscribed on the ceiling of his library.

Although

recent scholarship seeks psychological and moral convictions in the last book
of Montaigne's essays, centuries of readers found the epitome of Montaigne'.
thought in the question which forms the heart of the "Apology," his Que

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 232.
2

.lli.!!.,

3

~.,

4

.lli.!!. t

p. 233.
p. 262.
p. 244.
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s!jay-je.f.-"What do I know?"

Melville asks:

"What may man know?"l Montaigne

claims that the idea of the Pyrrhonian position is best understood by interrogation. and the question becomes a pervasive form for Melville's consideration of terminal realities.
Possible factors contributing to ltelville's interest in Montaigne.-It is probably not possible to pinpoint the exact circumstances that instigated Melville's interest in acquiring and studying the works of Montaigne,
although several possibilities present themselves.

In Boston, 1 January 1846,

Ralph Waldo Emerson gave the first reading of his lecture "Montaigne; Or,
The Skeptic."

Montaigne was an early and persistent favorite with Emerson

and received mention in his sceptically influenced essay "Experience," published in Essays, Second Series on October 19, 1844.

There is only a doubtful

but provocative possibility that Emerson might have led Melville to Montaigne,
for just how early and, if early, how deeply Melville was influenced by Emerson remains a moot question.

In the often quoted letter to Evert Duyckinck,

3 March 1849, Melville remarks:

"I had only glanced at a book of his

[Emerson's] onee in Putnam's store--that was all I knew of him, till I heard
him lecture.,,2

The ingenuousness of Melville's choice of "glanced" may enjoy

the latitude of his South Sea adventure claims, or, as he wrote to Hawthorne
of Solomon, he may have "a little managed the truth,") or, again, the remark
1

Clarel, Pt. IV, canto iii, 1. 109.

2

The Letters of Herman Melville, ed. :r-ferrell R. Davis and William H.
Gilman (3rd printing; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 79. Hereafter cited as Letters. Melville attended Freeman Place Chapel on Beacon
Street on 5 February 1849 to hear one of Emerson's five lectures on '~ind
and Manners in the Nineteenth Century."
)

~.,

p. 130.
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may be one of .t.ple truth.Sealt.' check-li.t of Melville'. reading .how.
the acqui.ition of Emerson'. The Conduct of Life in 1870, the E•• ays, first
and second series, in 1862, and the Poem. in 1859. 1 Internal evidence in ~
Confidence-Man (1857) and in Pierre (1852) and in some of the short stories
places the acquaintance even earlier. and Eleanor Melville Metcalf establishes, through a letter of Hrs. Nathaniel Hawthorne, that Melville read
Emerson's essays in 1850;2 finally, Perry Miller pushes the relationship even
further back by seeiug evidences of transcendentalism in Mardi (1849)-Miller .ay.:

"Clearly Melville must have read much of Emerson, if only in

Putn.. •• store, during these crucial years.,,3

The tendencies of transcenden-

talism were not unknown to New York literary circle., however, and Melville
could have easily gleaned second hand accounts of Emerson's lectures and
essay..

Further, .imilarities between Emer.on and Melville might well hinge

on the fact that both had many .ources in common.
In hi. lecture on Montaiane, Emer.on said:

"I heard with pleasure

that one of the newly-discovered autographs of William Shakespeare was in a
copy of Florio's translation of Montaigne."

4

While vi.iting the library of

1

Sealts, No•• 203, 204, 205, 206.

2

Eleanor Melville Metcalf, Herman Melville: Cycle and Epicycle.
(Cambridge, M.... : Harvard University Pres., 1953). p. 91.
3Perry Hiller, '~elville and Tran.cendentalism," in Moby-Dick
Centenaial Essals. edited for the Melville Society with an introduction by
Tyrua Billway and Luther S. Mansfield (Dallas: Southern Methodi.t Univer.ity
Pre8s, 1953). p. 146.
4
Works, IV, 163.

45
the British Museum in London in 1849. Melville saw this autograph and records
the fact in his Journal. l

Whether Melville knew Emerson's lecture or not, the

statement is important in establishing contemporary awareness of the connection between Montaigne and Shakespeare and a question arises concerning the
importance of Helville's own association of the two--is it, for example, mere
coincidence that Melville bought his Shakespeare and Hontaigne at the same
time?2

Melville's cognizance of the connection became particularized when he

marked, in Hamlet II: ii, the prince's speech, "Why, then 'tis none to you;
for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it
a prison," and comments:
Hamlet.")

80;

to me it is

"Here is forcibly shown the great Montaignism of

Sceptical implications, the subjective relativeness and variability

of human opinion, are evident in the passage.

The scepticism of Hamlet, with

its darkly doubting, questioning, Renaissance prince, had a profound effect
on Melville, and it usually heads his list of tragic characters and plays that
show Shakespeare in his "grandest conceits" and as tithe profoundest of thinkers.,,4

It is Hamlet, Timon. Lear, and Iago who say what is "so terrifically

true"i 5 it is the "deeper significances of its pervading indefiniteness" that
1

Journal of a Visit to London and the Continent by Herman Melville,
1849-1850, ed. Eleanor Melville Metcalf (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1948), p. 51. Hereafter cited as Journal--London and the Continent.
2

Sealts, No. 366.

3Jay Leyda, The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman Melville,
1819-1891 (2 vols.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1951), I, 288-291.
Hereafter cited as I.og.
4The quotations are from p. 126 of the first installment of Melville's
"Hawthorne and His Mosses,tt The Literary World, VII (August 17, 1850), 125127; (August 24, 1850), 145-147.
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makes the narrator apply Hamlet to Pierre's situation;

I

and when Melville

writes in "The Coming Storm,"
No utter surprise can come to him
Who reaches Shakespeare's core;
That which we seek and shun is there-Man's final lore-the one who is not surprised is described as the one who has "Hamlet in his
heart. tt2
A selection from the Westminster Review in the tlCritical Opinions"
section of the edition of Montaigne's works which Melville purchased discusses
the Shakespeare-Montaigne relationship; though the review calls attention to
the chronological problem in the question of the possible influence of Montaigne on Hamlet, analogies are drawn:
On the whole, the celebrated soliloquy in "Hamlei'presents a more characteristic and expressive resemblance to much of Montaigne's writings than
any other portion of the plays of the great dramatist which we at present
remember; though it would doubtless be easy to trace many apparent transferences from the Frenchman into the Englishman's works, as both were
keen and many-sided observers in the same age, and neighbouring countries.
But ftHamlet" was in these days no popular type of character; nor were
Montaigne's views and tone familiar to men till he had himself made them
so. Now the Prince of Denmark is very nearly a Montaigne, lifted to a
higher eminence, and agitated by more striking circumstances and a severer
destiny, and altogether a somewhat more passionate structure of man. 3
In Pierre, the narrator relates the tragic story of the Egyptian Memnon (who
serves as an analogue for Pierre himself) and the story is called the
''R_Ietism of the antique world"; in a following observation, Melville shows
1

Pierre, Bk. IX, chap. iii, p. 236.

2Collected Poems of Herman Melville, ad. Howsrd P. Vincent (Hendricks
House edition; Chicago: Packard & Co., 1947), p. 94. Hereafter cited as
Collected Poems.
1Montaigne, p. xli.
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how important he felt the connection to be between Shakespeare and Montaigne:
"The English tragedy [Hamlet] is but Egyptian Memnon, Montaignised and
modernised; for being but a mortal man Shakespeare had his fathers too."l
Melville was probably led to a more serious study of Montaigne because of his
affinities to and probable influence on the works of Shakespeare, which Melville so much admired, particularly Hamlet, and the element of scepticism. in
this, the greatest of Shakespeare's tragedies, was to find its way into all
of Melville's tragedies as something more than a literary device to be objectively manipulated with undisturbed detachment--rather, because of Melville's own probing, there is a growing and perceptible integrity between
the artist and his artifact in the realization of the tragedy that William
Ellery Sedgwick came so aptly to title TIle Tragedy of Mind.
In addition to the possibility, direct or indirect, of Emerson leading Melville to Montaigne, there is the conjectural possibility of a latent
interest sown by the presence of "long rows of old books,

. . . [some] printed

in Paris. ,,2 which formed part of Allan Melville's library during Herman' 8
childhood.

Though Melville's father "spoke French like a native, ,,3 his son

did not know foreign languages, but the presence of these books may have
engendered a curiosity that would later burgeon into an active investigation
of a number of French writers, Montaigne among them.
1

Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. Vi, p. 191.

2

Redburn, chap. i, p. 6.

3"Herman Melville,1I Cyclopaedia of American Literature, ed. Evert

A. Duyckinck and George L. Duyckinck (2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner,
1856), II, 672. Hereafter cited as Duyckincks' Cyclopaedia.
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In New York, Melville also had contact with a number of leading
Francophiles, artists who probably could have spoken of the works of Montaigne
with familiarity.

Anne C. Lynch, the later Mrs. Botta, conducted one of New

York's leading salons--perhaps

~

leading salon 1--frequented by a motley

group of literati; in Charles Frederick Briggs' roman
Tom Pepper, which began serialization in the

~irr~

~

clef, The Trippings of

14 November 1846, Mel-

ville's friend Evert Duyckinck as Tibbings shares with Anne Lynch, euphoniously
named "Lizzy Gil," and certain other of the elect, including Poe, the honor
of special and, particularly in nuyckinck's case, satirical characterization:
at one point in the narrative Duyckinck is shown in shadow-like attendance
on Cornelius Mathews at one of "Lizzy Gil's" l'Iotrees. 2

Another obvious con-

nection between Duyckinck and Miss Lynch is her inclusion in the Duyckincks'
Cyclopaedia of American Literature.

3

Melville owned a copy of Tom Pepper

4

and, while Mardi was in the making, recorded evidence shows him in attendance
at least once at "Lizzy Gil's," the occasion being a Valentine party 14
February 1848 at which Bayard Taylor--another Francophile--read a verse honoring Melville. S Without belaboring the fact of numerous social interconnectiona of Francophiles relating to Melville during hf.B residence in New York,
1

See the contributory chapter tlHer Salon" by A. J. Bloor in Memoirs
of Anne C. L. Botta, ed. Vincenzo Botta (New.York: J. Selwin Tait & Sons,
1894), pp. 181-191.
2

See Miller's chapter on "Tom Pepper" in The Raven and the Whal.e,

pp. 168-185.

3"Anne Charlotte Rotta" in Duyckincks' ~'y'c.l..9..P!l~, II, 627-628.
4

Sealts. No. 86A.

S

Log, I, 272.
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1845-1850, suffice it to say that the suddenly sceptical current of Melville '.

thought, which mace its debut in Mardi, may owe a great deal to an unwritten
but social source which could ':lell have directed both the choice and interpretation of his

reading~

including

~1ontaigne,

at this time.

As a corroborative clue to the type of coterie mentality which may
have influenced Helville's interpretation of a predominantly French core of
sceptic writers, perhaps not enough attention has been given to Anne C. Lynch
Botta's Hand-Book of Universal Literature, which first appeared in 1860 and
which, by 1867, was in its seventh edition.

Helville and Duyckinck both

receive at least a passing nod in the Hand-Book.
Botta declares:

"This work was begun many years

1

In her "Preface." Mrs.
8~O,1I

2

that is. during those

years when, in addition to the compilation and summation of numerous earlier
literary sources, she was acquiring through a peculiarly keen feminine impressionability the various idealities, including those of a number of leading
Francophiles, which came to a confluence within the precincts of her own
parlor, and it is revealing to discover as a note of coherence

aJl10ng

the

various entries in her section devoted to French literature in the Hand-Book
a marked preoccupation with scepticism.

Certain

passa~es

of the

~and-Book

are relevant not only to the present consideration of Melville's reading of
Montaigne but point back to Rabelais and forward to Bayle.

After a cursory

treatment of Rabelais, Mrs. Botta continues:
Intellect continued to struggle with its fetters. Many, like Rabelais,
mistrusted the whole system of ecclesiastical polity established by law,
------------------------~-----------------------------------------------------

1

Anne C. Lynch Botta, Hand-Book £If Universal },iterature (7th ed.;
Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1867), pp. 538, 543.
2
..ill,g.., p. ii1.
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and yet did not pin their faith on the dictates of the austere Calvin.
The almost inevitable consequence was a wide and universal skepticism,
replacin~ the former implicit subjection to ROlllanism.
The most eminent type of this school was Montsigne [whom Botta declares
is considered the earliest philosophi.cal writer in French prone 1 (153.3-1592). who. in his ESBays. shook the foundations of all the creeds of his
day, ~.lithout offer:tnr: R.nyt.hi.nl! t" -:-epl::!cc thl?ln. 1
Mrs. BottA i.ncludes Rabelais anc1 l'-10,..!taigne, as l,rell as Descart0R A.nd Pascal,
under "PERI on

SECmm," or

the renaissauc.(> and p;olden age of 1"rench literature

(1500-1700), and :f.n "PERIOD THIRD," the literature of the

ilh€'

of the revolu-

tion and of the nineteenth century (1700-1859),9.fter having already designated the

bed_nnin~s

of scertid.sm in the second period, she labels the first

part of the third period tfTIlE DAWN OF SKEPTICISl-f" and begins l·d th a discussion of Pierre Bayle.

Her explanatory remarks indicate a distinction made

earlier between scepticism as a

philo~ophical

or epistemolor,ical stance still

not incongruous with but suhstantiatinp, fideism--i.e., distrust of reason
strengthening reliance on faith--and the later scepticism which Mrs. Botta,
follOtJing the more contemporary concept, identifies with di.sbelief:
On the other h;lnd, the dominant influences of the 18th century were a
skeptical philosophy [etc.] • • • • The transition, however, was not
sudden nor immediate, and we corne now to the consideration of those works
which occupy the midway position between the submissive age of Louis XIV"
and the darinr, infidelity and republicanism of the 18th century.2

A description follows of the "ne~y ~eneration," which includes Bayle:

A certain indifference to principle began to prevail; men ventured to
doubt opinions once unquestioned; the habit of jesting with everything,
and unblushing cynicism appeared almost under the eyes of aged Louis •
• • • The Protestants, [were] exiled by the Revocation of the Edict of
Nantes. • • •
Among these refugees was Bayle (1647-1706), the coolest and boldest
of doubters. He wrote boldly agains t the intolerance of Louis XIV.,
1

2

Ibid., pp. 267-268.
Ibid., p. 285.

51

and he affords the first announcement of the characteristics of the
century. His "Historical and Critical Dictionary," a vast magazine of
knowledge and incredulity, was calculated to supersede the necessity of
study to a lively and thoughtless age. His skepticism is learned and
philosophical, and he ridicules those who reject without exaaination
still more than those who believe with docile credu1ity.1
Mrs. Botta then proceeds to "THE PROGRESS OF SKEPTICISM," which includes a
discussion of Voltaire.
Melville's view of French sources may also have received direction
from Wiley and Putnam.

Melville's American publishers for Typee, of which

Evert Duyckinck oversaw the American edition, and joint financers with Appleton for the journal The Literary World, with Evert Duyckinck as first editor,
Wiley and Putnam, imported for those with Gallic reading interests a large
selection of French authors both in the original and in translation.

Among

the names appearing on the advertising pages of Tbe Literary World, some
frequently, are Rabelais, Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Bayle, Voltaire and
Volney (a sceptic of the Enlightenment mentioned in C1are1, Part II, canto
xvi, 11. 38-39).

Among influences leading Melville to the sources which

profoundly changed his course of thought and, consequently, of his writing,
Evert A. Duyckinck, editor for Wiley and Putnaa's "Library of Choice B.eading,"
is probably one of the strongest but also one of the most difficult to define,
since his influence was, to a great degree, social and oral.

Even before his

only recorded attendance at Anne Lynch's, Melville was foraging in Duyckinck's
basement library and borrowing volumes of Rabe1ais in which he found not only
the coarse, vigorous humor that Duyckinck with other New Yorkers so vastly
enjoyed, but, of more significance, the artistic presentation of an abortive
1

ill!.

I

p. 286.
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search for truth.

During this time Melville purchased hia copy of Montaigne

and, a little over a year later, wrote to Duyckinck about his purchase of
Bayle's Dictionary in a tone which seems to denote a common familiarity with
the work--Duyckinck owned a set of Bayle's Dictionary which Melville probably
used before his own purchase.
Though Thomas Browne, whose works Melville also borrowed from Duyckinck
in 1848 before he bought his own folio in 1849, is an English sceptic, it is
significant that he joins the triumvirate of Frenchmen at thia important
period of Melville's reading, a relatively short period from 1848 through
1849:

the inherent scepticism of these works, probably pointed out though

not necessarily sanctioned by Duyckinck,

1

may have been reinforced the fo11ow-

ing year, 1850-1851. in the quickening conversations between Melville and
Hawthorne--as Marion L. Kesselring observes:
Throughout 1829, 1830 and 1831, Hawthorne apparently planned a course in
French literature for himself. The names of Montaigne [etc.] ••• recur
in the Charge-Books, volumes from sets of their worka usually being taken
in numerical order even though several days intervened between entries. 2
Among the entries in Hawthorne's reading list are Montaigne's Essais (4
volumes; Paris, 1802). of which all four volumes were checked out one at a
time; Pascal's Oeuvres (5 volumes; La Haye, 1779)--volumes I and II checked
out; Bayle's Dictionary (5 volumes; London, 1734)--all five volumes of this
work, in translation, were checked out over a period of time; and the sceptical Voltaire's Oeuvres completea (92 volumes; Kehl, 1785-1789), of which
1

As Miller points out in The Raven and the Whale, Richard H. Dana
senior Itfelt he was talking to a kindred spirit [in Duyckinck] as he denounced ••• '[those] who were apreading God1eas skepticism'" (po 73).

~rion L. Kesselring, Hawthorne's Reading: 1828-1850 (New York: The
New York Public Library, 1949), p. 9.
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forty-nine volumes were checked out. 1 When Montaigne asked during his explanation of Pyrrhonism:

"Can any thing be proposed to us to grant, or deny,

which it shall not be permitted to consider as ambiguous?" 2-he could not yet
know that Nathaniel Hawthorne would be one of his most apt pupils:
ing and ambiguity are the hallmarks of Hawthorne's prose.

question-

Melville and Haw-

thorne had much reading background in common to discuss, and their mutual
concern with the CtBmerian side of reality probably owes more to Montaigne's
sceptical descendant Pierre Bayle than has yet been properly assessed.
Melville's edition of Montaigne.--An extant statement of Melville'.
account with John Wiley shows that Melville purchased through Wiley, his
publisher, "1 Montagne (sic]" on 18 January 1848. 3 Melville's personal copy
of the works of Montaigne has not been located, and a measure of uncertainty
has remained concerning the particular edition he purchased.

The present

study endeavors to offer a few more degrees of practical certainty.
Merton M. Sealts, Jr. recorded Melville's purchase of Montaigne in his
extremely useful contribution to Melville scholarship,

'~elville's

Reading: A

Check-List of Books Owned and Borrowed" (previously cited in this chapter);
the section of the check-list which contains the Montaigne entry was published
in the Autumn 1949 issue of the Harvard Lihrary Bulletin, and it was noted
at that time: "Title and edition unidentified." 4 The 1952 Hendricks House
edition of Moby-Dick, edited by Luther S. Mansfield and Howard P. Vincent,
1

~.,

pp. 57, 58, 44, 63.

~ontaigne. Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 231.
3Sealts, No. 366.
4Ibid •
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although using the Florio translation, 1 identified the extract from Kontaigne
as "probably in William Hazlitt translation. If

2

Hazlitt, however, translated

only the "Journal" and "Letters"; he edited the Cotton translation of the
essays,

3

and, since the extract for Koby-Dick is borrowed from the essays,

theoretically, the question reaained whether Hazlitt's Cotton or another
editor's Cotton is the source.
The last English edition to precede Hazlitt's is, from all present
eVidence, the London 1811 edition of the Essays "with very considerable
amendaents and improvements from the most accurate French edition of Peter
Coste."

This is the last edition mentioned by Hazlitt (he refers to it as a

"reprint") in his own edition of 1842. 4 The 1811 English text of the Essays
is also the last listed before Hazlitt's in Samuel A. Tannenbaum's bibliography of Montaigne. 5 No intermediate editions appear in the usual places
of reference, e.g., the British Museum Catalogue and National Union Catalog.
Further, Charles Dedeyan, in his Montaisne chez ses amis Anglo-Saxons speaks
of "un arr~t dans les editions anglaises de Montaigne de 1811
something that "nous avons dUo constater."

a 1840,"

as

nedeyan's designation of the year

1840 is probably an approximation, since he goes on from this statement to
iuendricks House Moby-Dick, pp. 593, 599, 784.
2

n!!., p. 582.

3The title page of the first impression (see Appendix) reads: "The
Complete Works of Michael de MontaiRne; Comprising; The Essays (Translated
by Cotton). • • ."
4

Montaigne, 3rd page of "Preface."

5Hichel Eyguem De Montaiane (A Concise Bibliography) (Menasha, Wisconsin: The George Banta Publishing Co., 1942), p. 6.
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discuss the 1842 Hazlitt-Cotton text. l

The 1811 Essays was possibly still

available to Melville through Wiley, since it was advertised by Wiley and
Putnam in volume I of the Literary World for 18 September 1847 (see Appendix).
An examination of both the 1811 and 1842 editions, however, reveals,
through textual evidence, that the extract follows the later Hazlitt edition
(the editor, Hazlitt, is William Hazlitt the Younger [1811-1893], son of the
famous romantic essayist of the same name [1778-1830]).

It is fortunate for

those interested in Melville's sources that Razlitt did not feel bound to a
slavish presentation of Cotton's translation.

Hazlltt speaKs of an unnamed

later editor of Cotton's translation and remarks that "he has altered Mr.
Cotton's prose in above three thousand places. ,,2 Hazlitt apparently offers
this editor as a precedent, because he goes on to declare:

"The departures

which I have made fr01l his [Cotton's] translation • • • • are frequent.,,3
Emendations and other changes made by Hazlitt in the sectlon chosen by Melville as an extract for Moby-Dlck are adequate to establish Hazlitt as his
source.

If allowance is made for Melville's insertion ("whale's") and his

replacement of a general term by a more specific antecedent designation
(lithe sea-gudgeonn ) , which he used to clarify the extract and render it more
pertinent to hls book, the closeness with which he followed the Hazlitt text
is evident (see the Appendix for the passages corresponding to the MobY-Dick
extract as they appear in the 1811 Essays and in Hazlitt's edition; finally,
lCharles Dedeyan, MontaiBne chez ses amis Anglo-Saxons (2 vols.;
Paris: Boivin & Cie, [1943]). I, 257. I am grateful to Professor Donald
M. Frame of Columbla University for bringing this reference to my attention.

~ontaigne, 3rd page of "Preface."
3

~.,

4th page of "Preface."

,.
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the extract itself is given as it appears in the first American edition of
Moby-Dick [1851]).

In addition to correspondence of word and punctuation,

Melville follows the orthography of Hazlitt's "Raimond Sebond" rather than the
frequently variant earlier spellings of the name.
There is corroborative, if circuitous, evidence that John Wiley stocked
and sold the Hazlitt edition.

When Melville bought Montaigne's works in

January 1848, Wiley and Putnam were in the process of a dissolution of partnershipj George Haven Putnam in his memoir of his father recalls:

"The

capital that my father was to secure from the firm of Wiley & Putnam came to
him almost entirely in the form of books. ,,1

A few weeks after Melville's

purchase, the newly independent Putnam advertised in the Literary World for
March 11, 1848, a list of books entitled "Selections from recent Importations
of Books," which included the following item:
Montaigne's Works, edited by Hazlitt. R.
Svo. half morocco, $5 50. [See Appendix.]
The price of the Hazlitt edition also makes it the eligible source, since KelVille purchased "I Shakespear" together with his copy of Kontaigne at the
price of $9.25 for both, 2 whereas the 1811 edition of the Essays alone i.
priced $9.50-an,amount which. even with Melville's possible discount,
leaves it an unlikely candidate.
Recently, Robert Shulman, evidently working independently and remaining unaware of the earlier suggestion of Razlitt's "translation" of the
1

Georse Palmer Putnam: A Memoir (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1912). p. 108.
2

Sealts, No. 366.
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essays, concludes ftthere is every reason to think that this [Haz1itt's editionJ is the one. ,,1

Shulman reasons that Melville bought the text which

first appeared in 1842. 2

There is, however, a second possibility, since the

second impression of the Hazlitt-Cotton edition was brought out in 1845
(later printings appeared only after Melville's purchasing date), and the
proximity of this date to the purchasing date may make it more likely the one
Melville owned.

Judging from the account of Melville's purchase of "1 Mon-

taigne," Shulman states that "Melville's copy of Montaigne was apparently a
one-volume edition" and continues to describe correctly the Hazlitt-Cotton
text as just such a one-volume edition,
volume set.

3

whereas the 1811 Essays 1s

B

three-

For his study, however, Shulman uses what he tems a t'reprint,,4

of the Hazlitt-Cotton text (New York, 1889), a text which, if the transcribing and printing of the direct quotations from Montaigne in Mr. Shulman's
article are correct, contains a number of discrepancies in spelling and
punctuation.
Although possibilities may be narrowed to two, unless Melville's copy
of Montaigne's works is located, it may not be possible to determine definitively which of the two impressions he owned; however, for purposes of source
study, with serious reservations concerning some forty-eight leaves, there i8
1

"Montaigne and the Techniques and Tragedy of Melville's Billy Budd,"

eL, XVI (fall, 1964), 322, n. 1; in the same note, Shulman observes that "the
Florio translation had been out of print for over two hundred years and did
not receive renewed attention until late in the nineteenth century."
2Ibid •
3Ibid •
4Ibid •
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no pressing need to do so for the remainder and greater portion of the two
impressions.

The two most noticeable differences between impressions are the

border design (see note 1 below) and the title page, which has been reset for
the second impression:

in addition to the change of date, the title is modi-

fied and the name of the publisher changes from John Templeman to C. Templeman (see Appendix).

Other than these two divergent points, a collation made

by the "Hinman Collator" machine of the 1842 and 1845 impressions of Hazlitt's
edition 1 reveals, with the exception of forty-eight questionable leaves, that
1

This collation, though made between all the pages of the first impression and second impression (the so-called ItSecond Edit1on"-see title
page for second impression in Appendix), cannot, as yet, claim to be a complete collation. Of the so-called "Second Editions" of Haz1itt's Montaigne
!isted in the National Un~~ Cats1og--and there are six such listings, for
the American Antiquarian Society (Worcester, Mass.), The Free Library of
Philadelphia, Harvard, The New York Public Library, The Ohio Wesleyan University Library, and Yale--and the one listed in the British Museum Catalogue,
Ohio Wesleyan claim. not to have the "Second Edition" in its holdings, and
the other six copies are all composed of what appear to be mixed sheets. Aside
from the title page, the most noticeable difference between the first and
second impressions occurs in the simple border design of double rules broken
at each corner by an equally simple circular design: the design of the
first impression is a circle within a circle
and that of the second is
a circle with a dot at center
Plates were evidently made of the type
but not of the rules and corner designs. Of the three 1842 (first) impressions examined--the two listed in the !Y£ for Harvard and Johns Hopkins and
a personal copy--al1 pages (except four without borders) have the first
impression border throughout. Of the second impressions, all but the American
Antiquarian Society copy have pages 1-192 (beginning with the Essays) with
the first impression border and the remaining bordered pages with that of the
second impression. These 192 pages of the octavo comprise a dozen sheets,
signatures B-N. In the Harvard and Yale 1845 (second impression) copies that
were examined, pages 1-192 also seem slightly more yellowed, which may indicate that these sheets were left over from the first printing. The AAS
second impreSSion has only pages 97-192 or six sheets, signatures H-N, with
the first impression border: although 664 pages have been collated between
impressions with diverse borders, until it is known whether or not all the
"Second Editions" were composed of mixed sheets, it is not possible to claim
a complete collation of the two impressions, and these ninety-six pages (pp.
97-192) remain questionable. If the policy for the printing of these so
far undiscovered ninety-six pages with second impression border remained the
same, it would be safe to say there were no intentional changes; however,

0.

©
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not only do no significant textual variants occur, but the plates, stereotypes, uncorrected despite errors, remain the same for text and notes in the
first and second impression (loosely called a "Second Edition" on the title
page of the 1845 printing).

In addition to differing title pages and border

design, existing differences, apparently due to battered type, do not substantially affect the text:

on page 490 the first

~

in invention is present

in the first impression and missing in the second; page 519 of the first
impression has END OF THE ESSAYS.--this is missing in the second; page lxxxix
is numbered in the first impression and left unnumbered in the second.

In

addition to the not unusual amount of broken type, all of the compositorial
errors that were noted have been left standing from the first to the second
impression. 1
In summary; textual and corroborative evidence point to the Hazlitt
these pages have not been seen, and nineteenth-century printing holds many
surprises. 'Fortunately, the "Apology for Raimond Sebond," an essay that
seems to have profoundly influenced Melville's thinking, is not composed of
what appear to be mixed sheets and reveals no changes from the first to the
second printing.
lcompositorial errors corresponding in both impressions include
transposed letters (p. 235, cubred for curbed); reversed letters (e.g., p.
378, withont; p. 470, frand for frlud; p. 586, sociaty); faulty spacing (e.g.,
p. xiv, wasvety; p. 41, toimpose; p. 284, be ingtaken); repetition (p. 470,
do do not follow the common run); incorrect type (e.g., p. 486, nust1e for
nestle; p. 574, faees for faces; p. 588, considered). Other errors, such
as missing punctuation marks (e.g., missing periods on pp. 68, 199, n. 12,
and 328) and missing letters (e.g., p. 84, n. 1, h[a]d; p. 304, n. 1,
abso[1]ute1y; p. 490, relatio[n], may be due, in some cases, to battered
type; however, some instances seem certainly to be compositorial faults:
e.g., on p. 328, the period is missing at a point that is simultaneously the
end of a quotation, sentence, and paragraph; the quotation marks follow
immediately in the printing and no space was ever allowed for a period, and
no plate damage seems evident. In both impressions, p. 341 has been misnumbered as 141.
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edition of Montaigne's works as the one Melville most likely owned.

Between

the two impressions of this edition printed before Melville's purchasing
date there are no resettings (title page excepted), substantives, or minor,
intentional changes which affect the text.

The later 1845 impression may be

the more likely source because of the proximity of its publishing date to
Melville's purchasing date, but for practical purposes, with forty-eight
leaves in question (though not in copies examined and collated), either impression is safely eligible for source study.

Both impressions are being used

in this paper, and quotations with their locations correspond in both.
"Critical Qpinions" section of Melville's Montaigne.-Aside from the
three Books of "Essays," and with the exception of opinions written in French,
the section that exerted the greatest influence on Melville in his reading of
Haz1itt's Montaigne was probably the section entitled "Critical Opinions upon
Montaigne and His Works. fI

George, Marquis of Halifax, suggested that Mon-

taigne's freedom of style was intentiona1,l an encouraging precedent for the
contemporary American search for freer forms of literature from Emerson
through Melville and Whitmsn and on.

The Westminster Review connects Mon-

taigne with Shakespeare, particularly with Hamlet. 2

Throughout the opinions,

various conflicting comments raise the question of whether Montaigne was
detrimental to or a supporter of religion; according to Dugald Stewart,
Montaigne indulged in wily rhetorical devices; Stewart writes of the
"Apology" :
The principal aim of Sebond's book, according to Montaigne, is to

~ontaigne, p. xxxiv.
2Ibid •• p. xli.
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show that "Christians are in the wrong to make human reasoning the basis
of their belief, since the object of it is only conceived by faith, and
by a special inspiration of the divine grace." To this doctrine Montaigne
professes to yield an implicit assent; and, under the shelter of it, contrives to give free vent to all the extrav.gancies of scepticism. l
Stewart further calls attention to Montaigne's puncturing of human pride in
intellectual prerogatives by his elimination of the essential distinction
between the reason of man and the cognitive abilities of lower animals.
Stewart also says:

2

"The only study which seems ever to have engaged his

attention was that of !Il!!.";

3

a number of other references are made to Mon-

taigne's observations on human nature--Hazlitt (the romantic essayist) stresses
the "richness, truth, and force of his [Montaigne's] • • • observations on
• • • men.,,4

In Billy Budd, Melville's praise of Montaigne's honesty and

freedom from cant may have been prompted by Haz1itt's remarks on Montaigne's
"inexpressible frankness and sincerity" and "honesty of mind. ,,5
An encomium appearing in the Retrospective Review would have endeared
the "old confabulator" Montaigne to Hawthorne and Melville:
It is the author who gives utterance to the promptings of the heart, who
mingles human feelings with all his knowledge, that lays fast hold of our
affection, and whom, above all, we love and venerate. And such a one
is the lively old Gascon, Montaigne. 6
It is Stewart, again, who pOints out at a time that Ue1vi11e was
1

.!ill.,

p. xxxvii.

2Ibid •
3

.ll!.U.,

4

~.,

p. xxxvi.

p. xxxviii.

5

.!ill., pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

6

~.,

p. lCCtix.
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newly aware of the "wonder" of "the world of mind,tll that it is Montaigne who
is flat the head of the French writers who contributed • • • to turn the
thoughts of their countrymen to subjects connected with the Philosophy of
Mind" and who holds distinguished rank "in the history of modern philosophy.tt2
Montaigne, it is declared, has done more than any other author to introduce

~~ Philosophy, 3 and it is a philosophy of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The
Westminster Review points to Montaigne's "Apology" as the "chief document on
the subject of his philosophical opinions, or rather of his opinions about
philosophy,"

4

and Stewart finds that "an universal Pyrrhonisll is recommended"

in the "Apology," the most "serious" of the essays.
taigne's "unlimited scepticism,"
scepticism,"

7

6

5

Stewart speaks of Mon-

the Westminster Review of his "fundamental

and Hallam of his "bias towards Pyrrhonism"

"Apology" as a "long defence of moral Pyrrhonism."

8

and sees the

9

Particular aspectB of scepticism are latched upon by various commentators.

Dugald Stewart notices the tendency toward self-argumentation and the

element of contradiction; speaking of "the scepticism of Montaigne," Stewart

~ardi, II, chap.

lxv, 277.

~ntaigne, p. xxxvi.
3

l!!.!£. , p. xxxviii.

4

~.,

5

~.,

p. xlv.
p. xxxvii.

6Ibid •
7

1l!!!!. , p. xlv.

8

.!!:!!!!. ,

9

p. xlix.

.!!:!!!!. , p. xlviii.
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says that Montaigne. depending on "the current of his reflections and feelings,
argues. at different times, according to the varying state of his impressions
and temper. on opposite sides of the same question," and he remarks that
Montaigne does not resolve his doubts.

1

The Retroseective Review also finds
2

Montaigne "at once, • • • philosophical and inconclusive" --the observation
parallels that of the New York Daily Tribune's reviewer (Stedman?) who was
bothered by the lack of "distinct conclusions" in Clare!. 3 Melville's awareness of the variableness and moodiness of man--"it is all in all what mood
you are in; if in the Dantean, the devils will occur to you; if in that of
4

Isaiah, the archangels" --was probably strengthened by such comments as that
of Stewart. above, and of the Retrospective Review in their paraphrase of
Montaigne:
Human nature is a wayward and variable thins, and • • • we must expect to
find that his [man's] mind has undergone changes stailar to those of his
body, and that what he thinks today he will not think to-morrow. The
opinions of a mutable nature cannot be immutable. Doubts will arise,
contradictions will occur, and one opinion displace another, in its turn
to be deposed. 5
The ontological problem, the problem of cracking the veneer of appearances
to get at the hardwood of reality, is posed by Stewart:
In the mind of Montaigne the same paradoxes may be easily traced to those
deceitful appearance~ which, in order to stimulate our faculties to their
best exertions. nature seems purposely to have thrown in our way,
1

.ill!.,

2

~.,

p. xxvii.
p. xli.

3Quoted in Bezanson' 8 "Introduction" to Clare I , xl.
4

Moby-Di~~,

II, chap. lxxxvi, 122.

SMontaigne, p. xli.
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as stumbling blocks in the pursuit of truth. l
Hallam concerns himself with the moral implications of Pyrrhonism and finds
that Montaigne "was at a 10s8 to discover a general rule of moral law, as an
implanted instinct, a necessary deduction of common reason, in the varying
usages and opinions of mankind."

2

Finally, Melville's musings on the question

of immortality may have been moved by the rhetorically appealing article from
the Westminster Review, where it is asked:

"For what else are we but a

breath, and our lives but sparks of fire in a vault of darkness?,,3
Descartes
All that may be known with certainty about Melville's knowledge of
Descartes is that he knew

~

Moby-Dick and one in Pierre,

4

him.

The two references to Descartes, one in

are to the Descartian vortices; unfortunately,

as Howard P. Vincent has observed:

"It is not easy to be certain of precisely

what Melville meant by the 'Descartian vortices. '"

5

I t may even be wondered

if these vortices somehow relate to tile vortex imagery of Mardi and the presence of the great vortex at the end of Moby-Dick.
It is not known if Helvil1e was aware of Descartes' method of antecedent scepticism, 'his universal doubt, or of his questioning of the
inerrancy of sense-knowledge, the "dream" meditation and the demon hypothesis
1

~.,

2

p.

xxxvi.

Ibid., p. xlix.

3

.!!?M.,

p. xlii.

4

Moby-Dick, I chap. xxxv, 198; Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. it p. 372.

5
p. 157.

The Trying-out of Moby-Dick (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co •• 1949),
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directly from Descarte..

It would be strange. considering Melville's con-

tinued interest in philosophy, if he did not know this, one of philosophy's:
aost controversial and pivotal figures.

Regardless. however, the sceptic

quandaries found in Descartes (quandarie. aany scholars consider to be answered
inadequately) are found prior to Descartes in Montaigne and after Descartes in
Bayle (where the demon hypothesis is subsumed in his
cause of evil) and in Hae.

own

questioninl of the

Melville met Ulany .eferences to and from Des-

cartes in the Dictionary of Pierre Bayle, who became acquainted with Cartesianin in Geneva.

Also, by the time of Melville. Cartesiani.. had been ab-

sorbed into the main stream of sceptical thought, and the general contours of
the philosophy were evident and available in many forms--through conversation,
periodical literature. histories of philosophy, encyclopedias, to nam. only
the more obvious.
Sir Thomas Browne
Melville borrowed at least three of the four volaes of Sir Thomas'
Browne's Works l from Duyckinck after mid-February 1848, and he purchased on
19 December 1849. while in London, the 1686 folio of Browne's Works 2 in one
volume at Stibbs' the bookseller for sixteen shillings. 3 The 1686 folio is
divided into four sections:

the first contains "Vulgar Errors," the second

1

Sir Thomas Browne's Works: Including his Life and Correspondence,
ed. Simon Wilkin (4 vols.; London: William Pickering. 1835-1836). Sealts,
No. 89. Citations are from this edition unless otherwise stated.
2The Works of the teamed Sir Thomas Brown. ICt.
Basset [etc.]. 1686). Sealts. No. 90.
3
.
Joumal--London and the Continent, pp. 76, 85.

(London: Thomas
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"Religio Medici," the third ·'Hydriotaphia; or, Urn-Burial: Together with The
Garden of CYRUS," and the fourth section is composed of "Certain MISCELLANY
TRACTS."
Besides the example of Browne'. exquisite prose, the mine of rich
allusions Melville discovered in him, 1 and the sheer pleasure Browne's uninhibited and daring play with words gave the etymologically-minded Melville-Browne contrived such wonders as digladiation, "fighting with swords," and
writes of man's "deceptible condition" and of how the devil does "empuzzle"
our conceptions (he probably inspired Melville's own concoctions in Mardi,
2

e.g., unconsubsistent and Quadammodotatives )--there were passages to be
found which give evidence of Brownefs philosophical scepticism:

the whole

compendium of popular or "Vulgar Errors," in fact, points out the facility
with which man's mind stumbles into mistaken judgments; the first chapter is
devoted to a discussion of a fundamental cause of man's errors, his weak or
deceivable nature.

Adam and Eve are shown as deceived by Satan, by one

another, from themselves, and through the conduct of their senses--Browne
adds in the second chapter:

ttBeing thus deluded before the fall, it is no

wonder if their conceptions were deceitful, and could scarce speak without
an error after. ttl
The most forthright statement on scepticism occurs in Browne's
Relisio Medici:
I

See, e.g., the entry on Sir Thomas Browne in index to Hendricks
House Moby-Diek, p. 842.

~rdi. II, chap. lxxii, 308.
3Browne, II, 188.

67
I cannot think that Home~ pined away upon the ~idd1e of the fishermen, o~
tbat A~istot1e, wbo unde~stood tbe unce~tainty of knowledge, and confessed
so often tbe ~eason of man too weak fo~ the works of natu~e, did eve~
d~own bimse1f upon tbe flux and ~eflux of Eu~pus.
We do but 1ea~, today, wbat ou~ bett.~ advanced judgements will unteach, to-mo~~ow; and
A~istotle dotb but inst~ct us, as Plato did bim, tbat is, to confute bimself. I bave ~n tb~ougb all sorts, yet find no rest in any: thougb ou~
fi~st studies and junior endeavours may style us Pe~ipateticks, Stoicks,
or Academicks, yet I perceive tbe wisest heads prove, at last, almost all
Scepticks, and stand like Janus in the field of knowledge. l
In a letter to
Browne witb Emerson:

Eve~t

A. Duyckinck, 3

Ma~cb

"Lay it down tbat had not

Si~

1849, Melville connects
Thomas

B~owne

lived,

Emerson would not bave mystified ... 2 B~owne's name first appears in connection
"Vulga~ Eno~s"

with his

in

Ma~dit

wbere Melville's statement may well indicate

tbat be recognized him as a sceptic fideist.
1

.!!!.M.,

Melville writes (with i~ony?3):

p. 104.

2

Letters, p. 78.

3Leon Howard has written in his biography Herman Melville (Berkeley:
University of Cal1fo~ia P~ess, 1951), p. 113, that "some of the ea~ly
cbapters we~e later ~evised" in Ma~di "or even w~itten and inserted in their
entirety." A new element in some of these cbapters certainly seems to be
tbat of irony, the saying of one thing and sbowing of another; e.g., in Mardi,
I, chap. iii, 14, the na~rator says witb a rather sanctimonious t~anscenden
talism: "All things form but one whole; tbe universe a Judea, and God
Jehovah its head. Then no mo~e let us start with affrigbt. In a tbeocracy,
wbat 18 to fear?" Melville soon shows "wbat is to feartl--Taji desc~ibes his
"sense of perir' in tbe open boat, the "terro~f1 st~uck at tbe sigbt of tbe
Bone Sbark. The barmonioua wo~ld forming but "one wbole n becomes, instead,
a discordant world in wbicb creatures prey, war, and feed upon each otber.
The invitation to see Jehovab as a benevolent and providential God ("In a
tbeocracy, wbat is to fear?") is countermanded by tbe statement: "As well
bate a serapb as a sbark. Both were made by tbe same band" (Mardi, I, chap.
xii, 43; cbap. xiii, 46-47). The growing influence of sceptical writings on
Melville during tbe writing of Mardi not only be1ps account for tbe cbange
from romance to pbi10sopbica1 quest, but for the wide divergence of outlook
that, like oil and water, kept the work from ever coming togetber as a wbo1e.
The irony of the first cbapters--probably tbe last to be written or rewritten
--prepares fo~ tbe somber finale, but it is questionable if Melville reworked
passages so assiduously for a coberent tone and direction of material in tbe
central cbapters.
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"Be Sir Thomas Brown our ensamp1e; who, while exploding 'Vulgar Errors,'
heartily hugged all the mysteries in the Pentateuch."l Duyckinck seems to
have recognized the influence of Browne's scepticism, if not his ftdeism; in
his Cyclopaedia, Duyckinck mentions Melville's reading in Sir Thomas Browne
for Mardi and in his continued observations remarks:

"In the latter portions,

embarrassed by his spiritual allegories, he wanders without chart or compass
in the wildest regions of doubt and 8cepticism,,2-Duyckinck's observation on
Mardi gathers weight When it is recalled that he possessed firsthand knowledge
of MelVille's reading and possible reactions during the composition of the
novel and, in fact, lent Melville many of the books from his own library, including Browne.

Shortly after the publication of Mardi (in London, 17 March

1849), Melville wrote Duyckinck of his purchase of Bayle's Dictionary and announced that he intended to "lay the great old folios side by side & go to
sleep on them thro' the summer, with the Phaedon in one hand & Tom Brown in
the other.,,3
Melville drew on Browne's "Vulgar Errors" for an extract in Moby-Dick:
'What spermacetti is, men might justly doubt, since the learned
Hosmannus [sicl in his work of thirty years, saith plainly, Nescio
quid ill. '4
The phrasing of the extract most closely follows the 1686 folio,

5

which Me1-

ville owned at the time of the writing of Moby-Dick; also, Melville mistook

~ardit I, chap. xiii, 45.
2

Duyckincks' Cyclopaedia, II, 673.

3Letter of 5 April 1849, Letters, pp. 83-84.
4

Moby-Dick, I, xv.

5

Bk. III, chap. xxvi, p. 139.
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the f in "Hofmannus" for the old elongated!..

More to the purpose, the ex-

tract offered Melville an example of how philosophical scepticism could be
concretized into an artistic device integral to the philosophical framework
of the novel and contributive to the primary theme of a problematic universe.
The flNescio quid sit"--"I don't know what it is"--in reference to spenaaceti,
becomes the commentary, in different forms, on each member as Melville catalogs the anatomy of the whale, his surrogate, in different though sometimes
interdependent instances, for nature and God:

the skin--"The question is,

what and where is the skin of the whale?" and even if it is conceded that the
blubber should properly be considered the skin the mystery still remains,
since the body is crossed and recrossed with markings "hieroglyphical,,;l the
spout--ftAnd as for this whale-spout, you might almost stand iJn it, and yet be
undecided as to what it is precisely"; 2 the tail and head-The more I consider this mighty tail, the .ore do I deplore my inability to express it. At tiMes there are gestures in it, which • • •
remain wholly inexplicable. • • • Nor are there wanting other motions of
the whale in his general body, full of strangeness, and unaccountable to
his most experienced assailant. Dissect him how I may, then, I but go
skin deep; I know him not, and never will. But if I know not even the
tail of this whale, how understand his head? much more, how comprehend
his face, when face he has none?3
the brain--"If the sperm whale be physiognomically a sphinx, to the ph reno 104

gist his brain seems that geometrical circle which it is impossible to square";

~obY-Dick, II, chap. lxviii, 30, 31.
2

~.,

chap. lxxxv, 115.

3

chap. lxxxvi, 123.

4

chap. lxxx, 84.

~.,
~.,
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the forehead is a forehead "plaited with riddles";

1

ambergris--nBy some,

ambergris is supposed to be the cause, and by others the effect, of the dyspepsia in the wha1e t1 ;2 "the digestive organs of the whale are. _ • inscrutably constructed,,;3 the ske1eton--after relating the story of a whale's
skeleton being mistaken for that of a reptile, the narrator comments:

itA

significant illustration of the fact, again and again repeated in this book,
that the skeleton of the whale furnishes but little clue to the shape of hiB
fully invested body."

4

repeated in this book."

Melville's examples are, in fact, "again and again
Pina11y, again borrOWing from Browne's chapter "Of

Many Things Questionable as They are Commonly Described in Pictures" from
''Vulgar Errors,"S Melville, in his chapter "Of the Monstrous Pictures of
Whales," concludes that the whale's appearance cannot even be known with
exactitude:
Any way you may look at it, you must needs conclude that the great
Leviathan is that one creature in the world which must remain unpainted
to the last. True, one portrait may hit the mark much nearer than
another, but none can hit it with any very considerable degree of
exactness. So there is no earthly way of finding out preCisely what
the whale really looks 1ike. 6
Pascal
Our awareness of Melville's knowledge of Pasea1 rests on textual
1

!R1.4.- , chap. lxxix, 83.

2

!2!!!.. , chap. xcii, 161-

3

~.,

4

5
6

chap. c, 203.

Ibid. , chap_ civ, 221.
See note 261.7 in Hendricks House Moby-Dick, p. 746.

Moby-Dick. I. chap. lv, 336.
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evidence, particularly a well-known passage in MobY-Dick.
,;

tions of the Pensees were numerous

1

English trans1a-

and Pascal's works were sold by Melville's

publishers Wiley and Putnam; because of Melville's interest in and personal
purchase of the works of two other great French sceptics, Montaigne and Bayle,
it would be strange, though not impossible, if Melville ignored this great
intermediary figure.
Melville had access to the article on Pascal in Bayle's DictionaII.
where Pascal is called "one of the sublimest Wits in the World"; 2 however,
none of the DictionaI! accounts in the editions of 1710, 1734-1738, or 17341741 include the aspect of Pascal's biography that attracted Me1v111e--in
Moby-Dick, Pascal receives an accolade as a man of woe:
The truest of all men was the Man of Sorrows, and the truest of all books
is Solomon's, and Ecclesiastes is the fine hammered steel of woe. 'All
is vanity.' ALL. This wilful world hath not got hold of unchristian
Soloaon's wisdom yet. But he who dodges hospitals and jails, and walks
fast crossing graveyards, and would rather talk of operas than hell; call.
Cowper, Young, Pascal, Rousseau, poor devil. all of sick men; and throughout a care-free lifetime swears by Rabe1ais as passing wise, and therefore
jo1ly;--not that man is fitted to sit down on tombstones, and break the
green damp mould with unfathemably wondrous Solomon. 3
Almost forty years later, on Melville's seventieth birthday, 1 August 1889,
,;

Elizabeth presented to Herman the two volumes of The Correspondence of Honore
de Balzac translated by C. Lamb Kenny (London, 1878).4 In the second volume,
in a letter of Balzac to Madame Hanska, October, 1836, Melville scored:
1

The British Museum Catalogue. e.g., shows a holding of twelve editions of "Thoughts • • ." published between 1688-1851. I have used an
American edition of 1835 not mentioned in the Catalogue.
2

Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2464.

1Moby-Dick, II, chap. xcvi, 181-182.
4Sea1ts, No. 23.
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I can understand how the absolute asceticism of Pascal, and his
immense labours, brought him to the pass that he saw constantly an
abyss on both sides of him, and was obliged to have two chairs on
each side of the one in which he sat. l
The inclusion in Moby-Dick of Pascal's name with other so-called "sick men,"
and the scoring of the passage referring to Pascal's visions of the abyss
point to a particular incident in Pascal's life:

because of a seriously de-

clining state of health, Pascal's physicians recommended that he take excursions in the open air.

Accordingly, he went for an outing one day in a coach

and four; the two lead horses became frightened in an area where there was no
parapet, and they fell into the Seine--the traces gave way, however, and the
carriage remained on the brink of a precipice.

Because of the exhausted

condition of an already highly sensitive constitution, the shock of the
accident threw Pascal into a fit and he afterwards suffered from recurring
trauaatic visions of an abyss--v1sions which sometimes eamed for him the
reputation of being deranged.

Melville would have sympathized with Pascal's

deep realization of physical evil.

The concept of the abyss had other conno-

tat ions in relation to Pascal, too, since he so deeply realized the abyss of
man's misery without God; also, thoughts of annihilation were not entirely
foreign to Pascal's mind.
Henry A. Murray is willing to be rather decisive about Melville's
knowledge of Pascal; in the explanatory notes to his edition of Pierre he
writes:

"Having recently read Pascal. including no doubt the Provincial

Letters, Melville was especially alert to instances of theological
1

Log, II, 815.
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juggling."l

From internal evidence, Murray points to five of the Pensees as

possible sources of parallel thoughts occurring in Pierre.

2

From Bayle's presentation of Pascal Melville would have recognized the
element of scepticism, although it is muted and almost lost in the biographical details.

A more overt statement occurs in Bayle's article on Pyrrho,

where he writes that "Pascal • • • declared
as much

88

. . . reason ought to be degraded

possible, and represented as a faculty that ought not to be much

relied on. ,,3 Melville, knowingly or unknowingly, shared with Pascal an
appreciation of Solomon; his continued interest in Solomon and Job at least
partially stemmed from their sceptical affinities--Ephraim Chambers' article
on "Scepticism" states that "some have even charged Job and Solomon with
luerman Melville, Pierre: or. the Ambiguities, ed. Henry A. Murray
(Hendricks House edition; reprint; New York: Hendricks House, Inc., 1957), p.
459. Hereafter cited as Hendricks House Pierre.
2See notes in Hendricks Rouse Pierre for 232.23, 250.1, 407.33: in
Melville's statement, "Death ••• the last act of man's play, • • • begin how
it may, in farce or comedy, ever hath its tragic end," Murray sees a rendering
of Pensees, 210: "The last act is tragic, however happy all the rest of the
play is; at the last a little earth is thrown upon our head, and that is the
end for ever." Murray also quotes Pensees, 397, 398 as probable influences
in Melville's conception of Ahab and Pierre--the Pensees read: "The greatness
of man is great in that he knows himself to be miserable • • • All these same
miseries prove man's greatness. They are the miseries of a great lord, of a
deposed king." In this conjunction of misery and greatness, Mr. Murray might
have quoted Pierre, Bk. IX, chap. iii, p. 237: "Wherefore is it, that not to
know Gloom and Grief is not to know aught that an heroic man should learn?"-or, Ahab's "I feel my topmost greatness lies in my topmost grief" (Moby-Dick,
II, chap. cxxxv, 366). Although not mentioned by Murray, another possible
borrowing from Pascal's biography may have found its way into Pierre. Pascal
professed to have had a unique, personal, and spiritual revelation, an account
of which he wrote and kept between the cloth and the lining of his coat for
the remainder of his life. This action may have suggested to Melville the
business of P1in1immon's pamphlet becoming obscured in the lining of Pierre's
coat to be found only after his death.
3Bayle, 1734-1741 ed., VIII, 598.
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Scepticism; from their proposing a great Number of Questions, without deciding
any of them";

1

Pascal, too, may have been one of the sources influencing Mel-

ville in his appreciation of Ecclesiastes, which Helville, following traditional belief, thought to be the work of Solomon, and which he praised as the
"truest of all books" and the "fine hammered steel of woe, If for Pascal declared that "Solomon and Job knew best, and exhibited most accurately the
misery of man,tI

2

and Pascal shows that much of man's misery is his inability

,

to "know"--he writes in Pensees, 389:
Ecclesiastes shows that man without God is in total ignorance and inevitable misery. For it is wretched to have the wish, but not the power.
Now he would be happy and assured of some trut}1. and yet he can neither
know, nor desire not to know.
Pierre Bayle
Melville wrote to Evert Duyckinck 5 April 1849:

"I bought a set of

Bayle's Dictionary the other day, & on my return to New York intend to lay the
great old folios side by side & go to sleep on them thro' the summer.")
edition of the Dictionary purchased is unknown.

4

The

Melville was probably ac-

quainted with the Dictionary before his own purchase, since Duyckinck, whose
library Melville periodically invaded, owned the set in five volumes.

Mel-

ville must have done a great deal more than sleep on his folios of Bayle during
the ensuing two years, however, for, as Millicent Bell has shown, Bayle
1

Chambers, II, 31.

2

Blaise Pascal, "Thoughts on Religion and Other Subjects," trans.
Rev. Edward Craig, The Christian Library (New York: Thomas George, Jr., 1835),
IV, 559. Hereafter cited as Pascal, 1835 ed.
3

Letters, p. 83.

4

Sealts, No. 51.

Sealts lists three possibilities.
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exerted a notable influence on Melville's masterpiece, Mobr-Dick. 1
Melville met another Pyrrhonist with his reading of Pierre Bayle.

In

sceptic fashion, Bayle questioned the trustworthiness of sense knowledge and
also questioned accepted truths including rationalistically established
truths of Christianity--God's unity, benevolence, providence, and justice.
These attributes of God came under question as Bayle established a view of
reality involving a greater sceptical equipoise between the two polarities of
good and evil.
Melville, like Bayle, and, perhaps, largely because of Bayle, profoundly questioned the presence of evil in the world; he seems to have regarded evil, again like Bayle, not simply as the negation or absence of goodness, but as something excruciatingly positive in its own realm.

Be apparently

considered, at least for literary purposes, the Manichean pseudo-solution, discussed at length by Bayle, that, in order not to have to conclude to a malevolent God (it is argued that if God is only one and omnipotent and could prevent all evils if Be so chooses--but doesn't--then Be must be malevolent), it
would be preferrable to posit two necessary Principles, one responsible for
good, the other for evil.

Pushed further, however, Melville again fuses the

two elements in dne Principle, and does, therefore, question the possibility
of a malevolent one God--this is the Cartesian question rephrased by Bayle
and adopted by Melville:

"18 God the Devil?", is God responsible for evil?

In Chapter 1 of this study, the point was made that Bayle apparently sanctions
the idea of two conflicting coeternal Principles of good and evil.

Mr.

~illicent Bell, "Pierre Bayle and Mob! Dick," ~, CXVI (September,

1951), 626-648.
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Lawrence Thompson opines that Melville's predominant presentation of good and
evil as coalesced into one principle may be due to a misinterpretation of
Bayle. 1 This may be so.

It may be contended, however, that Melville found

sufficient grounds for such a reading of Bayle:

it may be argued, though not

concluded, that Bayle's arguments for two Principles may have been a ruse, for
it seems Bayle was surely astute enough to realize that, in his questioning
of evil, his rational arguments for Manichean dualism would be rejected, but
that the very rejection would leave his contenders confronted with the problem
of a malevolent God.

Evidence of his subsequent influence seems to point to

the preponderance of this view.

The Enlightenment tried to circumvent the

problem by rejecting a personal providenee and removing God further and
further away, so that He had very little to do with the affairs of men and
could not, therefore, be malevolent since He wasn't even involved; He was left
was a sort of nebulous beginning and end of the affair as Creator and Judge-not all, of course, were even this remotely reverent.

Bayle offers some

provocative examples that are insinuative of an ambivalent first principle-as ambivalent as the father figure in one of Melville's novels, the father
of Melville's dewy boy Pierre; Bayle writes of the Roman gods:
And though there was one Vejovis much more inclin'd to do Evil than to do
Good; nevertbeless it was beli(e]ved that Dijovis or Diespiter, i.e. the
good Jupiter darted the Thunderbolt. 2
The "good Jupiter" is, therefore, not all good, but wields a vast threatening
power toward man.

Melville's God, a primal power common to all creeds, races,

~ompson, pp. 30, 187.
2

Bayle, 1710 ed., III, 1150 [pagination erratic in this volume, but
see the article ''Manicheans''].
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and times, whether the Christian "God," the pagan "Jupiter," or a "Pictish
stora-king," is often a God connected with storms and prodigal of thunderbolts;
there is. e.g., the God of "The Candles" in Moby-Dick:

"Sky and sea roared

and split with the thunder, and blazed with the lightning," for "God's burning
finger ••• [was] laid on the ship,,;l the "Jupiter Tonans" of "The Lightning-Rod Man" whose eyes "played with an innocuous sort of lightning" tries
to intimidate and drive "a brave trade with the fears of man," while "scattered bolts" of "irregular thunder" boom overhead: 2 the "storm-admiral*' of
Pierre is an antagonist to man,3 and the grim "Pictish storm-king" of Clarel
is heard "scoffing" about the gables as Arculf and Adamnan tell their simple

tales of faith. 4 Bayle notes that-Plutarch is also mistaken,
are agreed in the Doctrine
Bomer the Prince of Poets,
Bomer, I say. set only one

when he thinks that the Philosophers and Poets
of two Principles. Did not he remember that
their Pattern, their common Original, that
God over the two Tuns of Good and Evil?5

The 8ugge8tion of a common dispenser behind the source8 of good and evil
would have been evident to Melville.

Bayle continues:

"The Apology of Costar

being 8carce in foreign Countries. I shall make no scruple to cite a long
Pusage out of it," and he offers the following passage on nthe two Tuns of
Good and Evil":
"Jupiter at all time8
"Bas at the Threshold of his Bouse,

~obY-DiCk, II, chap. cxix, 276, 279.
2

The Piazza Tales, pp. 171-173, 180.

3

Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 474.

4

Clare1, Pt. I, canto xxxv, 11. 107-110.

5Bayle, 1710 ed., III, 1150.
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"As HOIIler says, two full Tuns;
uAnd there is neither old Man, nor young,
"Reither WOIIlan nor Maid,
"Whether ahe be old or young, handsOllle or
"ugly,
'~o receives Life in this World,
"But drinks of these two Tuns.
n'Tis a full Tavern,
"Whereof Fortune is the Vintner,
It And mingles Pota an"dCups,
"To make all the World Soups;
ttShe 8ives all Drink with her own Hands,
"But to some more, to others lesa:
"There is none but every Day drinlta
"Out of these Tuna, either a Quart or a Pint,
"Or a Tierce, or a Gallon, or a Chopin,
"As it pleases Fortune,
"To give either with a full Hand or a few
"Drops,
''Which she puts into their Mouth:
1
"And pours out Good or Evil upon every one,
ftAccording as she ia in a good or bad HUtlour."

God ("Jupiter") ia aeen dispensing evil as well u
fortuitous or indifferent aanner.

good and thia in a

The preceding poem probably influenced

Helvi11e'a chaptera on "The Great Heidelburgh Tun," that "f.oua great
tierce, ,,2 and "Cistern and Bucketa" in Moby-Dick.

The Speraa Whale's head

becomes the analogue for the mind of God in the novel as Melville queations that mind and its poasib1e malign intentiona toward man.
subtle connections se. to align it with the evil Tun:
ing lion the

a~it

Hia aore

Taahtego is atand-

of the head" and "the place where he atood was • • •

treacherous and oozy"; he fal1a into the Tun and the narrator wonders
"whether the Evil One himaelf would have it to fall out ao, without atating hia particular reuons"; finally, the narrator remar1r.a that the

~ObY-DiCk.

II, chap. lxxvii,

72~
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incident will seem less incredible to "landsmenlt (often Melville's figure for
security seeking individuals who do not ask more ultimate contemplative questions, who do not "push off to sea") if they recall having heard of some one's
falling into a cistern ashore, an accident that happens "with much less
reason" than Tashtego's, "considering the exceeding slipperiness of the curb
of the sperm whale's well,,1_-Me1vi11e's statement recalls Montaigne's in the
"Apo10gylt:

"In a slippery and sliding place let us suspend our belief." 2

Millicent Bell suggests that Ahab'a words, "be the white whale agent,
or be the white whale prinCipal" may be an echo of Bayle in that Ahab does not
know if the whale's malicious strength "is the [direct] expression of the

,,-

Christian God or some delegated source of evil. ,,3 A passage from Bayle's
article on Zoroaster substantiates the tendency to push past a duality of
Principles to a common source; Bayle quotes Dr. Hyde at length and concludes:
"These words clearly express that in Zoroaster's Hypothesis, the two Princip1es, one Good and the other Evil, • • • or Light and Darkness were, properly
speaking, no more than Second Causes, and did not strictly deserve the Name
of Principles:
of God. tt4

they were the Effects of another Cause, and the productions

Bayle argues against this view, but not nearly so well as he

argues for it:
questionable.

the weakness of his rebuttal renders his intentions highly
Without, however, entering into an argument M hominem, it does

1Ibid., chap. lxxviii, 75-76, 79.

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 235.
3

Bell, p. 646.
4Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 3102.
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seem relevant to state that Melville would not be completely unjustified in
an ironical reading of Bayle.

The line of reasoning which sees secondary

causes as productions of another Cause, "God," may apply in "The Candles"
chapter of Moby-Dick, where there is the suggestion of a power behind the
power that Ahab defies:
There is some unsuffusing thing beyond thee, thou clear spirit, to whom
all thy eternity is but time, all thy creativeness mechanical. Through
thee, thy flaming self, my scorched eyes do dimly see it. l
Whatever the final responsible power is, the attributes of both Good
and Evil, God and the devil, become integrated in it as it is symbolized
through Moby-Dick:

the White Whale is not only described as "ubiquitous,"

"immortal," a "grand god," one who moves "divinely" and is compared to "Jupiter" and nJove, ,,2 but he is also full of "cunning ••• and malice," marked
by nintelligent malignity"; "all evil ••• [is] made practically assailable
in Moby Dick"; he evinces a tfdemoniac indifference," is "devilish," suspected
of a "latent deceitfulness" and exhibits "eternal malice.,,3
The presence of evil in the world led Melville, like Bayle, to question God's benevolence.

In his article "Diogenes the Cynick" Bayle writes

that "the number of those who perish notwithstanding their Vows, does far
exceed the Number of those whose Prayers are heard.,,4 Melville, in effect.
says the same:

in Moby-Dick Pip prays, "Oh, thou big white God aloft there

~oby-Dick, II, chap. cxix, 282-283.
2

~.,

I, chap. xli, 226, 227; II, chap. cxxxiii, 334, 335.

3~., I, chap. xli, 223, 228, 229-230; II, chap. <:xxx, 318; chap.

cxxxiii, 336; chap. <:xxxv, 362. 365.
4

Bayle, 1710 ed., II, 1104.
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somewhere in yon darkness, have merey on this small blaek boy down here, ,,1
but his prayer goes unheeded; as Moby Diek bears down upon the fated Pequod,
Starbuek asks:

trls this the end of all my bursting prayers?"

2

Even Ahab's

prayer, for Pip, "Cod forever bless thee; and if it eome to that,--God forever save thee, let what will befall, ,,3 goes unanswered in this world and,
aeeording to Melville's terms, remains dubious in the next.

The darkest

example oeeurs in "Benito Cereno," where, on the dead body of Don Joaquin,
Marques de Aramboalaza
was found seereted a jewel, whieh, by papers that were diseovered,
proved to have been meant for the shrine of our Lady of Merey in Lima;
a votive offering, beforehand prepared and guarded, to attest his gratitude, when he should have landed in Peru, his last destination, for the
safe eonelusion of his entire voyage from Spain. 4
Don Joaquin is killed through a mistake of the Amerieans:

the Negroes foree

him onto the bulwarks and tie a hatehet "edge out and upright to his hand";
seen in this "questionable attitude," the Amerieans shoot him, be1:l.eving him
to be a renegade seaman. S Melville's probing of the divine nature, not only
its benevolenee, but elaims for its providenee and justiee, have a direet
bearing on the subsequent problems of this study.
David Hume
Melville's referenees,

~passant,

~ob!-Diek, I, ehap. xl, 221.
2

~.,

~

~!2!!.,

4

II, ehap. exxxv, 364.
ehap. exxix, 317.

The Piazza Tales, p. 16S.

5Ibid •

to David Hume, though few, exhibit
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a marked esteem:

it is possible that a more than normal national pride in

his Scotch ancestry contributed toward this respect. l

Melville probably had

Hume in mind, among others, when, in Mardi, he describes Kaleedoni, that is,
Caledonia, an ancient name for Scotland and remarks that the people of Kaleedoni are known for "their penetration in philosophy," their "metaphysicians.,,2
A short time later in Redburn (1849), published the same year as Mardi,
Melville describes Hume's death in terms that, in some respects, seem applicable to Melville as well:
Though the Christian era had not then begun, Socrates died the death of
the Christian; and though Hume was not a Christian in theory, yet he,
lwilliam H. Gilman in Melville's Early Life and Redburn (New York:
New York University Press, 1951), p. 12, prints a letter of Melville's father,
Allan, to his father, which shows his pride in "discovering links that bound
him to [Scotch] aristocracy":
"Your greatgrandfather was a grandson of Sir John Melvill of Carnbee,
who was knighted by James the 6th & made baron of Granton 28th July 1580,
on which you may depend as a well-authenticated historical fact, ~
firmed El living testimony--I have also traced you back in direct lineal
descent to Sir Richard de Melville, Knight in the reign of Alexander the
3d in the year 1268, & have discovered that ~ branch At Boston, & my
great Uncle John then at Grenada, are expressly recognised in Douglas
Baronage of Scotland, of which I shall purchase if possible a cheap
edition. as belonging to the Melvilles of Carnbee & termed an ancient &
illustrious House of the founders of which Crawford & Douglas Peerage of
Scotland both say, were related to Queen Margaret consort of Malcolm
Canmere & came with her from Hungary. • • • ft
Melville seems to have come by his own pride naturally, and he had the added
impetus of his romantic literary trends, trends which had depended, to a large
measure, on the presence of aristocracy and class distinctions. In his article on Melville in the £yclopaedia, II, 672, Duyckinck states immediately
following the date and place of birth: "On his father's side he is of Scotch
extraction, If and Melville lIlust have impressed Hrs. Hawthorne with the same
information, since she wrote in early autumn of 1850 to her lIlother of Melville: "He is of Scotch descent--of noble lineage--of the Lords of Melville &
Leven, & Malcolm is a family n81lle" (quoted in Metcalf, Herman Melville:
£Icle and Epicycle, p. 92).
2

Mardi, II, chap. xlviii, 198.
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too, died the death of the Christian--humble, composed, without bravado;
and though the most sceptical of philosophical sceptics, yet full of
that firm, creedless faith that embraces the spheres. l
The passage calls attention to Hume's scepticism and may also be a reflection
of Melville's reading at this time in Montaigne, who devotes essays to the
subject of death and the manner of dying.
The source of Melville's knowledge of Hume remains unknown;2 he knew
Hume's essay on suicide and makes explicit reference to it in The Confidence3
~.
Since the essay "Of Suicide" was printed with "On the Immortality of
the Soul," the subject of which was of deep concern to Melville, it may be
conjectured that Melville was acquainted with it also, and, given Melville's
interest in theological works,

4

a further strong surmise may be made for his

direct knowledge of the "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion." Whether he
knew the remainder of Hume's works through primary or secondary sources is
anybody's guess.

Near the end of his life, as noted by William Braswell,

Melville marked heavily a passage in Schopenhauer saying that "from. every
page of David Hume there is more to be learned than from. the collected
1

Redburn, chap. lViii, 377.

~elville knew Hume's essay on suicide: a 1777 octavo printed the two
essays, "Of Suicide" and liOn the immortality of the Soul"; an 1824 octodecimo
(The Philosophical Works of David Hume [London: G. Fenton]) printed the same
two essays and the "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," finally, in 1826,
the complete essays were brought out in a four volume octavo set with the
same title as the preceding (Edinburgh: Printed for Adam Black [etc.) •••
London)--citations are from. this 1826 four volume edition.
3

The Confidence-Man, chap. xxiv. pp. 180-181.

4

Sealts notes in the first article on "Melville's Reading," p. 143,
that New York book dealers declined purchasing the lot of books which Mrs.
Melville offered for sale after her husband's death. because of the "preponderance of these theological books."
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philoaophical works of Helel.: Herbart. and Schleiel'llacher together. ,,1
In hia "The Deailn of the ArgUlllent in Moby-Dick," Howard C. Horaford
ainlles out in particular the "duperate implications of Hume's skeptical
epistemOlOlY u2 and speaks of "the consequences of the new epistemology"; 3 it
.ust be sub.itted, however, that the epist_oloBY, as this study endeavors to
show, is not entirely "new," and, though Hume undoubtedly influenced Melville.
probably early
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Thorp suggests, 4 he is by no .eana a unique source.

In

addition to his awareneas of Hume's scepticism and unchristian Christianity,
Melville offers .ore evidence of a knowledge of the general outlines of Hume's
philosophy than of particulars, though he may have known them; a search for
"direct" allusions may be misleading. 5 Although a number of parallels .ay be
drawn between Melville and Hume, for the purposes of this study four are of
primary concern:

the epistemological, ontological, ethical, and retributive;

these will be amplified in the following chapters.

Suffice it to say here

~elville" Religious Thought (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University
Press, 1943), p. 14.

~S, VIII (Autumn, 1962), 234.
3

!1?!!.,

p. 235.

~illard Thorp, Herman Melville: Representative Selections (New York:
American Book Co., 1938), p. xxvi, n. 18.
5'or example, Starbuck'a arB_ent, "VenBeance on a dUllb brutel •••
that s1mply smote thee from blindest instinct! Madness! To be enraged with a
dab thing, Captain Ahab, seems bluphemoua" (Moby-Dick, I. chap. xxxvi, 204),
aeema to point to Hume's "The only proper object of hatred or vengeance, ia
a person or creature endowed with thought and consciousnesa" (Huae, IV, 117).
But the core of this concept is alao present in Monta1gne, a mentor to both
Melville and Hume--Montaigne saysi' "This is the reason why we do not fall
upon a beaat or a stone when it hurts us, because they are not capable of
being sensible of our revenle" (Bk. II, chap. :xxvii, p. 321).
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that Melville, like Hume (though not exclusively), questioned the certitude
of knowledge and the actual existence and nature of reality; he would have
balked at the utilitarian and pragmatic bent of Hume's ethics and been much
less sanguine about a man-made ethical code, but he would have understood the
difficulty that underlay this expedient in lieu of stabler forms; with Hume,
he questioned the immortality of the soul and pending annihilation.
IIIIanue1 Kant
Recognition of Melville's knowledge of Kant rests not only on textual
evidence in the novels, but on the testimony of Melville's Journal of 18491850.

Kant's name, as well as Rabelais's, Montaigne's, and Browne's, first

appears in the great intellectual ragout of Mardi,

1

where Melville also makes

reference to "Abstract Noumenons,,2 -whether Melville has Kant's concept of
noumenon in mind in this particular reference is not clear, however, since it
appears without comment.

That Melville understood the essence of the problem

that was to become, in Kantian terms, the phenomenal-noumenal problem, i.e.,
man's limited ability to perceive mere sensible impressions, the superficial
appearances of things--phenomena, but his inability to penetrate this unyielding wall of appearances to seize the essence of the thing-in-itself-noum.enon, the terms of the novel give ample evidence, particularly through the
dialogue of Babbalanja who seeks the "pearl" beneath the shell, "the mystery
that lieth beyond" mere appearance, "things infinite in the finite. 1t
problem, however, is common to the phalanx of scept1c writers.

~ardi, I, chap. 11i, 14.
2

~.,

II, chap. lxvi, 282.

The
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Kant's name again appears in Redburn in a passage that gives evidence
of Melville's recent reading in Montaigne's ttApology,tt especially the section
on the rationality of animals:
There are unknown worlds of knowledge in brutes; and whenever you
mark a horse, or a dog, with a peculiarly mild, calm; deep-seated eye, be
sure he is an Aristotle or a Kant, tranquilly speculating upon the mysteries in man. No philosophers 80 thoroufhly comprehend us as dogs and
horses. They see through us at a glance.
Melville's most serious apprenticeship to Kant probably occurred on
his journey to London and the continent in 1849-1850.

He enjoyed lengthy

discussions with Franklin Taylor, who was well versed in German philosophy,
and his travelling companion for a good part of the trip and visit was George
J. Adler, professor of German at New York Uni.versity; Melville's journal
entry for October 12th reads:
board with whom to converse.

"There are some very pleasant passengers on
Chief among these is a Mr. Adler, a German

scholar, to whom Duyckinck introduced me.

. . . He is

metaphysics, & discourses of Kant, Swedenborg, &c."

2

full of the German
Ten days later, October

22nd, Melville records:
1/2
about 9
P.M. Adler & Taylor came
into my room, & it was proposed to have whisky punches, which we ill have,
accordingly. Adler drank about three tablespoons full--Taylor 4 or five
tumblers 'c. We had an extraordinary time & did not break up till after
two in the morning. We talked metaphysics continually, & Hegel, Schlegel,
Kant &c were discussed under the influence of the whiskey.3
I forgot to mention, that

1!!! night

--Faced with the melancholy reflection that facts are in absentia to prove
that Melville mentally masticated the ponderous prose of the Critiques at
I

Redburn, chap. xl, p. 254.

2

Journal--London and the Continent, p. 4.

3

1!!£.,

p. 12.
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first hand, regret may be alleviated by recalling these conducively "transcendental" and elucidating circwnstances in which he imbibed his knowledge of
the philosopher of K8nigsberg.

As several successive journal entries show,

the subject of metaphysics, particularly German metaphysics, was never left
very far astern.

1

In Moby-Dick, Melville uses Kant opposite Locke to set up a situation
of sceptical polarity.

A Right Whale's head is hoisted up on the side of the

ship Pequod opposite a Sperm Whale's head, and the narrator comments:
So, when on one side you. hoist in Locke's head, you go over that way;
but now, on the other side, hoist in Kant's and you come back again; but
in very poor plight. Thus, some minds forever keep trimming boat. Oh,
ye foolish! throw all these th.under-heads overboard, and then you will
float light and right. 2
Though his juxtaposition of the two philosophers is not further clarified in
the passage, Me1v1.lle prohably had in mind the epistemological view of Locke,
where the mind is fundamentally passive and affected, a "tabula rasa" inscribed by sense impressions of external nature, as opposed to the idealistic
epistemological view of Kant, where the mind, not purely passive and receptive,
is also active and

effecti~g

knowledge by providing, through the categories

constituent to internal human nature, forms for the matter received through
sense impressions.

Melville finally rejects both extremes of systematized

1

Friday, November 1: "In the evening played chess, & talked metaphysics [with) my learned friend till midnight"; !hursday, November 15:
ftWent with Adler to the 'Edinburgh Castle', a noted place for its fine Scotch
ale, the best I ever drank. Had a glorious chop & a pancake, a pint & a half
of ale, a cigar & a pipe, & talked high German metaphysics meanwhile N ;
Tuesday, December!: "Thenee to his [Adler's1 room and talked high German
metaphysics till ten o'clock"; Friday, December I: "Sat up conversing with
Adler till pretty late,--(Topic--as usual--metaphysics)" (Ibid., pp. 16-17,
32. 57, 59).
2

Moby-Dick, II, chap. lxxiii, 59.
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philosophy; though, despite his own advice, he did a great deal of "trimming
boat" himself on the underlying problem of matter and mind.
Describing the transcendental Apostles in Pierre, Melville employs
Kant's name for the sake of a pun, but also, perhaps, for the idealistic
affinities appropriate to transcendentalism, where truth is made to conform
to the mind rather than vice versa:
Often groping in vain in their pockets, they cannot but give in to the
Descartian vortices; while the abundance of leisure in their attics
(physical and figurative), unite with the leisure in their stomachs, to
fit them in an eminent degree for that undivided attention indispensable
to the proper digesting of the sublimated Categories of Kant; especially
as Kant (can't) is the one great palpable fact in their pervadingly
impalpable lives. l
Henry A. Pochmann sees Melville's Moby-Dick and Pierre as parallels of
Kant's first and second Critiques respectively:

according to Pochmann, Mel-

ville, like Kant, examines the problem of knowledge on identical levels, the
metaphysical and the moral. 2

It may be, however, that Melville is primarily

questioning the three large areas of enquiry:

God, nature, and man--man

being particularly the self, the man best known if known at all.

In a

passage of a letter to Hawthorne on the "last stages of metaphysics," Melville
speaks of the ''Me, a QQ£., a Nature. ,,3 Although the "self" is an important
element in

Moby-Dic~,

4

the accent is often on God and nature as seen through

1

Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. i, p. 372.

2

Henry A. Pochmann, German Culture in America (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 439.
3
Letters, p. 125.
4

Emerson's Over-Soul, the Divine Reality that stands behind phenomenon
and emanates through it and infuses itt 1s at some furthest recess of man's
soul identified with it. Emerson pushes Renaissance Protestant humanism to
ultimate proportions by deifying mankind. "The Divinity School Address" is a
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the proteanly symbolic whale.

In Pierre, Melville stresses self:

phrases

such as "in his soul," "into his soul," "through thy soul," "within ourselves,"
Itinterior," "the heart,1t the spells "evoked in me" become more prevalent.
God and nature are not forgotten, but, almost, as it were, assuming the darkly
inconclusive conclusions of Koby-Dick, they are summarily reviewed near the
beginning of Pierre in order to concentrate on the self; God, through the
father figure, has failed:
has failed:

"Thy sacred father is no more a saint"; nature

"The before undiBtrusted moral beauty of the world is forever

fled"; but--at this early juncture--self remaine:

''Myself am left, at least. It 1

The final tragedy comes with the failure of self.

In The

Confidence~an,

too,

as Miss Foster perceptively shows, Melville divides his allegory into the
logical consequent of the premise of the Over-Soul: if every man at the
marrow of his being is identified with the divine principle, then, ~ facto,
every man is divine. The hypostatic union is no longer unique. The notion
of Self-Reliance is an outcropping of romantic individuali... , but Emerson
baptized it. As the divinity-of-all-men premise is a logical consequent of
the postulate of the Over-Soul, so is Self-Reliance the logical consequent
of both of these: if the!!Ai!!!t is divine because of its identification
with the Over-Soul, then self-reliance becomes synonymous with reliance on
God: "Self-reliance, the height and perfection of man, is reliance on God"
(Emerson, Works, XI, 236). Melville was as enamoured with the idea of selfreliance and the dignity of the individual as Emerson--he would "cross the
frontiers into Eternity with nothin8 but a earpet-bag,--that is to say, the
E80" (Letters, p. l2S)-but he repudiates transcendental optimism in the
outcome of this reliance. In "The American Scholar," EmersOll, that 8reat
spiritual entrepreneur, asserts, in the cause of self-reliance: "That if the
sin8le man plant himself indomitably on his instincts, and there abide, the
huge world will come round to him" (EmersOll, Works, I, 115). Melville's Abab
"indomitably" takes his stand, there abides, and the whole world, represented
by the Pequod, comes round to him--and 80es down. As Melville writes in
Pierre (Bk. XVIII, chap. ii, p. 364); "Our God is a jealous God; he wills not
that any man should permanently possess the leas t shadow of his own selfsufficient attributes."
1

Pierre, Bk. III, chap. vi, pp. 89-90.
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consideration of God, Nature, and Man, as he methodically punctures trust in
each of them. 1 This three-fold division, in fact, seems to offer the larger
dimensions of form for each of his more philosophical novels.

Though not

specifically Kantian, the division of Kant's Critiques, of course, may have
been an inspiration for Melville's own considerations.
The consideration allotted to each sceptic writer included in this
chapter on Melville's sources will be augmented in following chapters.
Melville had met, some more, some less, in his reading or conversation, all
of the sceptics here included--Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus, Rabelais, Montaigne,
Descartes, Browne, Pascal, Bayle, Hume, and Kant--by the time of his most
perfect work of art as well as record of sceptical enquiry, Moby-Dick.
Attention turns now to a closer study of Melville's works; selected passages
from the works of these authors, beginning with Rabelais, will accompany
the following investigation of the philosophical problems inherent to scepticism as they are found in the texts of Melville's writings.

The fundamental

thesis of this study is that Melville's basic problem (logically) is epistemological, a lack of noetic certitude which gave rise to an ontological
difficulty concerning the nature of a consequently uncertain reality, which,
in turn, engendered an ethical question, aince ethics depends on one's view
of being or reality, and, finally, the ethical inconsequence which Melville
envisioned rendered the retributive rationale--immortality and Banctions-meaningles., until nothing was left but nothing.
Melville's predominant one.

This course of reasoning is

While the element of nihilism is evident, in the

1The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, ed. Elizabeth S. Foster
(Hendricks House edition; New York: Hendricks Bouse, Inc., 1954), pp. lvilvii.
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end, Melville no more trusted the powers of a fallible and limited reason to
reach negative dogmatic conclusions than to reach more positively sanguine
ones, and, for Melville the sceptic, the case of the universe ends with a
question mark.

CHAPTER III
SCEPTICISM IN MELVILLE'S WRITINGS: EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
"But deign, sOlDe little sign be given- n
"Timo1eon."
The fact of inguiry
All literature is comprised of the

~

and the verba, the sense and

the style, the matter and the manner--in short, !!h!! is said and how it is
said.

Every writer writes from a premise:

the more universal, profound, and

ultimate the premise, if the writer is also imbued with a unique gift of
rhetoric to articulate it, the greater is his chance of reaching the highest
echelon of artistic achievement.

Herman Melville, in his greatest works,

wrote from such a universal premise and probed it to profound and ultimate
proportions.

Because his premise is universal, it appears in different guises

in works of contemporaneity as well as those of antiquity; a modern philosopher
writes:
Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled,
there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the
reason, to find the cause, to explain. Just what is wanted has many names.
In what precisely it consists, is a matter of dispute. But the fact of
inquiry is beyond all doubt. It can absorb a man. It can keep him for
hours, day after day, year after year, in the narrow prison of hill study
or his laboratory.l
The "fact of inquiry"--Melvil1e' s titanic struggle might be summarized in
1

Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 4.
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these brief words.

Like all aen, only more than most aen, he wanted to

~.

Perhaps this assertion aay be questioned in view of the fact that Melville
wrote to Hawthorne:

"I stand for the heart.

To the dogs with the headl"l

But he also wrote that
in those aen who have fine brains and work them well, the heart extends
down to hams. And though you saoke them with the fire of tribulation,
yet, like veritable hams, the head only gives the richer and the better
flavor. 2
Man needs aore love than knowledge:
My fellow-creature, do you know
That what aost satisfies the head
Leaat solaces the heart? Less light
Than warmth needs earthly wight. 3
Though love is first in the priority of tmportance, however, knowledge is first
in the order of precedence:

we cannot love what we do not know.

In the end,

in any true humani.. that encompa.ses the whole aan, the head and heart stand
united.

In the final part of C1are1, Melville calls the heart the "Spouse

of the brain, ,,4 and in his paean of praise for Hawthorne, he reaches the vertex of hi. acclaim when he applies to Hawthorne Hawthorne's own words from
the "Select Party":
intellect. itS

The present study concentrates on the problem of knowledge and

dependent problems:
but
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"A great heart burns as the household fire of a grand

epistemology and scepticism are bloodless words on paper,

their problems actually occur existentially in the indiVidual, as they
1

Letters, p. 129.

2Ibid •
3Clarel, Pt. III, canto xxi, 11. 244-247.
4Ibid ., Pt. IV, canto ~viU, 1. 82.
5The Litera!! World, VII (August 24, 1850), 147.
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did in Melville, they are vital and personal, problems that may significantly
affect the ''heart.''
What is the object of man's inquiry? what does he want to know? Melville once wrote that "truth is in things, and not in words." 1 Many philosophers would credit him with only a half score, since there is a kind of truth
in both, but Melville touched a fundamental fact:
being.

the object of the mind is

Before man employs "words" to speak, write, or read, he is confronted

with beings, and when he finally does speak, write, and read, these human
actions are radically affected by the nature and degree of his perception of
ontological truth, of being.
is in itself.

Man seeks to know being, whatever is, as it

Like Melville' a Pierre, man wanta to "know what !!.."

2

How much of being does man desire to know? Man's very metaphysical
make-up seems to be penetrated with an insatiate desire to know what will
satisfy all his questions once and for all because it is the All.

Melville's

Babbalanja is concerned with "things infinite in the finite.,,3 Melville's
most memorable protagonists, as well as Melville himself, seek to reach the
final and ultimate heart of truth.

They want to enucleate the core of reality,

to probe the interiority of being, to reach the omega point in each datum of
existence--and of existence itself.

Babbalanja, in Mardi, wants what is

"beneath the seeming," the "precious pearl wi thin the shaggy oyster," the
"circle's centre,ft or--in the terms of Melville's felicitous contruct-the

~ardi, I, chap. xciii, 329.
2

Pierre, Bk. III, chap. vi, p. 90.

~ardi, II, chap. lxxvi, 328.
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"idea-1mmanens," the immanent or indwelling idea. 1 Melville praises
Shakespeare for his "short. quick probings at the ••• axis of reality.II 2
Ahab, too, wants to "touch the axis," to "strike through the mask,"3 Pierre,
to strike through the helm of the Black Knight and see the "face" of Truth. 4
The next question i. the epistemological poser:
to know1-or t in Melville's tems:

"What may man know?"S

how much is man able
Because knowledge

is the progeny of a union between a knowing subject and a knowable object, it
will be curtailed by the limitations of either.

It is the intention of the

present chapter to investigate Melville'. deliberations on the knowing subject
--Man.

Because Melville is primarily an artist rather than a philosopher, it

will not be surprising to find in this investigation that his works do not
offer any schematic arrangement of abstract philosophical tenets; instead, his
views are manifested through themes, characters, dialogue, situation, and
imagery.

Melville opts for no particular process of ideogenesis in the ques-

tion of truth, certitude, knowledge, of the origin and accuracy of ideas:

in

the question of whether knowledge precedes experience or experience knowledge,
he never completely rejects the first, the Platonic concept, e.g., of innate
ideas, 6 though he obliquely challenges their final validity on the grounds of
1

~'t

II, chap. x, 36; chap. lxxii, 308.

2The LiteratI World, VII (August 17, 1850), 126.

~obY-Dick, I, chap. xxxvi, 206, 204.
4Pierre, Bk. 111, chap. vi, p. 91.
5C1arel, Pt. IV, canto iii, 1. 109.
6See Mardi (II, chap. lxxvi, 326): "The essence of all ideas is
infused," and Pierre (Bk. XXI, chap. i, p. 395): "All the great books in the
world are but the mutilated shadowings-forth of invisible and eternally
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the possibility of a deceptive or nonbenevolent first cause, but he more frequently works in terms of the faculties and acquired knowledge,l and he increasingly emphasizes the importance of experience. 2 His treatment of the cognitive faculties, though fairly inclusive, is, like Montaigne's, at random.
Most of Melville's sceptical sources from Rabelais and Montaigne on
are in the Renaissance tradition or heavily influenced by that tradition:
renaissance thought, particularly that of the Protestant reformation. questioned, along with the "rule of faith," the grounds of epistemological certitude; the renaissance revival of the often glorious and just as often complex
conglomeration of Greek and Roman

thought-~ontaigne's

numerous quotations are

apt testimony--offered a welter of confusing and conflicting concepts; a polymorphic society began to replace the great medieval monolithic structure and
challenged that structure in both its predominantly Catholic theology and its
supporting scholastic philosophy, a philosophy heavily indebted to Aristotelianism.

An epistemological assumption of this traditional philosophy is the

fundamental position of the senses in the acquisition of knowledge; the
Dominican theologian and scholastic philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, e.g., in
his Summa Theologica, cites Aristotle:

"The Philosopher [Aristotle] says

unembodied images in the soul."
lIn addition to numerous forthcoming quotations, see, e.g., such
passages as faji's observation on King Yoky talking with his hands and a
servitor interpreting: "Very curious to note the rapidity with which motion
was translated into sound; and the simultaneousness with which meaning made
its way through four successive channels to the mind--hand, sight, voice, and
tympanum" (Mardi, II, chap. lxx, 293).
2In The Confidence-Man, e.g., some eighteen references are made to
experience.
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(Metaph. i. 1; Poster. ii. IS) that the principle of knowledge is in the
senses." 1 Further, emphasis is on a positive guarantee of certainty in sense
perception; distinguishing sense from intellect, Aristotle, in Bk. 111, chap.
iii of De Anaa, writes:

"For perception of the special objects of sense is

always free from error, • • • while it is possible to think falsely as well as
truly, II and, again, "sensations are always true." 2

In "Lactio Four" of his

commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, Aquinas writes:
Understanding may be 'correct' or 'incorrect' • • • • Sensation, on the
other hand, can only be 'correct', for the senses are infallible with
respect to their proper objects. 3
1

Summa Tbeologica (3 vols.; Chicago: Benaiger Brothers, Inc., 1947),
I, 428--Pt. 1, Q. 84. Art. 6. In fairness to both Aristotle and Aquinas, however, the quotation should be qualified. Aquinas continues:
"But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual
operation, according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible
does not suffice, but something aore noble is required, for the agent is
!!.2!:!. noble Sh!A .!h!. patient, a8 he 8ays (De Cener. 1. 5] • • • • Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by
the mere impre8sion of 80me 8uperior being8, as Plato held; but that the
higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which
we have spoken above (Q. 79, M. 3, 4), CAuse8 the phantasm8 received frOll
the senses to be actually intelligible, by a proceS8 of abstraction.
According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasm8, intellectual knowledge is caused by the sense8. But since the phantasms cannot
of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually
intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible
knowledge i8 the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but
rather thu it is in a way the material cause."
SOlIe interpretations of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge maintain that
there is nothing in the intellect that is not fir8t in the senses--thia concept is important in the sceptical procedure of arguing first against the
sen8es and consequently against reason.
2

The Ba8ic Work8 of Aristotle, ed. with an introduction by Richard
McKeon (7th printing; New York: Random House, 1941), p. 587.
3Ariatotle's De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the
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Scholasticism, as exemplified, e.g., in Aquinas, does not deny mistakes of sense perception through some discernible reason:

e.g., the taste of

a fever-stricken person might judge "a sweet thing to be bitter, through his
tongue being vitiated by ill humors"; or,--and Aquinas is here borrowing an
example from Aristotle' s De Anima--one might judge "the sun to be only a foot
in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size"; again, "much
more is sense deceived concerning accidental 8ensible objects, as when it
judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same"--but,
Aquinas continues:
'nae reason of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is per M!.
directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the
same. Hence, so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning
its own proper object does not fail.
Earlier in the same article, Aquinas maintains stoutly;

"Sense is not de-

ceived in its proper object. ,,1
Renaissance sceptical and contending reaction, therefore, questioned
2

Aristotelianism with its positive emphasis on the validity of sense knowledge;
by stressing the inefficacy of the senses, reason is automatically subverted,
since it depends for its principle and material cause on sense knowledge; subsequently, the various fields of knowledge, sciences and disciplines, which
depend upon both the senses and reason, were undermined.

Melville is not so

COIIl1Ientan: of St. 'naomas Aguinas, trans. Kenelm F08ter, O.P. and Silvester
Humphries, o.P. with an introduction by Ivo Thomas, O.P. (New Haven: Yale
Univeraity Press, 1951), p. 382.
1

Aquinas, Summa 'naeologica, I, 438--Pt. 1, Q. 85, Art. 6.

~ontaigne writes: "The god of scholastic knowledge is Aristotle; 'tis
irreligion to question any of bis decrees, a8 it was those of Lycurgu8 of
Sparta; his doctrine is a magisterial law, which, peradventure, is as false
u another" (Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 250).

99
logically tidy; neverthe1ess--and probably because he inherited the aggregate
problem of this sceptical tradition through those spokesmen who became,
through reading, his mentors--Me1vi11e's thought easily falls within the
order of the above sequence, i.e., a rejection of the final trustworthiness
of the senses, of reason which depends on the senses, and of the various discip1ines which depend on both.

Though Melville, as artist, does not present

this schematic order, its various elements are assumed and incorporated in
the themes, dialogue, and imagery of his works.

While inflicting some initial

distortion to Melville's art by subordinating it to this schema, this approach
does clarify the implications of his scepticism, show how he employed these
implications and thereby help bring to his predominantly sceptic themes and
imagery a fuller understanding of their significance and suggestiveness.
Sense knowledge"
The external senses.--The uncertainty of sense knowledge is one of
the chief staples of the sceptic writers.

Rabelais writes:

The soul is seldom able to report those things in such sincerity 8S it
hath seen them, by reason of the imperfection and frailty of the corporeal
senses, which obstruct the effectuating of that office; even as the moon
doth not communicate unto this earth of ours that light which she receiveth from the sun with so much splendor • • • and liveliness as it was
given her. 1
Descartes, too, has serious reservations concerning sense knowledge:
All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the
highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses.
I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part
of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have
even once been deceived. 2
1

Rabe1ais, II, Bk. III, chap. xiii, 273.

2

Descartes, p. 98.
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Sir Thomas Browne's "Vulgar Errors" appropriately begins with a tautly organized chapter on the causes of errors or deception; using Adam and Eve as
exemplars of the human condition Browne says:
the conduct of their senses."l

"They were deceived through

Browne mentions the "fallacies of sense" and

writes of "those wayes, which have most reference unto sense, and wherein
there 1yeth most notable and popular delusion." 2 Pascal claims:
Man is only a subject full of error, natural and ineffaceable, without
grace. Nothing shows him the truth. Everything deceives him. These
two sources of truth, reason and the senses, besides being both wanting
in sincerity, deceive each other in turn. The senses mislead the reason
with false appearances. 3
Pierre Bayle asserts that the "senses always impose upon us"--and his use of
impose with upon gives the meaning "to practice tricks or deception." 4 Hume
remarks on "the imperfect judgments of our senses and imagination" and our
"fallible and uncertain faculties." 5
Montaigne postpones his discussion of the senses until near the end
of the "Apology" and gives it something of a climactic and capping position
in the essay--he declares:

"Now all knowledge is conveyed to us by the

senses," and "upon the consideration of the senses • • • lies the greatest
foundation and proof of our ignorance." 6 Montaigne employs a number of
1
2

Browne, II, 185.

!.!:!!.£.,

193, 194.

3Pensees,
"
83.

4

Bayle, 1734-1741 ed., VIII. 601.

5

Hume, It 101, 236.

6

Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, pp. 275, 274 respectively.

mine.

Underlining
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arg\Dllents against the five external senses, arguments which He1ville eventually
appropriates in his writings.

Montaigne first questions the adequacy of the

existing number of the senses; he writes:

"I make a doubt whether or no man

be furnished with all natural senses , ,,1 and he later observes:

"We have

formed a truth by the consultation and concurrence of our five senses; but
perhaps we should have the consent and contribution of eight or ten to make
a certain discovery of it in its essence."

2

In Mardi, the first of Melvi11e's

novels to mention Montaigne, Mohi the historian asks Babbalanja:

"Philosopher,

our great reef is surrounded by an ocean; what think you lies beyond?"
Babbalanja answers that the appearance of certain strangers proves the existence of "isles afar." and then continues:
Nor is it at all impossible, Braid-Beard, that beyond their land may exist
other regions, of which those strangers know not; peopled with races
something like us Mardians [earth-dwellers]; but perhaps with more
exalted faculties, and organs that we lack. They may have some better
seeing sense than ours. 3
Melville uses this thought again later in the novel:

Babbalanja, in his mys-

tiea1 vision of heaven, is endowed with the use of an additional sense.

When

he later relates his vision to the other members of the quest, he eannot find
words to tell of all the unsearehab1e things about whieh his guide discoursed,
for as Babbalanja explains:

'~y

sixth sense whieh he opened, sleeps again,

with all the wisdom that it gained," and, as he fe11 back to earth, he was
left with only his "five sense8.,,4
1

.!!?!.!t.,

2

!lli..,

It may also have been Montaigne's

p. 275.

p. 276.

3

Mardi, II, chap. xxix, 115-116.

4

.!!?!.!t.,

chap. lxxxiv, 376, 378.
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discussion on the want of additional faculties that inspired a passage in
Babbalanja's soliloquy over the bones of the dead king Marjora:
Art thou? or art thou not? I see thee not; I hear thee not; I feel thee
not; eyes, ears, hands, are worthless to test thy being; and if thou art,
thou art something beyond all human thought to compass. We must have
other faculties to know thee by.l
In his discussion of the possible deficiency of the sense faculties, Montaigne
turns to the example of animals who apparently possess senses that humans
lack--e.g., the cock who crows when day is near and animals who know what
herbs will help cure their illnesses.

Melville employs the argument but con-

structs his own examples:
Belike, the eagles, from their eyries look down upon us }<tardians t in our
hives, even as upon the beavers in their dams, marvelling at our incomprehensible ways. And cunning though we be, some things hidden from us
may not be mysteries to them. Having five keys [five senses], hold we
all that open to knowledge? Deaf, blind, and deprived of the power of
scent, the bat will steer its way unerringly:--could we?2
Montaigne further questions the validity of sense knowledge because
of the possibility of error and uncertainty in the operation of the senses
due to illusions; e.g., an anchored ship may seem moving, or, from a distance,
separate rocks may seem to form one island. 3 Melville, in tiThe Encantadas,"
uses a like argument but, as usual, creates his own examples.

He quotes a

statement of Cowley, that "excellent bucanier":--''My fancy led me to call it
Cowley's Enchanted Isle, for, we having had a sight of it upon several points
of the compass, it appeared always in so many different forms; sometimes like
a ruined fortification; upon another point like a great city"; Melville adds:
1

~.,

It chap. lxxviii, 276.

~ardi, II, chap. lxxi, 298-299.
3

Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 277.
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fiNo wonder, though, that among the Encantadas [Melville's microcosm] all
sorts of ocular deceptions and mirages should be met."

1

In the third sketch,

"Rock Rodondo," Melville describes the illusory effect of the Rock, which
had a "sail-like look" from the "long bird-lime streaks of a ghostly white lt :
It is visible at the distance of thirty miles; and, fully participating
in that enchantment which pervades the group, when first seen afar invariably is mistaken for a sail. Four leagues away, of a golden, hazy
noon, it seems some Spanish admiral's ship, stacked up with glittering
canvas. Sail hoi Sail hot Sail hot from all three masts. But coming
nigh, the enchanted frigate is transformed apace into a craggy keep.2
At the end of the sketch, Melville circles back to the illusion with his usual
ontological anticlimax:
Its bird-lime gleams in the golden rays like the whitewash of a tall
lighthouse, or the lofty sails of a cruiser. This moment, doubtless,
while we know it to be a dead des~rt rock, other voyagers are taking
oaths it i8 a glad populous ship.
In this case, the illusion is uncovered, but the question remains:

do we

always discover the deceptions of our senses? As Melville sublimated the act
of seeing
to symbolize the intellectual act of knowing, so he a1.0 symbolically
"'- .,.->,.--.
elevated the concrete connection of mirage with sight to inaight--in this
passage which takes a thrust at ultimate responsibility for the lack of a
criterion, the ensuing state of fluctuating uncertainty is likened to a mirage:
In those Hyperborean regions, to which enthusiastic Truth, and Earnestness,
and Independence, will invariably lead a mind fitted by nature for profound and fearless thought, all objects are seen in a dubioU8, uncertain,
and refracting light. Viewed through that rarefied atmosphere the most
immemorially admitted maxims of men begin to slide and fluctuate, and
finally become wholly inverted; the very heavens themselves being not
innocent of producing this confounding effect, since it is mostly in the
1The Piazza Tales, p. 206.
2

~.,

p. 194.

3Ibid ., p. 198.
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heavens themselves that these wonderful mirages are exhibited. 1
In addition to the possibility of a deficient number of senses and
of deception by illusion or mirage, Montaigne shows that the senses may be
altered by the passions of the soul:
fied by the passions of the soul." 2

"Our senses are • • • very often stupeIn Melville's "Benito Cereno," Captain

Delano becomes disturbed and suspicious when Babo and Don Benito withdraw to
the opposite bulwarks and begin whispering, so the Captain fears, about himself; he believes he sees a certain "secret sign" passed between Don Benito
and a "suspicious" member of the crew and remarks:

ttlf I could only be cer-

tain that, in my uneasiness, my senses did not deceive me." 3
Montaigne's next problem is the problem of the dream--he writes:
"They who have ccopared our lives to a dream were, perhaps, more in the right
than they were aware of." 4 Although logically subsidiary to the epistemological problem, the dream hypothesis, in certain respects, is more directly
an ontological probl_ and will be treated as such in the next chapter, but
at this point it will be examined in its relationship to illusion and sense
knowledge.

Briefly, the problem is that sense experience and dream experi-

ence can be so much alike that one can hardly be distinguished from the other
--in fact, the very grounds for such a distinction is questioned.

The example

that comes moet forcibly to mind is Melville's character Nehemiah in Clarel.

As the next chapter endeavors to show, Melville questions whether all men
1

Pierre, Bk. IX, chap. i, p. 231.

2

Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 279.

3

The Piazza Tales, p. 97.

4

Montaigne, Bk. II. chap. xii, p. 279.
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might not live in a dream world, since reality itself might be no more than
dream; nevertheless, as Melville writes in Clarel, this is "the world we know I
(Sole know, and reason from)," 1 and the dream is not solved or challenged by
withdrawing into a greater dream.

Nehemiah's greater dream is his unguestion-

ing faith, a faith not reconciled with fact and maintained only by becoming
tapervious to evil and experience-His soul pre-occupied and freed
From actual objects through the sway
Of visionary scenes intenae-- 2
a dream that, finally, may differ only in degree rather than in kind.

Kel-

ville ironically describes Nehemiah's knowledge--he knows the words of the
"seers," can "cipher out I The mystic days and dates sublime"--but he has
frequently to ask "the hour of day. ,,3 Nehemiah is described as having absent,
"dreamy" eyes;

4

he has a "dreamy" interest in the young Turk with his fiery

steed; S meditating on Christ's visits to the peaceful and pastoral Bethany,
which the pilgrims are passing, Clare1 questioningly muses, "can one dream
the dream[?]"--Nehemiah can:

he is riding along "dreaming of his fairy1and.,,6

His dream becomes identified with illusion:
By Olivet in waning day
The saint in fond illusion went,
lClarel, Pt. III, canto iii, 11. 13-14.
2

~ ••

Pt. I, canto xxvi, 11. 20-22.

3Ibid., canto viii, 11. 44-52.
4

!.2!!., canto ix,

1. 3.

5!.2!!., canto xi, 1. 79.
6
Ibid., Pt. II, canto vi, 11. 23, 39.
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Dream mixed with legend and event. 1
Finally, Nehemiah's waking and sleeping states beeome inextrieab1e.
frequently shown sleeping or dozing:

He is

he is able to "elose" his pious aeeounts

only after "half told I The theme he'd leave, then nod. droop, doze--"; 2
C1are1 visits Nehemiah in his hermitage but presently steals forth, "leaving
Nehemiah in slumber eaught";) Nehemiah falls asleep under the olive trees in
Gethsemane and Vine gestures to "let this poor dreamer take his rest,,;4
again. on route, "Released from travel, in good hour I Nehemiah dozed within
the tower,,;5 in the eanto "Of Petra," Nehemiah, like Pierre, p1aees himself
beneath a huge roek, but, with none of Pierre's eha11enge, Nehemiah evinees
simple trust and is "slumbering low ... 6
Pina11y, "dream mixed wi th • • • event" and led Nehemiah to his death
in the Dead Sea.

Montaigne says:

We wake sleeping, and sleep waking. • • • Our reason and soul reeeiving
those faneies and opinions that eome in dreams, and authorizing the
aetions of our dreams with the like approbation that they do those of
the day. 7
In a eanto signifieantly entitled "The Sleep-Walker," Nehemiah, "with
throbbing brain I O'erwrought by travel," falls into a vision or "eestasy"
1~'t Pt. I. eanto x, 11. 67-69.
2
)

~.,

11. 102-103.

~.,

eanto xxii. 1. 114.

4

~.,

5

~.,

eanto xxx, 1. 99.
Pt. II, eanto xx, 11. 26-27.

6

!1!!!1•• eanto xxx, 1. 70.

7Montaigne, Bk. II, ehap. xii. p. 279.
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that soon blend. with .leep:
Then, by that sleight each dreamer knows,
Dream merged in dream: the city r08e--

. ... .. . . .. . . . .. .... . .

Appeared the New Jerusalem.l

Nehemiah gives a like credence to his dream fancies as he would to hi. senaes:
The visions changed and counterchanged-Blended and parted--distant ranged,
And beckoned, beckoned him away.
In sleep he rose; and none did wi.t
When vanished this somnambulist.
If the sense of touch or feeling is considered under the a.pect of
pain, Kontaigne, with Pascal and Melville following suit, is willing to credit
it with quite positive prox:1mate effects.

In the "Apology," Montaigne dis-

cusses the fact that the senae. sometimes impo.e upon our reason but add.:
I set aside the senae of feeling, that has its functions nearer, more
lively, and substantial, that so often, by the effects of the pains it
helps the body to, subverts and overthrows all those fine Stoical resolutions and eoapels h1.a to cry out of his belly who has resolutely established this doctrine in his soul--"that the colic, and all other pains
and di.ea.... are indifferent thing., not having the power to abate anything of the sovereign felicity wherein the wise man is seated by his
virtue. ,,3
Earlier, Montaigne write. in the same vein about the philosophy of Varro and
Aristotle and asks:

"Did they extract frOil their logic any consolation for

the gout?,,4 Pascal affirms that "all the philosophy in the world does not
lClarel, Pt. II, canto xxxviii, 11. 7-8, 14-15, 42.
2

~.,

11. 46-50.

~ODta1gne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 277.
4

~.,

p. 223.
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avail against an hour of suffering. ,,1

A similar idea of the inadequacy of

philosophy in the face of pain is present in Melville's letter to Hawthorne,
June l85l--Melville criticizes Goethe's pantheistic philosophy:
What nonsensel Here is a fellow with a raging toothache. UMy dear boy,"
Goethe says to him, "you are sorely afflicted with that tooth; but you
must live !!!. the all, and then you will be happy. ,,2
Despite positive prox.imate effects, Melville still questions the substantiality
of even that which causes pain, and the sense of feeling or touch is finally
left in a state of dubiety:

"What object sensible to touch I . . . may faith

rely on[?],,3
The final coup de grace to the possibility of sense knowledge offering any sbsolute and ultimate veridity occurs in Clarel.

Margoth, the scien-

tific materialist, and Rolfe, the seeking sceptic, are debating whether the
Jordan valley was struck by natural or supernatural forces; Margoth is q\\ite
sure it was through natural forces:

"One here perceives the sign--of course;

I All f S mere geology, you know." Rolfe counters:
that?"

"Nay, how should one know

Margoth:
By sight,
Touch, taste--all senses in assent
Of common sense their parliament. 4

When Margoth finishes speaking, the ass brays out a "hideous hee-haw."

5

lBlaise Pascal, The Miscellaneous Writings of Pascali Consisting of
Letters, Essays. Conversations. and Miscellaneous Thoughts, trans. George
Pearce, Esq. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1849), p. 196.
2

Letters, p. 13l.

3C1arel. Pt. I, canto xxiv, 11. 70-71.
4

Ibid., Pt. II, canto xxxiii, 11. 50-55.

5Ibid., 1. 76.
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The internal senses.--Melville also undercuts the possibility of
attaining any final verity aided by the operations of the four internal senses:
common sense, imagination, instinct, and memory.

The common sense a8 the

first of the internal senses is here used, again, in the framework of the
traditional philosophy against which much of the renaissance movement militated:

it is not exactly considered in the context of the colloquial Ameri-

canism of tlhorse sense" or the like widely used term of "common sense," both
of which in popular parlance have the meaning of good practical judgment, although there remains a dependence of meaning of the newer form on the older;
rather, it is used in the sense of the

~

first definition of common sense

as "an 'internal' sense which was regarded as the common bond or centre of the
five senses, in which the various impressions received were reduced to the
unity of a common consciousness." Melville's use of the term in Clarel l
approximates this meaning.

The reference, with its rejection of common sense,

is, again, the one just previously cited in which Margoth claims he knows the
Jordan valley was struck by natural forces, and he knows this-By sight,
Touch, t&ate--all senses in assent
Of common sense their parli8Dlentand Melville allows the ass to become suddenly voluble.
In Mardi. Babbalanja dispatches the validity of the imagination:
"Things visible are but conceits of the eye:
the fancy.

things imaginative, conceits of

If duped by one, we are equally duped by the other.,,2

Although instinct does not enable the hunters to reach Babbalanja's
I

~.,

11. 53-55.

~rdi, I, chap. xciii, 329.
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"ultimate" in Mardi, Melville does, at one point, give it great praise; however, he employs the term with generic scope and does not present it in any
clear context.

In chapter xxxi Melville barely finishes referring to the in-

stincts of brutes when he uses "instinct" as a synonym for reason:

"Is not

reason subtile as quicksilver--live as lightning[?) ••• Can we starve that
noble instinct in us, and hope that it will survive?"l

The old man of Serenia,

in his explanation of the nature of the Serenians' love for Alma [Christ),
uses the word apposite to feeling:
fond, filial, reverential feeling. tl2

I~e

love him from an instinct in us;--a

The highest encomium of instinct--wbat-

ever it means to Melville--occurs in Babbalanja's praise of Lombardo the poet:
"For though Lombardo abandoned all monitors from without; he retained one autocrat within--his crowned and sceptred instinct.,,3

Instinct is not considered

infallible, however, even in Mardi; Babbalanja quotes from one of his old
"Our very instincts are prejudices."

authors:

4

By the time of Clarel, the

limitations of instinct are clearly expressed:
Such counter natures in mankind-Mole, bird, not more unlike we find:
Instincts adverse, nor less how true S
Each to itself t What clew, what clew?
Montaigne writes of the internal sense of memory:

"Memory is a

faculty of wonderful use, and without which the judgment can very hardly peJform
1 Ibid. , II, chap. xxxi, 123.
2Ibid • , chap. !xxxiii, 368.
3

~.,

chap. lxxvi, 328.

4Ibid. , chap. lxxi, 298.

SClarel, Pt. Ill, canto xx, 11. 39-42.
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its office."

1

Pascal may take his cue from Montaigne when he writes:

"Memory

is necessary for all the operations of reason." 2 Melville's most trenchant
attack on memory occurs in that epistemological mare's-nest The Confidence~.

The

con~an

John Ringman (but one avatar of a Confidence-Man of divine

proportions) feigns acquaintance with the merchant:
"How do you do, Mr. Roberts?"
"Eh?"
"Don't you know me?"
"No, certainly."
The merchant's certainty, however, gradually crumbles under the onslaught of
the con-man:
"I see you have a faithless memory, Mr. Roberts. But trust in the
faithfulness of mine."
'~ell, to tell the truth, in some things my memory ain't of the very
best. • • ."
flOh, sir, suffice it that it is as I say. Doubt not that we are all
well acquainted."
"But--but I don't like this going dead against my own memory; 1--"
"But didn't you admit, my dear sir, that in some things this memory
of yours is a little faithless? Now, those who have faithless memories,
should they not have some little confidence in the less faithless memories
of others?"
When the merchant still hesitates, the con-man continues in Lockean terms:
I see, I see; quite erased from the tablet.
He renews his attack by asking the merchant if he ever received a head injury,
so that the events registered in his memory were "afterwards bruised out by
the injury."

The merchant is now listening with more than ordinary interest,

and the con-man presses his advantage by relating a fictitious accident that
happened to him as a child and which brought about the oblivion of events in

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xvii, p. l03.
2
,/
Pensees, 369.
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his memory.

He rounds off by asserting:

You see, sir, the mind is ductile, • • • images, ductilely received
into it, need a certain time to harden and bake in their impressions,
otherwise such a casualty ,as I speak of viII in an instant obliterate
them, as though they had never been.
The merchant finally admits not to an injury but to a sickness, a brain fever
which caused him to lose his mind completely for an interval.
concludes:

The con-man

"That brain fever accounts for it alL II 1

Intellectual knowledge
Montaigne vas inexorable in his deflation of esteem for the faculty of
intellect or "reason."

He devotes a large section of his "Apology" to a demon-

stration that man's exalted reason is a faculty that he shares in common with
brute nature.

2

Melville seems to have given Montaigne's argument on the

rationality of animals some consideration as his statment in Redburn, previously cited, shows:

"There are unknown worlds of knowledge in brutes. tt3

In

Moby-Dick the narrator affirms that the "sperm whale is in some cases sufficiently

powerful~

knowing, and judiciously malicious, as vith direct afore-

thought to stave in, utterly destroy, and sink a large ship."

He documents

his assertion on the knowingness of the whale with an excerpt from Owen
Chace's account of the sinking of the Whale-ship Essex:

the selection contains

such passages as "it was anything but chance vhich directed his operations,"
1

The

Confidence~an,

chap. iv, pp. 21-24.

2

See, e.g., Montaigne's discussion of bees and their activities: "Can
we imagine that such, and so regular, a distribution of employments can be
carried on without reasoning and deliberation?tI (Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 207).
3

Redburn, chap. xl, p. 254.
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the whale's attacks "were calculated" and marked by "decided, calculating mischief."l

In the climax of the chase, when Moby Dick turns to rend the Pequod,

knowledge becomes Omniscience--it is with a "predestinating head" that the
whale advances and with "retribution, swift vengeance, eternal malice." 2 Montaigne, in this same section on the rationality of animals, declares:

"When

I play with my cat who knows whether I do not make her more sport than she
makes me?"

3

Melville develops this query in his poem

Kitten"; he has Montaigne say to the kitten:

'~ontaigne

and His

''We, you know, in mind are one,"

and
Pishl what fops we humans here,
Won't admit within our sphere
The whitest doe, nor even thee-We, the spotless humans, we!4
Montaigne's most devastating argument against the intellect is founded
on the fallibility of sense knowledge; stated simply, the argument runs:

man's

knowledge comes through the senses and depends upon them for its certainty; but
the senses are uncertain in operation; therefore, man's dependent reason and
knowledge are subsequently uncertain.

Monta1gne writes:

"The uncertainty of

our senses renders everything uncertain that they produce"; 5 earlier in his
essay he is even more explicit:
The sects that controvert the knowledge of man do it principally by
the uncertainty and weakness of our senses: for since all knowledge ia

~obY-Dick, I, chap. xlv, 258, 259.
2

Ibid., II, chap. cxxxv, 365.

"Eternal" suggests a divinity.

3
Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 206.
4
5

Collected Poems, pp. 381-382.

Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 281.
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by their means and mediation conveyed unto us, if they fail in their report
if they corrupt or alter what they bring us from without, if the light
which by them creeps into the soul be obscured in the passage, we have
nothing else to hold by.l
.
On the question of the dependence of reason on the senses, Melville does not
develop Montaigne's argument gua argument, but it is everywhere implicit in
his works:

man must work with his perceptions of tithe world we know I (Sole

know, and reason from)," 2 and, as he endeavors to do so, the question arises:
"Whose the eye that sees aright, I If any?,,3 and he is left with the consequent agonizing doubt of possible intellectual deception based on the errancy
of sense knowledge-nif I could only be certain that • • • my senses did not
deceive me.,,4
The direction of Montaigne's argument against reason that activated
both the most sublime disquisition on Christianity 5 and, yet, the most
strenuous defiance from Melville was voiced early in the "Apology":
The means that 1 shall use [in the argument against reason] • • • is to
crush and spurn under foot pride and human arrogance; to make them sensible of the inanity, vanity, and vileness of man; to wrest the wretched
arms of their reason out of their hands; to make them bow down and bite
the ground under the authority and reverence of the Divine Majesty. 'Tis
to that [the Divinity] alone that knowledge and wisdom appertain; that
alone that can make a true estimate of itself, and from which we purloin whatever we value ourselves upon. • • • "God permits not any being
but himself to be truly wise." • • • "God resists the proud, but gives
grace to the humble." "Understanding is in the gods:' says Plato, "not
1

.ill.s!..,

2

p. 276.

Clarel, Pt. III, canto iii, 11. 13-14.

3

~.,

4

Pt. II, canto xxii, 11. 134-135.

The Piazza Tales, p. 97.

5
Mardi, II, chap. lxxxiii.
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at all, or very little, in men."l
Closely connected with this argument is the idea that man is not much worth
the serious consideration of the gods:

in Pierre, Melville writes of man that

"in his infinite comparative minuteness and abjectness, the gods do likewise
despise him, and own him not of their clan";

2

Montaigne quotes Ennius:

I ever thought that gods above there were, 3
But do not think they care what men do here.
In Book III of the Essays, Montaigne writes the following about the physical
act of love, but his general thought is applicable here also:

"I believe it to

be true that, as Plato says, the gods made man for their sport ••

. . 'What a

strange sporting cruelty is this?,,,4 and in the same Book, he writes:
goda play at tennis with us, and bandy us every way."S

"The

The indifference of

the "gods" becomes a constantly recurring theme in Helville.
Melville is willing to concede that "God permits not any being but
himself to be truly wise":

Babbalanja's celestial guide declares that "no

mind but Oro's [God's1 can know all. • • • perfect wisdom can be only Oro's." 6
Melville is even willing to concede that "God • • • gives grace to the humble":
Babbalanja's guide tells him, "since humility is thine, thou art one apt to
learn.

That which they own wisdom could not find, thy ignorance confessed

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii. p. 204.
2

Pierre, Bk. XXII, chap. i, p. 413.

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 238.
4

~.,

Bk. III, chap. v, p. 406.

5

lhM.., chap. ix, p. 444.

6
Mardi, II, chap. lxxxiV, 375.
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shall gain.

Come, and see new things"; later, a more exalted angel hears thea

discoursing and is drawn to Babbalanja's angelic guide, because, as he 8ays,
"thy humility was manifest; no arrogance of knowing.
things."l Melville could admit that it was so:

Come lh2!!. and learn new

that it should be so was

another matter.
The episode of the "willful boy" in Mardi seems significant in view
of the fact that Melville was probably reading the "Apology" for the first
time during his composition of Mardi.

In the above cited pa8sage from the

"Apology" in which Montaigne relates his efforts to crush human arrogance by
leaving reason un reconciled with and subservient to faith, he speaks of the
"vileness of man" and assays through his argUlllent to make man ''bow down and
bite the ground under the authority and reverence of the Divine Majesty":
Melville's "willful boy" tries to see the image of Oro [God] and exclailaB aloud
when he cannot; the censor-bearers cry, "let him speak no more; but bow down,
and grind the dust where he stands; and declare himself the vilest creature
that crawls.

So Oro and Alma cOlll1and. II

The boy's answer may well be close to

Melville's mind at thi8 time:
I feel nothing in me 80 utterly vile, • • • and I cringe to none.
But I would as lief adore your image, a8 that in my heart, for both mean
the 8ame; but more, how can I? I love great Oro, though I comprehend hila
not. I marvel at his works, and feel as nothing in his 8ight; but because he 18 thus omnipotent, and I a mortal, it follows not that I _
vile. Nor so doth he regard me. We do ourselve8 degrade ourselves, not
Oro us. Hath not Oro made me? And therefore _ I not worthy to stand
erect before him? Oro is almighty, but no despot. I wonder; I hope; I
love; I weep; I have in me a feeling nigh to fear~ that i8 not fear; but
wholly vile I .. not; nor can we love and cringe.
1

.!lli.., 374, 377.

2Ibid •• chap. viii,. 29-30.
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As Melville's scepticism deepened, he came to question the despotism of God,
but the tems of his worship remained unchanged--"I cringe to none. • • • nor
can we love and cringe."
fear or be abased:

Ahab, too, would respond to love, but he will not

t'Come in thy lowest form of love, and I will kneel and

kiss thee; but at thy highest, come as mere supernal power; and though thou
launcheat navies of full-freighted worlds, there's that in here that still remains indifferent."

Because Ahab has come to a realization of evil and feels

that he has been struck out at, he reasons to an element not of love but of
warfare in the "supernal power" and concludes that the "right worship is
defiance."l
Melville looked for a greater coition of reason and faith than was
offered by Christianity as he personally understood it:

he was not about to

have the "wretched arms of his reason wrested out of his hands."

He poignantl

questioned the limitations of the human intellect, but he held the tlgrand
intellect" in high esteem.

In Mardi, Babbalanja says to Yoemy:

Nor is there any impiety in the right use of our reason, whatever the
issue. Smote with superstition, shall we let it wither and die out, a
dead 11mb to a live trunk, as the mad devotee's arm held up motionless for
years? Or shall we employ it but for a paw, to help us to our bodily
needs, as the brutes use their instinct? Is not reason subtile as quicksilver--live as lightning--a neighing charger to advance, but a snail to
recede? Can we starve that noble instinct in us, and hope that it will
survive? Better slay the body than the soul; and if it be the direst of
sins to be the murderers of our own bodies, how much more to be a soulsuicide. Yoamy, we are men, we are angels. And in his faculties, high
Oro is but what a man would be, infinitely magnified. Let us aspire to
all things. Are we babes in the woods, to be scared by the shadows of the
trees? What shall appal us? If eagles gaze at the sun, may not men at
the gods?2

~obY-Dick, II, chap. cxix, 282, 281.
~ardi, II, chap. xxxi, 122-123.
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Babbalanja's reason, finally, does not enable him to gaze at the gods nor
attain for him his much desired Hultimate U ; in Serenia, he settles for the
"penultimate":

"My voyage is ended.

Not because what we sought is found; but

that I now possess all which may be had of what I sought in Mardi."

1

In Mardi, the maiden Yillah, through multiple associations, becomes
the symbolic embodiment of all that man desires, the omnicomplete, the summum
bonum, the sovereign good.

2

Melville may have been struck by Montaigne's dis-

cussion of what philosopher's have propounded as the "sovereign good of man.,,3
Among the other desiderata of human yearning is knowledge or the possession
of truth, and it receives a lion's share of attention in Mardi:

man's desire

for knowledge is frustrated along with his other desires--"And in all this
tour of Mardi, how little have we found to fill the heart
slaughter all our yearnings,"

4

. . . ..

how much to

but, unlike the search for other goods, Mel-

ville carries the search for knowledge beyond the pales of earth, and the
Christian neophyte Babbalanja records in his narration of a celestial vision
what may well have been the dilemma of his author.
1

Babbalanja inquires about

Ibid., chap. lxxxv, 380.

2

Not only is Yillah the ~ and beauty and felicity that Taji seeks,
but she comes to represent such desiderata as the dignity of the individual-when the willful boy is sacrificed for refusing to admit to vileness, Babbalanja declares that Yi11ah "must have fled" these shores long since (Mardi, II,
chap. viii, 30); she is liberty--after observing slavery in Vivenza [America],
it is concluded that "Yillah harboured not" in Vivenza (Mardi, II, chap. lviii,
252); she is peace: "Yi11ah still eludes us. And in all this tour of Mardi
how little have we found to fill the heart with peace" (Mardi, II, chap. lXXXi,
358). Examples could be multiplied, since Yillah is usually associated with
the positive element that is found wanting at each stage of the journey of
quest.

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 270.
4

Mardi, II, chap. lxxxi, 358.
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the blest souls:
still mixed?

"Is theirs, oh guidel no happiness supreme? their state

Sigh these yet to know?"

'The guide answers:

"No mind but Oro's

can know all; no mind that knows not all can be content; content alone approximates to happiness."

1

'The idea of heaven without consummate knowledge is

not Melville's idea of heaven.

Happiness becomes mixed with usadness"; in

the second angel's eyes "swam tears unshed"; the spirits have "weeping halos,"
and around the one Shekinah, the "air was flaked with fire;-deep in which
2

fell showers of silvery globes, tears magnified. If Melville condemned "nominal" Christianity in his first two novels 3 and in Mardi. 4 Later in Mardi 5
his portrait of a real Christian community is sympathetically drawn, and it is
not at variance with reason:

Babbalanja addresses the old man:

that in your faith must be much that jars with reason."
"No, brother I

'~ethinks,

'The old man answers:

Right reason, and Alma, are the same; else Alaa, not reason,

would we reject," and when the philosopher accepts Christianity he says,
"Reason no longer domineers; but still doth speak.,,6

Reason has its place,

but, for Taji--apparently Melville-Taji--it just doesn't go far enough.-There might be a way to obtain supreme knowledge, but Melville questions it
on the grounds of the price demanded:

with Emersonien echoes of the pervading

1

l!!!., chap. lxxxiV, 375.

2

~.t

375, 376, 377, 378.

3See, e.g., IYPee. chap. xxv, p. 244; chap. xxvi, p. 263;
XVii, p. 74.
4
Mardi, II, chap. ix, 32.
5

~.,

chap. !xxxiii.

6Ibid ., 370, 371.

~,

chap.
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OVer-Soul, Babbalanja speaks of the soul that
intent upon itself, ••• pierces in upon its own essence, and is resolved
into its pervading original; becoming a thing constituent of the all-embracing deific; whereby we mortals become part and parcel of the gods; our
souls to them as thoughts, and we privy to all things occult, ineffable,
and sublime. l
If only God knows all, then man can know all only if he is "part and parcel"

of God.

But, like his fellow contemporary writers,

quately solve the problem of the One and the Many:

2

Melville could not adeit was simple and at least

pseudo-sublime to reduce everything to One--the panthdsm of being resolved
back into the "pervading original," but it could be ultimately achieved only
at the cost of the Many--the loss of each separate and distinct individual
1
2

~.,

chap. lxvi, 281.

Both Emerson and Whitman try to solve the problem of the One and the
Many by somehow dissolving the Many back into the One, by positing some underlying, fundamental identity of man (multiple) and God or the Over-Soul (one).
Emerson writes: "I am part or parcel of God" (Works, I, 10). In his essay
"The OVer-Soul," Emerson applies numerous images of water: "stream, tt "flowing river." "ebb," Itsea,1t "tide of being," "floats," "surges" (Works, II, 268,
281, 284, 294, 296). Whitman, too, in writing of the "general soul" utilizes
images of water: "The universal and fluid soul impounds within itself not
only all good characters • • • but • • • distorted characters" (Emory Holloway
[ed.], The Uncollected Poetry and Prose of Walt Whitman [Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1921], II, 65-66; underlining mine). Whitman
speaks of God as "fountain" and "reservoir," and his images of the sea, of
"float." and solution are bound up with his concept of the universal soul;
water is implied in such lines as "lave me all over, I Bathe me 0 God in thee"
(Emory Holloway [ed.), Leaves of Grass by Walt Whitman [The Inclusive Edition;
Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1926], p. 348). In Leaves of Grass
(Ed. Holloway, pp. 134, 192, 4, 349, 373 respectively), Whitman sees man
created--tfstruck from the float forever held in solution"--only, at last, to
return to this sae "float forever," "the partial to the permanent flowing,"
so there is a tlmerge at last" or a soul that "melts" back into God; however,
Whitman is not able completely to reconcile or submerge the Many (individual
personal identities) into the One, nor as a singer of the "Self" does he wish
to, so he refers to "actual faces" within this "merge," and, consequently, the
whole idea becomes rather vague and glutinous and comes close to conjuring up
a phantasm of the One and the Many as a vast vat of hot chocolate full of
partially melted marshmallows--not quite One and not quite Many.
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identity.

Melville would not pay that price; he cherished what he called his

"sovereignty in myself" and would not be even so much as "tributary":

he

sought parity rather than identity with the One--he would treat 'with all
Powers upon an equal basis"l and even be a "democrat to all above." 2
In some respects, Babbalanja's character does not fulfill its promise.
Whatever else it is, Mardi is also a record of Melville's growing realization
of the implications of scepticism, and he did not accept all of these tmplications without some struggle; he tries, e.g., to retain some proximate, if
limited, reliability of reason:

in an argument on reason that seems to at-

tempt to mitigate Montaigne's efforts to "humble lt the "arrogance" of human
reason <as shown in the previously cited passage, a passage that Melville
probably found offensive in tone), Melville has Babba1anja say, citing
Bardianna,
it [reason] is not so arrogant as some think. Nay, far too humble, at
times it submits to the grossest indignities. Though in its best estate,
not infallible; so far as it goes, for us, it is reliable. When at fault,
it stands still. • • • But if this our first revelation [with transcendental overtones, Melville sees reason coming directly from God and calls
it the "first revelation"] stops short of the uttermost, so with all
others. If, often, it only perplexes: much more the rest. They leave
much unexpounded; and disclosing new mysteries, add to the enigma.
Fellow-men! the ocean we would sound is unfathomable; and however much
we add to our line, when it is out, we feel not the bottom 3-although these lines somewhat prepare us for Babba1anja's later acceptance of
Christian faith, their static wisdom and passive acquiescence seem a far cry
from the Babba1anja who seeks the "ultimate," who wishes to use reason to
1

Letters, p. 125.

2

Moby-Dick, I, chap. xxxviii, 211.

3

Mardi, II, chap_ lxxi, 301.
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fl

gaze at the gods," and who is driven almost to madness by a philosophic

demon.

The structure of the novel may be responsible:

Montaigne, in his

"Apology," writes that "Plato seems to have affected this method of phi1osophising in dialogues; to the end that he might with greater decency, from
several mouths, deliver the diversity and variety of his own fancies";

I

Mel-

ville the sceptic, a man arguing with himself, does something akin to this by
assuming in different instances various personae of his novel Mardi.

What

gives evidence of having been but one line of thinking in Melville becomes
bifurcated into two characters in Mardi.

In the relationship of character

to the intensity and thrust of the search, the traits of the early Babbalanja
seem to be transferred in the denouement to Taji:

having newly discovered the

world of mind after the novel was under way, Melville may have felt he would
strain artistic plausibility by having his young, romantic hero Taji philosophizing to the depth that Babbalanja would, and when Babbalanja comes front
stage, Taji recedes only to come forward again as primary protagonist, after
Babba1anja submits his reason to Christian faith, to become a hunter and
challenger of an intensity that logically results, in Melville's terms, from
a depth of involvement and perception comparable to Babbalanja's.

The split

results in neither character reaching tragic heroic proportions.

Melville was

eminently successful when he channelled this side of his thought in the one
character of Ahab.
In this early novel of Mardi, Melville, the growing sceptic, can still
say of reason, at one point, that, though limited, "it is reliable," until his
increasing awareness of the possibility of deception, not only through the

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 235.

12)
senses but by some responsible first cause or power renders even this reliability uncertain, and, even at this early juncture, he sees reason as "reliable'
only "so far

88

it goes," which, for Melville isn't far enough.

Babbalanja

finds reason or knowledge limited even in heaven and Melville finally rejects
the possibility of being "privy to all things occult, ineffable, and sublime"
by being resolved into the "pervading original" because of the implied price
deaanded of one'a aovereign individuality.

Aa Melville became more deeply

cognizant through hia reading and writing of the problems of sceptici.. and
realized more fully its pervading intellectual frustration, his tone becomes
more militant, hia defiance more marked:

Moby-Dick becomes a battle of wits.

In his colossal quest !lover all sides of earth,,,l the "calculating tf
Ahab seeks an encounter unto death with the "calculating" sperm whale Moby
Dick, whoae significance spills over from that of a particular white whale to
become a symbol for all of Nature and, finally, a surrogate for God.

In this

great battle of wits, the "grand intellect" of Ahab is able to subdue lesser
intellects, even that of his most formidable human opponent Starbuck:
My soul is more than matched; she's overmanned; and by a madmanl Insufferable ating, that sanity should ground arma on such a field! But
he drilled deep down, and blaated all my reason out of mel 2
Ahab speaks of his ttbrain-battering fight,") and "The Battering-Ram"
becomes "the sperm whale's head,,4_-the locus of the intellect.
plays an important role in the novel.

Ahab's obsession i8 to thrust "through

~ObY-Dick, I, chap. xxxvi, 203.
2

~.,

chap. XXXViii, 211.

3~., chap. XXXVii, [209].
4

~.,

II, chap. lxxVi, 69.

Head imagery
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the vall," and, to hill, "the White Whale is that vall, tt 1 particularly the
head, which is described as a "dead, blind wall" and a "dead, impregnable,
uninjurable wall.,,2
Parts of the Sperm Whale's head that receive special attention are
the spout or spiracle, which "is on the top of his head,,,3 and the forehead or
brow.

The jetting of the whale spout becOllles symbolic of what is "ponderous

and profound tf and of the "act of thinking deep thoughts. I • 4 In a sentence replete with sceptical iIlplications, Melville writes of the spout (as he has of
all the other Itinexplicable" parts of the whale):

"And as for this whale-

spout, you might almost stand in it, and yet be undecided as to vhat it is
precisely." 5 Further, a warning is given:
Nor is it at all prudent for the hunter to be over-curious touching
the precise nature of the whale-spout. It viII not do for him to be peering into it, and putting his face in it. You cannot go with your pitcher
to this fountain and fill it, and bring it away. • • • I have heard it
said, and I do not much doubt it, that if the jet is fairly spouted into
your eyes, it will blind you. The wisest thing the investigator can do
then, it seems to me, is to let this deadly spout alone. 6
Ahab, however, is not the prudent hunter but, like Taji, a "hunter that never
rests.,,1 and on the third and last day of the chase, in his groping for the
axis of reality, Abab cOIle. "fairly within the 81Iloky mountain mist •••
1

illS· , I, chap. XXXVi, 204.

2

!!!!!!. , II, chap. lxxvi, 69, 71.

3

!!?!.!!. ,

chap. lxxxv, 112.

4

1lli.. , 116.

5

!!?!.!!. ,

115.

6

1lli.. , 115-116.

7Mardi, II, chap. lxxxv, 382.
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thrown off from the whale's spout"; he "staggered; his hand smote his forehead.
'I grow blind; handal stretch out before me that I may yet grope my way. ,,1
The whale's forehead, the "Battering-a_," is a hieroglyphically
"wrinkled brow";

2

the whale has no "features"-"nothing but that one broad

firmament of a forehead, plaited with riddles.,,3

In the climactic three-day
4

chase and actual encounters with the "grand god" Moby-Dick. the head of both
man and Sperm Whale assume near allegorical proportions in the epic struggle
of Ma.a to "conquer. 1t to comprehend the Divine Mind, to "clutch I God's
secret."S the key to the "problem of the universe. lt6
mains elusive:

But the "secret" re-

man's best efforts are seemingly met by the disdainful indif-

ference of the gods, or, if man persists so as to demand attention, he is
faced with possible powers of malign destruction, a destruction which, given
the earnestness of man's quest and aspirations and the seriousness of his
plight, but bespeaks an even greater indifference. 7
In an episode reminiscent of Montaigne's remark on Plato--ItI believe
it to be true that, as Plato says, the gods made man for their sport • • • •

~ObY-DiCk, II, chap. cxxxv, 363-364.
2

1!!!., I. chap. xxxvi, 201.

3
4

Ibid., II, chap. lxxix, 83.

~.,

chap. exxxiii, 335.

SClarel, Pt. II, canto XXi, 11. 29-30.
6

Moby-Dick, I, chap. xxxv, 197.

7For further consideration of the qualities of active malignity and
indifference as being not exclusive see the section on "An indifferent deity"
in chapter V.
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'What a strange sporting cruelty is this?",l_-the White Whale takes Ahab's
boat in his mouth and plays with it "as a mildly cruel cat her mouse," and
the bluish pear1-white lining of the jaw is "within six inches of Ahab's
head.,,2

Finally, in an effort to extricate himself from the Whale's mouth,

Ahab is dumped "flat-faced upon the sea," and the "regal," dignified, and indomitab1e old man bobs ludicrously in the waves--and
seen, like a tossed bubble. ,,3

f~e1p1ess

Ahabts head was

The Whale then litera11y--and figurative1y--

swims circles around Ahab, and the center of the circle tfhad now become the
old man t a head. ,,4
This disdainful indifference oil the tlgoda" to the intellectual asp irations of man had been prepared for three chapters earlier in "The Hat."

In

seeming anticipation of his intellectual parity, Ahab doffs his hat and stands
bareheaded to no one.
the hat "slouched,"

5

As a further assertion of his individuality, he wears
' 6

and keeps it on even while he sleeps.

While Ahab is

perched aloft keeping watch for Moby Dick, a sea-hawk (birds, in Melville, are
often connotative of heavenly agents 7) swiftly circles Ahab's head, then
snatches his hat and darts away with it.

Melville's narrator records:

"An

eagle flew thrice round Tarquin's head, removing his cap to replace it, and

~ontaigne, Bk. 111, chap. v, p. 406.

~obY-Dick, 11, chap. exxxiii, 336.
3

Ibid., 337-338.

4

!!?H., 338.

5

Ibid., 1, chap. xxx, 160; 11, chap. exxx, 319; chap. exxxiii, 340, 34

6

!!?H., 1, chap. LI, 297.

7

Ibid., II, chap. exxxv, 367.
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thereupon Tanaqui1, his wife, declared that Tarquin would be king of Rome."l
But Ahab's efforts will not be crowned:
sea.

the wild hawk drops his hat into the

A quarter of a century later, the apparent futility of the search is

still a question for Melville, and, in Clarel, Mortmain is victim to the same
action of a !fgreat bird":
Oh, the hag,
That from the very brow could pluck
The cap of a philosopher
So near the sky, then, with a mock,
Disdain and drop it. 2
Undaunted by disdain, the Pequod's single-purposed, monomaniacal captain of the hunt, by the very degree of his defiance, demands destruction.

As

the hunters approach the Whale on the first day of the chase, they are able
to see "the vast, involved wrinkles of the slightly projecting head beyond.,,3
After sounding, the Sperm Whale rises, his great mouth yawning beneath the
boat.

Ahab whirls the boat away:

"Now, by reason of this timely spinning

round the boat upon its axis, its bow, by anticipation, was made to face the
whale's head while yet under water."

4

Bested on the first day, Ahab returns

to the chase the second day, Hand cheering his men, he told them he would
take the whale head-and-head,--that is, pull straight up to his forehead."

5

The Whale offers "appalling battle U and "dashed his broad forehead" against
1

Ibid., chap. cxxx, 323.

2

Clarel, Pt. III, canto xxv, 11. 134-138.

3

Moby-Dick, II, chap. cxxxiii, 333.

4

.!.hl&., 336.

5

Ibid., chap. cxxxiv, 347.
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the bottom of Ahab's boat, spilling him out once more;

1

then, satisfied that.

his work for that day is done, the Whale departs, pushing "his plaited forehead through the ocean."

2

On the fatal third day Ahab declares:

forehead I meet thee, this third time, Moby-Dick!"
Hoby Dick comes "head on" among the boats,

4

3

"Forehead to

Accepting the challenge,

and, later in the fray, wheels

round on Ahab's boat "to present his blank forehead at bay."S
By his designations for the Whale's forehead in earlier chapters (e.g.,
as a "dead, blind wall,,6), Melville slowly invests his concrete symbolism with
abstract connotations, until he is able to pronounce his dictum on the apparent
futility of man's quest for truth in a later, apparently isolated, metaphorical aentence, the terms of which, through accretion, have become packed with
significance:

"The dead, blind wall butts all inquiring heads at last" 7--a

significance that is powerfully translated into the accelerated action of the
denouement when the questing world-ship is irrevocably sundered by the Sperm
Whale--smote by "the solid white buttress of his forehead." 8
Though Melville never lost his appreciation of the intellect and never
personally or through his protagonists gave up the quest, he clearly saw the
1

Ibid •• 347, 349.

2

.ill.Q.. , 349 •
3
!.!t!!. , chap. cxxxv, 356.
4
!ill. , 360.
5

.!lli.. , 363 •

6

!ill. , chap. lxxvi, 69.

7

!lli. , chap. cxxv, 300.

8

!lli.. , chap.

CXXXV,

365.
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limitations of reason--the battle of wits, "reason's endless battle," would
continue but not avail to find the secret to the problem of the universe,
not avail to "solve the world":
let him [man] rule-Pull down, build up, creed, system, school,
And reason's endless battle wage,
Make and remake his verbiage-But solve the worldl Scarce that he'll do:
Too wild it is, too wonderful. l
Intuition
Of all the means whereby man comes to knowledge, intuition is apparent
ly the last one Melville is willing to abandon.

Writing of Hawthorne's genius,

Melville implies some connection between the "heart" and intuition:
For it is not the brain that can test such a man; it is only the heart.
You cannot come to know greatness by inspecting it; there is no glimpse
to be caught of it, except by intuition; you need not ring it, you but
touch it, and you find it is gold. 2
Further, Melville writes with approbation of the tlintuitive Truth lf in
Shakespeare:
But it is those deep, far-away things in him; those occasional flashingsforth of the intuitive Truth in him; those short, quick probings at the
very axis of reality,--these are the things that make Shakespe.e, Shakespere. 3
In Moby-Dick, published one year after the Mosses review, the narrator
remarks:
rainbows do not visit the clear air; they only irradiate vapour. And so,
through all the thick mists of the dim doubts in my mind, divine intuitions now and then shoot, enkindling my fog with a heavenly ray. And for
lClarel, Pt. IV, canto iii, 11. 110-115.
2The Literary World, VII (August 17, 1850), 126.
3Ibid •
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this I thank God; for all have doubts; many deny; but doubts or denials,
few along with them have intuitions. Doubts of all things earthly, and
intuitions of some things heavenly; this combination makes neitherlbeliever
nor infidel, but makes a man who regards them both with equal eye.
The quotation ends in sceptical suspension between two polarities.
Intuition gives no final and incontestable assurance, however.

Pierre,

in the novel of the same name, ponders on tithe intuitively ccrtain, however
literally unproven fact of Isabel's sisterhood to him,,;2 yet, later, his doubts
return:

"How did he know that Isabel was his sister?")

Just before Pierre

knocks on the door of the low, red farm-house that shelters Isabel, the young
enthusiast is musing and
his sublime intuitiveness also paints to him the sun-like glories of godlike truth and virtue; which though ever obscured by the dense fogs of
earth, still shall shine eventually in unclouded radiance, casting illustrative light upon the sapphire throne of God. 4
Pierre's "sublime intuitiveness" about the "glories of god-like truth and
virtue" becomes suspect, however, when Pierre becomes "the fool of Truth, the
fool of Virtue." S
In what is probably the most inexorably dark novel of Melville's dark
period, the "intuitions of some things heavenly" cOIle under fire:

in The

Confidence-Man, the merchant relates the calamities of an unfortunate man, and
in the shattering piece of satire that follows, Melville reveals a Calvinistic,
Old-Testament penchant for expecting merited recompense here in this temporary

~obY-D1ck, II, chap. lxxxv, 116-117.
2
)

Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. viii, p. 195.

~.,

4

~.,

5

Bk. XXVI, chap. 1i, p. 492.
Bk. VI, chap. i, p. 156.

llli,. , Bk. XXVI, chap. iv, p. 499.
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and mundane sphere.

He indicates that it is a gullible faith that overlooks

the "unjust" imposition of calamity in this life, and he concludes with a
devastating blow at intuition:

the confidence-man, with tongue in cheek,

warns against admitting the existence of "unmerited misery," especially if
"brought about by unhindered arts of the wicked," since to do so might affect
one's "conviction of a Providence," and, having pointed up directly through
narration and obliquely through satire that such tlunmerited misery" does, in
fact, exist in experience, Melville, who places great emphasis on experience
throughout the novel, plants his last and most lethal bit of irony in the
mouth of the confidence-man:
It was of the essence of a right conviction of the divine nature, as
with a right conviction of the human, that, based less on experience
than intuition, it rose above the zones of weather. l
If Melville viewed intuition as somehow related to the heart, and,
judging from his Mosses review. he seems so to have viewed it, then, despite
his regard for the tfheart," the dependability of intuition is still not beyond
question, since Melville did not view the dependability of the heart of man
as beyond question:

in

Clar~~

the piercing query is made:

Hast proved thy heart?

2

The disCiplines
,

Even as the whole ascending structure collapses if the foundations of:
the building are undermined, so the authority of the various disciplines is
automatically toppled when the intellectual and sense knowledge upon which it
1
The Confidence-Man, chap. xiii, p. 84.
2

Clarel, Pt. III, canto vi, 1. 71.
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is based are found to be infirm.

At various junctures in the Works of

Rabelais, which Melville read, religion, philosophy, medicine and law come in
for a sound drubbing, and the arts and sciences--poetry, painting, music,
astrology, mathematics, scientific projects, all are shown as subject to
Queen Whims.
Montaigne, in the "Apology," shows that the claims of astrology, logic,
geometry, physics, metaphysics, rhetoric, grammar, mathematics, the liberal
arts and sciences have all been questioned, 1 and, throughout the essays.
nothing is too sacred to escape Montaigne's own inquiries.

Pascal notes this

tendency of Montaigne in his essay "On Epictetus and Montaigne":
Then Montaigne examines very deeply the sciences:--Geometry, the uncertainty of which he points out in its axioms, and its terms which it doea
not define, as extension, motion, &c.; physics and medicine, which he
deprea.es in a variety of ways; history, politics, morals, jurisprudence,
&c. So that, without revelation, we might believe according to him, that
life is a dream, from which we do not wake till death, and during which,
we have as few principles of truth as in natural sleep.2
Melville, in turn, though he makes no exhaustive attempt to bring all
the various fields of knowledge under indictment, does include a representative group and deflates the pretensions of several kinds of disciplines.
Mardi, Yoomy the poet challenges the historian Mohi:
you yourself grope in the dark.

In

"In all your chapters,

Much truth is not in thee, historian. ,,3

Mohi later avenges himself by questioning the veridity of the creations of
art and retorts after Yoomy's poetic tale:

"He has not spoken the truth,"

and Babbalanja adds that "things visible are but conceits of the eye:

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 234.
2

Pascal, 1835 ed., p. 581.

~rdi, I, chap. xciii, 324.

things
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imaginative, conceits of the fancy.

If duped by one, we are equally duped by

the other." 1 The inadequacy of the arts, even their possible danger if placed
in the wrong hands, is brought forward in Clarel.

Rolfe requests of Ungar:

Tell us if for earth may be
In ripening arts, no guarantee
Of happy sequel.
Ungar answers:
Arts are tools;
But tools, they say are to the strong:
Is Satan weak? weak is the Wrong?
No blessed augury overrules. 2
The foibles of law are lampooned in the account of the "lawyer"sorcerers in the isle of Minda, who construe the law to serve their

own

ad-

vantage and will not give over their clients until such clients are "financially or physically defunct.,,3 Government and politics come under scrutiny
in the description of the wine-bibbing congressmen and of their government,
whose "federal temple of freedCllll ••• was the handiwork of slaves";

4

the rise

and fall of kingdClllls is rehearsed and the precariously anarchically-inclined
populace of the democratic republic is warned:

"Better be secure under one

king, than exposed to violence frCllll twenty millions of monarchs, though oneself be of the number"--the contemporary example of France, for Melville, was
a timely example:

"Better be the subject of a king, upright and just; than a

1

!ill., 329.

2Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxi, 11. 12-18.

~ardi. 11, chap. xl, 163.
4

Ibid., chap. lvii, 243.
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freeman in Franko, with the executioner's axe at every corner." 1 In Clarel.
Melville is still warning against the latent dangers of democracy:
One demagogue can trouble much: 2
How of a hundred thousand such?
Although the complaint is more immediately of a moral nature in some of these
instances, the lack of a criterion is tacitly understood.
In Moby-Dick, Ahab decries the uncertainty of science before trampling
on his quadrant:

t'Tbou canst not tell where one drop of water or one grain

of sand will be to-morrow noon; and yet with thy impotence thou insultest the
sunl

Science I

Curse thee, thou vain toy.,,3

In Clarel, the materialistic

scientist Margoth is called a "vrl:t wight U and "kangaroo of science,,;4 "the
ray I Of Science' beacon" gives but "dreary" light and a "shallow knowledge."S
"No umpire" to render judgments in the "battle of the star and clod,"
"Science the feud can only aggravate."

6

Philosophy, too, is unable to withstand critical inspection.
tells Babbalanja:

Media

"The free, airy robe of your philosophy is but a dresm,

which seems true while it lasts; but waking again into the orthodox world,
straightway you resume the old habit.,,7

Babba1anja, a philosopher himself,

1

ng.. 244, 242.

2

Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxi, 11. 115-116.

~ObY-Dick, II, chap. cxviii, 274.
4

Clarel, Pt. II, canto xx, 1. 108; canto xxi, 1. 11.

5

Ibid., canto xxi, 11. 97-101.

6

ng., Pt. IV, canto xxxv, 11. 14-16.

7Mardi , II, chap. xvi, 57.
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shows, through the symbol of the short-lived light of the slough-inhabiting
glow-worm by which the philosopher Midni reads, the limitations of this ontologist who must go "forever ••• halting and stumbling through his studies,
and plunging through his quagmires after a glim."l Pierre, too, recognizes
the unreliability of the "so conveniently adjustable drapery of all-stretchable
Philosophy.tt 2
Because it concerns the problem of philosopky, the question of Melville's scepticism arises:

by labelling Melville a sceptic, is there an at-

tempt to confine him within some philosophical school or system all of which
he rejected as uncertain and relative?

The tagging on of labels is usually

fraught with the danger of a certain amount of misrepresentation:

no man's

philosophy is precisely that of another; however, through the study of sceptical sources which profoundly shaped his mental attitude toward reality. and
supported by the uncertainties of national and familial background and personal reverses, Melville was caught up in the current of sceptical thought
stemming particularly from the Renaissance, and Melvillean scepticism most
closely approximates the questing attitude of the Pyrrhonian sceptics.

To

align Melville with the Pyrrhonians is not to align him with a schematized
philosophical system--a claim to comprehend reality which Melville did not
profess.

Pyrrhonian scepticism is a doubting, questioning, questing attitude

rather than a circUMscribed school of philosophy:

as Diogenes Laertius says,

writing of the various sects or schools of philosophy,
1
2

Ibid., chap. Ii, 213.

Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 472.
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if by the name sect we understand those who incline to rules which are
consistent with the principles which they profess, then the Pyrrhonean
cannot be called a sect, for they have no rules or principles. l
Doubt and the quest form the prevalent intellectual atmosphere of
Clarel.

Although the degree of Melville's self-projection through his mask

or persona Rolfe in Clarel remains questionable, if Melville does intend some
autobiographical equation in the canto in which Derwent labels the ttPoised at
self-center and mature" Rolfe a ''Pyrrhonist,''

2

there would be no essential in-

compatibility with Melville's later statement in Billy Budd in what, consideriug Melville's esteem for "honesty" and lack of cant, may be a personal view
issued under the alias of an tthonest scholar":

''You are aware that I am the

adherent of no organized religion, much less of any philosophy built into a
system. ,,3
The pretensions of scholarship in general, moreover, were punctured
early when, in Mardi, the renowned erudition of the scholar Doxodox is discovered to be nothing more than occult gibberish.

4

The ttdivine sciences" do not fare any better.

In Mardi, Media at-

tacks both the divine and natural sciences; Yoomy, Mohi, and Babba1anja debate
on the nature of amber and ambergriS, and Media laughs to himself:

"It's

pleasant to sit by, a demi-god, and hear the surmisings of mortals, upon
things they know nothing about; theology, or amber, or ambergris, it's all
1
Diogenes Laertius, p. 12.
2

C1arel, Pt. IV, canto 1ii, 1. 127;

3

pa.

II, canto xxi, 1. 32.

Billy-Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 127, p. [74].

4

Mardi, II, chap. lxvii, 286.
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the sde."l

Pascal, as seen in the last cited passage frOlll his thoughts, had,

at least, the comfort of faith in revelation, but science and the scientific
method had raised new questions about Scripture or revelation.

After Babba-

lanja's geological "sandwich System" account of creation, Media remarks:
'~ohi tells us that Mardi [earth] was made in six days; but you, Babbalanja, have built it up from the bottom in less than six minutes."
"Nothing for us geologists, my lord. At a word we turn you out whole
systems, suns, satellites, and asteroids included. Why, my good lord, my
friend Annonimo is laying out a new Milky Way, to intersect with the old
one, and facilitate cross-cuts among the comets. 2

Melville probably alludes in this chapter to the friction between the literalist interpretation of Genesis ("six dayslt of creation) and the long periods of
time requisite to the geological explanation (the "six minutes" mentioned by
Media merely mean the time required for Babbalanja's telling--not the time he
implies the actual process required).

Although Melville ridicules geology by

ironically attributing to it the power of creation, the questions raised by
science did not leave Melville entirely unmoved.
Further, if Scripture is God's revelation to man, how is it to be interpreted?

Melville himself found what he personally felt was substantiation

for many of his darkest views:

the Old Testament wilderness and Ishmael

themes he saw as analogues for man's predicament upon earth--sons arbitrarily
cast off, orphans grappling with the primeval, chaotic forces of nature; he
questioned the possible nonbenevolence of God as the instigator of evil as
well as good-Melville marked in his Bible Isa. 45: 7:
create darkness:

1 make peace, and create evil:

1!k!!., chap. XVii, 63.
2Ibid ., chap. xxviii, 113.

"1 form the light, and

I the LORD do all these
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things." Melville brooded on the possible insignificance and annihilation of
man--as an epigraph to his poem. "Buddha" and in an allusion concluding chapter
xxxi of White Jacket, Melville used James 4:14:

"For what is your life?

It.

is even a vapour, that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away."

What is, for Melville, the ambiguity of Scripture, is dramatized situationally in Clarel:

the prodigal Lyonese youth gives a predictably sensual

rendering of the Song of Solomon.

Between ramblings on wine and women he

recites:
Thy white neck is like ivory;
I feed among thy lilies, dear:
Stay me with flagons, comfort me
With apples; thee would I enclosel
Thy twin breasts are as two young roes.
Clarel protests:
Nay. pardon me,
But you misdeem it: Solomon's Song
Is allegoric--needs must be.
But the youth retorts:

"Proof, proof,pray, if 'tis not too long."l

Clarel,

like Melville, has no "proof."
Self-knowledge and the variable subject
If man turns, in his quest for criterione, to the subject he supposedly

knows best, himself, and tries to elicit constants from the structure of his
own nature, he still seems, according to Melville, foredoomed to failure.
can no more comprehend himself than any other thing.

Montaigne asks:

Man

"Those

people • • • that are ignorant of nothing • • • have they not sometimes in
their writings sounded the difficulties they have met with of knowing their
1

Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxvi, 11. 179-189.
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own being?"l and, after listing an impressive array of conflicting opinions,
he adds:
Man is no better instructed in the knowledge of himself, in his corporal
than in his spiritual part. We have proposed himself to himself, and his
reason to his reason, to see what she could say. I think I have sufficiently demonstrated how little she understands herself in herself; and
who understands not himself in himself, in what can he?2
Montaigne extends the argument in a more comprehensive sceptical thrust by
quoting from Pliny, !!S.. Rist. ii.l:

"As if he could understand the measure

of any other thing, that knows not his own.") A parallel thought occurs in
Browne's ReU.gio Medici:

"No man can judge another, because no man knows

himself .tA
In Melville's Mardi, Taji asks:

'tOh stars! oh eyes, that see me,

vberesoeter I roam: serene, intent, inscrutable for aye, tell me, Sybils, what
I am. ,,5

Babbalanja, too, suffers the conundrum of defining his own identity:

Though I have now been upon terms of close companionship with myself for
nigh five hundred moons, I have not yet been able to decide who or what I
am. To you, perhaps, I seem Babbalanja; but to myself, I seem not myself.
All 1 am sure of is a sort of prickly sensation allover me, which they
call life; and, occasionally, a headache or a queer conceit admonishes me,
that there is something astir in my attic. But how know I, that these
sensations are identical with myself? For aught I know, I may be somebody
else. At any rate, I keep an eye on myself, as 1 would on a stranger. 6
In Moby-Dick, the self that is mirrored back in the golden doubloon is a

~ontaigne, Bk. 11, chap. xii, p. 250.
2
)

Ibid., pp. 259-260.

!!l1!!.,

4

p. 260.

Browne, II, 95.

SMardi, 1, chap. lviii, 208.
6

!!l1!!. t II, chap. xxxix, 155.
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"mysterious self," 1 and the narrator in Pierre says, "'Bxplain ye my deeper
mystery,' said the shepherd Chaldean king, smiting his breast, lying on his
back upon the plain; tand then, I will bestow all my wonderings upon ye, ye
stately stars! tt,

2

In The Confidence-Mas, the merchant becomes indignant when

the confidence-man questions hie identity:
"I hope I know myself."
"And yet self-knowledge is thought by some not 80 easy. Who knows,
my dear sir, but for a time you may have taken yourself for somebody
else? Stranger things have happened.")
Linked with the inability to know self is the inability to know God.
"Apology" Montaigne quotes St. Bernard:

In his

"'1 know by myself,' says St. Bernard,

'how incomprehensible God is, seeing I cannot comprehend the parts of my own
being. ,,,4 Melville has Clarel entertain a corresponding thought:
But if in vain
One tries to comprehend a man,
5
How think to sound God's deeper heart!
A primary reason for man's inability to know even himself is his
variableness and mutability.
theme in Montaigne:

'~an,

The inconstancy of man is an ever recurring

in sooth, is a marvellous, vain, fickle, and un-

stable subject, and on whom it is very hard to form any certain or uniform
judgment,"

6

and he quotes Herod. 1. 86 on "the uncertainty and mutability of

~ObY-DiCk. II, chap. xcix, 190.
2

Pierre, Bk. III, chap. ii, p. 70.

3The Confidence-Man, chap. iv, p. 22.
4

Montaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 252.

S

Clarel, Pt. II, canto xxxii, 11. 117-119.

~ontaigne, Bk. I, chap. i, p. 2.
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human things, which in an instant are subject to be totally changed into a
quite contrary condition." I
The "Apology" contains an extended argument against the whole man in
both hi. intellectual and corporal stability:
Besides this infinite diversity and division, through the trouble that
our judgment gives ourselves, and the incertainty that every one is sensible of in himself, 'tis easy to perceive that its seat is very unstable
and insecure. How variously do we judge of things?--How often do we alter
our opinions? What I hold and believe to-day I hold and believe with my
whole belief; • • • but has it not befallen me, not only once, but a
hundred, a thousand times, every day, to have embraced some other thing
with all the same instruments, and in the same condition, which I have
since judged to be false? ••• It is certain that our apprehensions, our
judgment, and the faculties of the soul in general, suffer according to
the movements and alterations ot the body, which alterations are continual.
Are not our minds more sprightly, our memories more ~rompt and quick, and
our thoughts more lively in health than in sickness?
M'ontaigne also quotes Plutarch's eleamenes:
when I am in health:

"Neither am I the 8ame man now as

being now another person, my opinions and fancies are

also other than they were before.")
Melville, too, influenced by the fluidity of his own temperament, saw
the "self" as a complex of changing states and mercurial moods:

"Por man is

heir I To complex moods.,,4 Writing to Hawthorne in November 1851, Melville
says:
This is a long letter, but you are not at all bound to answer it.
Possibly, if you do answer it, and direct it to Herman Melville, you
will missend it--for the very fingers that now guide this pen are not
precisely the same that just took it up and put it on this paper.
1

!h![., chap_ xviii, p. 25.

2
)

~.,

Bk. II, chap. xii, pp. 262-263.

~.,

p. 291-

4

Clarel, Pt. I, canto iv, 11. 10-11.
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Lord, when shall we be done changing?l
'----PorHOntaigne, man was part of a more universal flux:
Finally, there is no constant existence, neither of the objects' being nor
our own; both we, and our judgaents, and all mortal things, are eve~ore
incessantly running and rolling; and consequently nothing certain can be
established from the one to the other, both the judging and the judged
being in a continual motion and mutation. 2
In Mardi, Babbalanja, too, questions man's place in a universe of change:
Nothing abideth; the river of yesterday fl~~eth not to-day; the sun's
rising is a setting; living is dying; the very mountains melt; and all
revolve:--systems and asteroids; the sun wheels through the zodiac, and
the zodiac is a revolution. Ah gods! in all this universal stir, am 1
to prove one stable thing?3
.
Earlier in the November 1851 letter to Hawthorne, cited above, Melville writes:
In me divine maganimities [sic) are spontaneous and instantaneous--catch
them while you can. The world goes round, and the other side comes up.
So now I can't write what I fe1t. 4
In Pierre, the narrator remarks:
a statue, planted on a revolving pedestal, shows now this limb, now
that; now front, now back, now side; continually changing, too, its
general profile; so does the pivoted, statued soul of man; ••• look for
no invariableness in Pierre. Nor does any canting showman here stand by
to announce his phases as he revolves. Catch his phases as your insight
may.5
As

MelVille, in The Confidence-Man, shows the influence of Montaigne's
essay "Of the Inconsistency of Our Actions"; Montaigne writes:
I have often thought even the best authors a little mistaken in so

~etters, p. 143.

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 281.
3Mardi, It chap. lxxviii, 277.
4

Letters, p. 142.

5

Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 469.
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obstinately endeavouring to mould us into any consistent and solid
contexture. l
Melville defends the inconsistency of one of his characters against what he
calls the usual demand made upon the writer of fiction that "in the depiction
of any character, its consistency should be preserved" by arguing that a requirement equally insisted upon is that "fiction based on fact should never be
contradictory to it," and that, in fact, or. "in real life, a consistent character is a .!!!!! .!!!!.. If

Rather, the self is "at different periods, as much at

variance with itself as the butterfly is with the caterpillar into which it
changes." 2
Lack of a universal con census
A multiplication of variables does not produce one constant, and the
effort to reach a universal criterion through the common consensus of many
men, each variable in his own entity, but produces the contrary condition of
increased diversity.

In a statement that also further confirms the previous

section, Montaigne writes:

"Never did two men make the same judgment of the

same thing; and 'tis impossible to find two opinions exactly alike, not only
in several men, but in the same men, at different times.,,3
Again, it is the "Apology" that offers the most trenchant argument.
After a few scattered assertions on "the rash and fortuitous change of our

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. i, p. 152.
2

The Confidence-Man, chap. xiv, pp. 89-90.

~ontaigne, Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 494.
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opinions,,,l and the "infinite variety of our reasons and opinions,,,2 the
essay zeros in on the heart of the argument:
Now if on our part we received any thing without alteration, if human
grasp were capable and strong enough to seize on truth by our own means,
these means being common to all men, this truth would be conveyed froa
hand to hand, from one to another; and at least there would be some one
thing to be found in the world, amongst so many as there are, that would
be believed by men with an universal consent: but this, that there is no
one proposition that is not debated and controverted amongst us, or that
may not be, makes it very manifest that our natural judgment does not
very clearly discern what it embraces; for my judgment cannot make my
companions approve of what it approves; which is a sign that I seized it
by some other means than by a natural power that is in me and in all
other men. 3
The apparent diffusiveness of the "Apology" itself, with its hOdgepodge of quotations and observations, becomes, in effect, integral to Montaigne's purpose:

the variegated amalgam of his materials is a montage illus-

trating his variegated and unstable subject--man.

Montaigne thus offers, e.g.,

the various and conflicting opinions on what constitutes physical beauty;4
in a section on the notions of the Supreme Being, God becomes everything
from

and air, serpents, dogs and oxen to our own souls; 5 the soul 1s

SUD

6
Montaigne
opined to be anything from blood to an area between the eyebrows.

concludes tersely that "men ••• are not agreed about anyone thing.,,7
1

.!..!?.!!. , Bk. II, chap.

2

Xii, p. 201 •

Ibid. , p. 223.

3

~.,

p. 262.

Underlining mine.

4

!lli.. , pp. 221-222.

5.!ill. , pp. 237-239 •
6Ibid. , pp. 252-253.
7Ibid., p. 262.
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in Book II of the Issays there occurs hi. wonderfully paradoxical statement
the tlthere never wea in tbe world two opinions alike. no aore than tvo hairs
or two ,rains: tbe 1I0st uaiveraal quality is diversity. ,.1 The aarae thouaht
1a echoed in Book III:

ItThere 1. no quality so UAiver.al, in this itaage of

things, .s diversity and variety.n2
In addition to his readins of Montaigne, Malville vas confronted with

the s ..a concluaion--or lack of ODe--in his other reading at this period.

An

artistic prOjection of the problem of diveraity and disagreement characteria..
Rabelais'. worka.

To Panurge's "doubt"' and "prabl_atic th_e,,4--n..ely,

"Whether he should "arry, or not ..arry1 US--u IDany various opinions are prafferred as there are those in the different professions.

In Book III, chapter

xii, no agreement i. reached on the reading of the Virgilian Lottery; in Book
III~

chapter xiv, there i. no agreqaent on the interpretation of Panurse'.

dream of the felicity of his future married state; Book III, chapter xviii is
entitled:

"HOW PANTAOltmL AND PANURG!

-

DID DlVERS1.Y [sic] EXPOUND TB.E VERSES

OF THE STBYL 01 PARZOUST,n Book Ill, chapter xl1v, -'BOll PANTAGRU!1. 'REl..ATETH A
STRANGE

HISTORY 0., THE PERP1.EXITY 0., HOKAN JUDGMENT"; and chapter xlvi of the

SaDle Book ia entitled, "HOW PANTAG'RUEL AND PANtTRGE DIVERSELY INTERPRET THE
WORDS OF TltIBOULIT" (Tr1boulet i. tbe fool, and each lIan reads into b1s worda
1

chap_ xxxvii, p. 363.

2

Ibid., Ik. III, chap. xiii, p. 493.

~.,

,

aabelais. Ill, Bk. III, chap. xxx, 22.

4

IM.d •• chap_ xxxv, 49.

5Ibid •

146
and inane actions what he wishes and finds diverse significances in the empty
wine bottle Triboulet returns to them).
Finally, in an effort to obtain a definitive answer, Pantagruel and
Panurge resolve to make a visit to the oracle of the holy bottle.

1

Signifi-

cant for the problem of Melville'. scepticism is the development of this pilgrimage in Rabelais's Book IV.

The "Explanatory Remarks" on Book IV, chapter

i state that "By Pan tag rue 1 and his attendants, who embarked for the Oracle
of the Holy Bottle, we may understand" the "search after truth; which Rabelais
places in the bottle."

2

In their search for the oracle of the bottle, the

travellers visit many countries, and "all the countries in this voyage are
3

islands" --a device which, in addition to the idea of the quest. Melville
adopts in Mardi.

In the explanatory remarks to chapters xxxii and xxxiii of

Book V, there is again mention of the "Oracle of the Bottle, or rather •••
the knowledge of truth.,,4 The travellers at last reach the temple of the holy

On the portal of the temple are the words:

bottle.

"In wine, truth,"S and

the doors of the gates are "wrought with little vine-branches."
bottle speaks, it orders Panurge to "TRINe," i.e., to drink.
speaks in confirmation of an action already performed.

6

When the

The oracle but

Bacbuc, the priest at

the oracle, returns Panurge to the "fantastic fountain" from which the
1

Ibid., chap. xlVii, 101.
2Ibid., 166.

3Ibid., 167-in "Explanatory Remarks" for Bk. IV, chap. i1.
4

~.,

S

IV, 119-120.

Ibid., Bk. V, chap. xxxvii, 248.

6Ibid •
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travellers have already drunk:

"Bacbuc asked us then, how we liked our tiff.

We answered, that it seemed to us good harmless sober Adam's liquor, •••
mere element." 1 But Bacbuc then explains:

"Drinking of this miraculous li-

quor, you will find its taste like any wine that you shall fancy to drink.
Come then, fancy and drinktt; "drink once, twice, or thrice more, said Bacbuc.
still changing your imagination, and you shall find its taste and flavour to
be exactly that on which you shall have pitched. ,,2

Through his artistic

finale emerges Rabe1ais's message of the relativity and subjectivity of Truth
--each one who drinks the water of the fountain finds it a different wine.
Melville writes in Mardi:
drink for himself.,,3

"Truth dwells in her fountains; where every one must

Bacbuc says:

"If you observe what is written in Ionian

letters on the temple gate, you may have understood that truth is in wine.
The Goddess Bottle therefore directs you to the divine liquor; be yourself
the expounder of your undertaking." 4
The present problem of the absence of a universal consensus, a criterion, marks a profound change of stress in Melville's thought.

He is not

beyond questioning the constancy of man even in Typee (1846)--he askst

'~at

dependence could be placed upon the fickle passions which sway the bosom of
the savage? His inconstancy and treachery are proverbial. ,,5

In this early

romance, however, it is the concept of universality that is accented:
1

..

~

2

~.,

chap. xlii, 263.
264.

~rdi, I. chap. lxxxii, 290.
4

~.,

5Typee,

chap. xlv, 270.
chap. xi, p. 101.
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They [Typees] seemed to be governed by that sort of tacit COlllllon-sense
law which, say what they will of the inborn lawlessness of the human race,
has its precepts graven on every breast. The grand principles of virtue
and honour, however they may be distorted by arbitrary codes, are the same
all the world over; and where these principles are concerned, the right
or wrong of any action appears the same to the uncultivated as to the enlightened mind. It is to this indwelling, this universally diffused perception of what is just and noble, that the integrity of the Marquesans
in their intercourse with each other is to be attributed. 1
Six years later, the title hero of Pierre will follow his "indwelling,

...

universally diffused perception of what is 1ust and noble and be duped into
becoming the "fool of Virtue." Between the publication of the two works, Me1ville was deeply affected by personal reverses as well as by his further reading in sceptic sources.

That Melville had become well aware of the problem

of the universal and the particular is evinced in his June 1851 letter to
Hawthorne:

"What plays the mischief with the truth is that men will insist

upon the universal application of a temporary feeling or opinion.,,2
The positive position of Melville's sceptical self-argument is not
lacking in Mardi--as, of courae, it never is, completely, in Melville's works
--and a statement appears that endorsea the notion of a common core of criteria:

"The catalogue of true thoughts is but small; they are ubiquitous; no

man's property; and unspoken, or bruited, are the same,,,3 but the negative
side of Melville's argument begins to take precedence in the aame novel, and
the preoccupation with diveraity, relatiVity, and subjectivity occurs in the
majority of his major works thereafter.

In volume II, chapter xi of Mardi,

Babba1anja tells of the enigma of the banian tree.
1

The episode ia, finally,

.ill.!!., chap. xxvii, p. 270. Underlining of "universally" added.

2

Lettera, p. 131.

l.Mardi. II, chap_ xxii, 90.
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an allusion to the evasiveness of truth, but more immediately, coming, as it
does, in the discussion of Maramma with its many religious references-"altars," "idols or images," "gods," "his Holiness" the "Pontiff, It "abbey,"
"pagoda," "eremite," "hermit"-the search for the "original and true" banian
trunk among all the maze of "rooted branches" seems relevant to the proliferation of religious beliefs and the consequent confusion.

The lack of consensus

is illustrated when each of the nine blind men grasps a different branch and
believes he has found the "one," original and true trunk.
The best known example occurs in Moby-Dick.
man who reads the markings on the coin projects his

In "The Doubloon, til each
own

subjective state--

the coin, "the image of the rounder globe." ''but mirrors back his

own

mysteri-

ous self"-rather than discovering any uniform and objective validity.

The

"crazy""'Witty" Pip points up the subjective diversity in his thrice repeated
paradigmatic litany:
look."

"I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they

Stubb eavesdrops on the various "interpreters" and observes:

another rendering now; but still one text.
world, you see."
Pierre:

"There's

All sorts of men in one kind of

This philosophic exemplum is given overt expression in

"Nature is not so much her own ever-sweet interpreter, as the mere

supplier of that cunning alphabet, whereby selecting and combining as he
pleases, each man reads his own peculiar lesson according to his own peculiar
mind and mood. tt2
In The Confidence-Man, perhaps taking his cue from Rabelais's Book V,
chapter xxix, where it says,

"80

many Men, so many Minds, It or from Bayle, who

~obY-Dick, II, chap. xcix, 188-195.
2

Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iv, p. 476.
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"We commonly say, quot capitl1l

writes:

~

sensus, as many Men so many Minds," 1

Melville entitles the novel's second chapter "Showing that Many Men Have Many
Minds."

The contents of the chapter show the varying responses to the pre-

sence on board the Mississippi steamer Fidele of a deaf-mute:

comments range

from "Odd fish!" and "Humbug!" to "Singular innocence" and "Jacob dreaming at
Luz. n

The narrator remarks:

"Such the epitaphic comments, conflictingly

spoken or thought, of a miscellaneous company.,,2

Because of the many conflict-

ing variants in human nature, Melville, later in The

Confidence~an,

suggests

that
upon the whole, it might rather be thought. that he, who. in view of its
inconsistencies, says of human nature the same that, in view of its contrasts, is said of the divine nature, that it is past finding out, thereby
evinces a better appreCiation of it than he who, by always representing it
in a clear light, leaves it to be inferred that he clearly knows all about
it. 3
In the searching doubt of Melville's self-argument "the other side cOlies up"
for a mOlient, and, later in the same chapter, he stresses the universal aspect
of a common human nature:
The grand points of human nature are the SUle to-day they were a thousand 4
years ago. The only variability in them is in expression, not in feature.
The stress, if not the conclusion, of his argument, however, returns to the
concept of multiplicity.
Almost twenty years later, in Clarel (1876), Melville is still creating situations to exemplify the predicament of aan's manifold reactions to
1Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2792.
2

The

Confidence~n,

3

~.,

4

~.,

chap. ii, p. 6.

cbap. xiv. p. 91.
p. 92.
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reality.

At the monastery of Mar Saba is a palm tree reportedly planted by

St. Saba himself.

Derwent, Vine, Mortmain, Rolfe, and Clarel all react to

the palm, each in a diverse manner. 1
In Melville's sceptical argument with himself, he seems to argue, in
Clarel, through a debate between Ungar and Rolfe, that it may well be that
man's nature is uniform, but that it is truly so, or, if it 1s,

!h!! 1t

is,

is seemingly impossible to discern through the undulating proscenium of shifting circumstances and transient phenomena.

Ungar argues:

The human nature, the divine-Have both been proved by many a sign.

..... ......... .....

For man, like God, abides the same
Always, through all variety
Of woven garments to the frame.
Rolfe replies:

Yes, God is God, and men are men,
Forever and for aye. What then?
There's Circumstance--there's Time; and these
Are charged with store of latencies
Still working in to modify.2
Finally, in his last and posthumously published work, Billy Budd, Melville is still pursuing the same problem.

The apparently tangential conclud-

iug chapters following the death of Billy are, by their presentation of the
variety of adversely contending human impressions of Billy Budd and his actions on board the Bellipotent, actually integral to the final expression of
lFor the varying reactions to the palm tree see Clarel, Part III:
canto xxv, 11. 67-70 for Derwent; canto xxvi, 11. 26-64 for Vine; canto xxviii,
11. 51-98 for Mortmain; canto xxix, 11. 31-82 for Rolfe; canto xxx for Clarel.
2

~.,

Pt. IV, canto xxi, 11. 67-82.
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Melville's question.

1·

As an antinomy to the often prevalently presumed and

complacent concept of the commonality of human nature, Melville stresses
plurality--each man

~

generis--and a consequent condition which renders it

questionable whether man can elicit from such heterogeneity any homogeneous,
universal and absolute standards, standards which would. in fact, show that
man understood himself:
Such counter natures in mankind-Mole, bird, not more unlike ve find:
Instincts adverse, nor less how true 2
Each to itself. What clew, what clew?

1

See Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealta, pp. 192-193, first note for

leaf 321.
2

.

Clarel, Pt. III, canto xx, 11. 39-42.

PAlT 11
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS CONSEQUENT
TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION

CHAPTER IV
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM
ttls all but dream?"
Clarel.
A-conseguent problem
For Melville, the knowing subject is limited by the possible deficiency and definite weakness of his faculties, his variability, and, it must
be added, the limitation of his experience. 1 But what of the knowable object?
The lack of noetic certitude in the knowing subject gives rise to an onto1ogica1 difficulty concerning the nature of a consequently uncertain reality,
and the inability to get behind appearances engenders the suspicion that
perhaps there is not anything behind to "get at. If

Finally, even appearance

itself comes under suspicion, until life and reality are questioned as being

~ontaigne, in a quotation from Cicero's Acad. 1. 12, draws attention
to man's limited experience due to the very brevity of his life:
Almost all the ancients have declared that there is nothing to be known,
nothing to be perceived or understood: the sense. are too limited, men's
minds too weak, and the course of life too short (Bk. II, chap. xii, p.
230).
Melville takes issue with this last point of the quotation, however:
But years attain not truth,
Nor length of life avails at all
(Clarel, Pt. I, canto xvii, 11. 172-173).
The reason "length of life" does not avail is because "the more we learn, the
more we unlearn; we accumulate not, but substitute; and take away more than we
add. We dwindle while we grow" <Hardi, II, chap. xx, 80). For Melville, "you
know nothing till you know all; which is the reason we never know anything"
(Redburn, chap. xxvi, p. 154). Neither is it possible for one man to be
"coextensive with ~ is" (The Confidence-Man, chap. xiv, p. 90).
154
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merely illusion or dream.
The phenomena1-noumena1 problem
Although Kant gave the phenomena1-noumena1 problem a more recent
terminology and philosophical elaboration in the Critique of Pure Reason and
personally found it not an

insuperable problem, the problem as problem is

much older and for Melville. at least, traces back among the moderns to his
readings in Montaigne.
called noumenon.

Por Kant,

~

Ding

~~,

a thing-in-itself, is

But noumenon can be known only by intellectual intuition,

which Kant denies to man; according to Kant, man has only sensible intuition
and knows only phenomenon:

in the "Preface" to the second edition of the

Critick of Pure Reason Kant writes that "we can have no cognition of an
object, as a thing in itself, but only so far as it is an object of sensible
intuition, that is, as phenomenon. 11 I

Kant himself did not deny the existence

of noumenon:
We must be enabled, at least, to think these objects as things in themselves, even though not to cognize them. For, otherwise, the absurd
proposition would thence result, that there would be appearance
(phenomenon) without anything which then appeared. 2
Unfortunately, "thinking does not make it so," and Kant obliterates the
possibility of any kind of speculative proof and, for many, leaves the existence of noumenon problematical--man may not know what

~,

only what appears.

Kant himself was content to accept phenomenon or appearance as reality
IImmanuel Kant, Critick of Pure Reason, trans. Francis Haywood (2d
ed.; London: William Pickering, 1848). p. xxxi.
2llli.
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for scientific knowledge.

As Norman Kemp Smith points out, Kant posited an

Jtimportant distinction between appearance (Erscheinung) and illusion (Schein)."
Erscheinung is the appearance of a given object:

Schein "signifies a repre-

sentation, such as may occur in a dream, to which nothing real corresponds."

2

But the question remains whether Kant, despite his intentions, actually succeeded in proving the grounds for such a distinction.
explain Kant's view of appearance:

Smith continues to

"The further qualification must be added,

that the predicates of appearance are constant and are inseparable from its
representation,,;3 Smith later challenges this view:

"That certain perceptions

are more constant than others does not prove that all alike [extended objects]
may not be classed as illusory. ,,4

Smith's reason for challenging Ken t derives

from Kant's epistemology or theory of knowledge, which is heavily subjective:
matter that is received is chaotic, confused, unformed; it is Kant's categories
of the mind which help constitute and create, "fora,tI what is actually known.
Smith points out that Kant's critics (Lambert, Mendelssohn, and Garve) rightly
"objected that if bodies in space are representations existing, as he [Kant)
so often asserts, only 'within us,' their appearing to exist 'outside us' is
a complete illusion.,t 5 Kant observed that it is an nabsurd proposition" to
have appearance without anything which appears:

Melville questioned whether

1A Commentary to Kant's • Cri tigue of Pure Reason' (London: Macmillan
and Co., Ltd., 1923), p. 148.
2Ibid •
3

lill.,

p. 149.

4

lill., pp. 150-151.

5

~.,

p. 150.
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reality was not, in fact, an "absurd proposition" and no more than dream or
illusion.
Prior to Kant, Hume enunciated the same problem of man's inability
to know beings in themselves and, unlike Kant, made no assertions about their
actual existence but rather stressed the impossibility of any absolute knowledge in this regard.

In his Treatise of Human Nature in a section entitled

"Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses,." Hume writes:
But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions, it follows,
that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions
and objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the existence or any
of the qualities of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning
the existence of the latter, or ever satiafy our reason in this particular.
A few pages later Hume adds:
We suppose external objects to resemble internal perceptions. I have
already shown, that the relation of cause and effect can never afford us
any just conclusion from the existence or qualities of our perceptions to
the existence of external continued objects: and I shall further add, that
even though they could afford such a conclusion, we should never have any
reason to infer that our objects resemble our perceptions. 2
In An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, in his section on "Sceptical
Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding," Hume concludes briefly:
"Nature has kept us at a great distance from. all her secrets, and has afforded
us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects"~--Melville,
too, pondered the problem of nature's "secret" and came close to concluding
there wasn't any; in his 161 April? 1851 letter to Hawthorne, with whom he
enjoyed talking "ontological herOics," Melville wrote:
iuume, I. 274.
2

lk!.4•• 279.

3

lk!.4.,

IV. 41.
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And perhaps, after all, there is ~ secret. We incline to think that the
Problem of the Universe is lilte the Freemason's mighty secret, so terrible
to all children. kturns out. at last, to consist in a triangle, a mallet,
and an apron,--nothing morel l
Perhaps there is B2 secret--already latently suggested in this passage is
Melville's great ontological anticlimax, his suspicion that perhaps t'being"
is really "nothing."
The problem confronting Hume and Kant (though divergently resolved).
the problem of the bridge between mental and extramental reality, i8 anticipated by Montaigne; i.e., how do we know that the form of an object we are
perceiving--that is, the form supposedly received by the material senses to be
refined in the alembic of the mind--is actually a truly representative form
of an actually existing object perceived? Montaigne asks (using "foreign
subjects" in the present sense of "object"):
And to say that • • • the senses convey to the soul the quality of foreign
subjects by resemblance. how can the soul and understanding be assured
of this resemblance, having of itself no commerce with foreign subjects?
As they who never knew Socrates cannot, when they see his picture. say
it is lilte him. 2
He asserts simply:

''We have no cOllUllunication with being.") This inability to

ca.municate with being, the 1mpasse of phenomena, appearances, becomes the
"wall" symbol in Melville's writings:

Ahab wants to thrust "through the wall";4

Pierre-Enc.ladus is foremost in hurling himself against the precipice's

~tters, p. 125.
~ontaigne, Blt. II, chap. xii, p. 281.
3Ibid •

~oby-Diclt, I, chap. xxxvi, 204.
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"unresounding wall,,;l Bartleby dies "at the base of the wall" with "his
head touching the cold stones"; 2 the questing world ship of "The Berg" strikes
the berg's "dead indifference of walls" and without budging it goes down "in
bafflement. ,,3 The wall symbol finally, and more importantly, expands to
connote the cause itself of the frustration of man's desire to communicate
with Being--the indifference and unresponsiveness of the First Cause, or God,
who becomes concretized and embodied in the White Whale, and "the White Whale
in that wall," a "dead, impregnable, uninjurable wall." 4
Melville first mentions Kant in Mardi,S where he also refers to
"Abstract Noumenons,,:6

that he understood the Kantian use of noumenon at the

time of the writing of Mardi, as previously noted, is questionable though
possible, but it is highly probable that, a year and half later, he came to
understand the phenomenal-noumenal problem in a Kantian context because of
his prolonged discussions with the German scholar Adler.
the problem, he apparently did not accept Kant's solution.

If he understood
It must be stressed

again, however, that his understanding of the problem was, in all likelihood,
conglomerate, derived from collected sceptical sources.
If man's best efforts are incapable of penetrating appearances in
order to comprehend what Babbalanja calls "the essence of things; • • • that
1

Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iv, p. 482.

2

The Piazza Tales, p. 64.

3Collected Poems, pp. 203-204.
4

~oby-Dick,

I, chap. xxxvi, 204; II, chap. lxxvi, 71.

SMardi, I, chap. iii, 14.
6

~.,

II, chap. lxvi, 282.
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which is beneath the seeming,"

1

a resulting problem arises which questions

the very existence of anything beyond appearance, and of appearance itself,
and engenders a fear of possible deception.
Question of deception
The idea of deception is prevalent in a number of the quotations already cited from Melville's sceptical philosophical sources.

It is Descartes

who posed what Pascal and Hume saw as "the highest point in sceptical doubt": 2
If • • • it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me
subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to
his goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is
clear that this is permitted.)
Browne, as already seen, begins his "Vulgar Errors" with the problem of deception and discusses the "deceptible condition" of men who are deceived by
Satan, one another, themselves, and the conduct of their senses.
Pascal says of the man without grace:

"Everything deceives him • .,4

The devout
Bayle

offers the argument of the "new Philosophers" that color is a modification of
the soul rather than something existing externally in substances of objects
of the senses,

5

and he writes:

Ever since the beginning of the World all Men, except, perhaps, one in
two hundred Millions, do firmly believe that Bodies are coloured. and
yet 'tis a Mistake. I ask, whether God deceives Men with respect to
1

~.,

2

chap. x, 36.

Popkin, pp. 181-182.

3

Descartes, p. 101.
4
,
Pensees, 83.
5

See Moby-Dick, I, chap. xlii, 244.
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those Colours? If he deceives them in that respect, what hinders but
he may deceive them with respect to Extension[?] __ l
and the problem keeps broadening.
The theme of deception is of fairly constant recurrence in Melville:
not only is there the possibility of self-deception--"!f I could only be certain that • • • my senses did not deceive me,,2_-but there is the question of
interpersonal deception:

"Do we then mutually deceive?

Off masks, mankind.

that I may know what warranty of fellowship with others my own thoughts
possess,") and, at a more pragmatic level, a senile old miser has enough of a
lucid moment to suspect he has been deceived out of his gold by the ConfidenceMan:

"Somehow, can't trust my senses any more, since trusting him."

Reality itself is delusive; in The Confidence-Man, the

4

etymologically~inded

Melville has the Sophomore (Greek sophos and moros, the "wise-fool") remark:
"No appearances can deceive me." 5

The universe itself, Ishmael says earlier,

in Moby-Dick, is at times taken Jlfor a vast practical joke," and God Himself
is the "unseen and unaccountable old joker,,6_-here , in this statement, is
seen the tendency, which occurs in both Melville's sources and in Melville
himself, to push beyond the immediate and intermediate to the extremity of
responsibility.
1
2

B.yle, 1710 ed., IV, 2620.
The Piazza Tales, p. 97.

3

~.,

4The
5

Melville considered this terminal responsibility, this "god,"

II, chap. v, 20-2l.

Confidence~an,

~.,

chap. xx, p. 134.

chap. ix, p. 62.

6
Moby-Dick, I, chap. xlix, 286.
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whether under the Christian appellation of "God" or under other aliases--Fate,
Jove, Jupiter, Jehovah, Confidence-Man, etc.--as the ultimate deceiver.
wonders "what cozening, hidden lord" commands him;

I

Ahab

Pierre accosts Fate:

"Thou art a palterer and a cheat; thou hast lured me on through gay gardens
to a gulf,"2 and the "purple promise" of the Delectable Mountains (connected,
in Bunyan, with paradisaical promise) becomes a IIcunning purpleness" curtaining

II

stark desolation" and "ruin";) in Israel Potter, the IIBunker" Hill

Monument assumes remarkable affinities to the Deity, and the devil-God
Confidence-Man ("Jehovah shall be thy confidence")

4

is the master deceiver--

in The Confidence-Man, Melville seams his satire with such terms as "fleece,"
"fool," "goose," "bluff," "joke," "gull," "bogus," "dupe," "sham," "false,"
"humbug," "imposture," "spurious," "decoy," "deception," "deviltry,"
"sharpers," "delUSion," "charlatan," until the whole context of the novel,
Melville's world picture, becomes a maze of deception with "Jehovah" the
supreme Confidence-Man and deceiver.
The fear of deception is one of man's most common fears, because it
is a frustration of one of his most fundamental drives, the drive to know.

In Mardi, Melville's island king Donjalolo must renounce his right to rove
I

~.,

2

II, chap. cxxxii, 330.

Pierre, Bk. III, chap. vi, p. 90.

3~., Bk. XXV, chap. iv, pp. 478-479.
4

The Confidence-Man, chap. xlv, p. 334. Throughout this study, the
term "devil-God" is used .!!.Q.!:. in the Manichean sense of two goda, one of which
is evil--an evil-god or devil-god as opposed to a good-god; rather, it implies
more the Christian concept of God and the devil as ambiguously combined in ~
Being, a devil-God--this is how indifferent Melville sees the primal power
may be.
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beyond his own circumscribed glen, and, for Melville, every man is, in a
certain analogous sense, a Donjalolo unable to communicate with the "outside"
world, with extramental reality, and, like Donjalolo, may conclude:

"Better

know nothing, than be deceived."l
Question of a nonbenevolent deity
It would seem that only a final power or deity that is malign, rather
than benign, could be responsible for man's tldeceptible condition."

As

abundant Melville scholarship has shown, Melville seriously questioned the
notion of a benevolent deity.

In Mardi, Yillah, as the summum bonum, becomes

inextricably submerged in the evil Hautia, "the vortex that draws all in,,2 __
"in some mysterious way seemed Hautia and Yillah connected": 3

the situation

of "goodness," as seen in Yillah with her "blue, firmament eyes,"

4

is ques-

tioned through the parallel case of Ady who is tltransformed" into one of the
evil Hautia's maidens, so that, seeking her, one sees "blue eye within black." 5
Melville poses his question through a like situation at the end of Pierre
where the blue-eyed Lucy, representing light or goodness. becomes engulfed
or overshadowed by the dark, evil-influenced, poison-bearing Isabel; Melville
almost thumpingly identifies his symbol:

~ardi, 1, chap. lxxxii, 290.
2

Ibid., 11, chap. xc, 395.

3

Ibid., chap. lxxxvii, 386.

4Ibid., It chap. xliii, 158.
5Ibid., II, chap. lxxxix, 392.

Lucy's brother cries "Lucy I

A lightS
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a lightl--LUCyl"l as he stumbles through the darkness of the prison cell.
Melville restates the 8ame question of ambiguity in Pierre through the two
portraits of the "father" that somehow, though one is noble in air and the
other of shadowy significance, become ambiguously one:

"Consider in thy mind,
2

Pierre, whether we two paintings may not make only one" --the present instance
provides an apt example of Melville's tendency, mentioned in the section
which discusses his possible debt to Pierre Bayle, to push beyond any definite
duality, as, e.g., that of Manicheism, or instrumental causation to a single
principle, a tendency which Bayle himself gives occasional evidence of possessing.

Further, it is the portrait with the darker connotations that seems the

truer likeness.
Like the white-robed Moor in Clarel,3 the whiteness of Moby Dick is
but a deceptive covering for the blackness of "eternal malignity."

The shark

is one of Melville's symbols for evil, and his oft quoted references to sharks
are illustrative of his view of the ambiguous conjunction of good and evil in
the Primal Power:
shark.

the narrator in Mardi remarks, liAs well hate a seraph as a

Both were made by the same hand,,;4 a like thought occurs in Clarel:

"The shark thou mad'st, yet claim'st the dove"j5 and Queequeg gives pronouncement that "de god wat made shark must be one dam Ingin. ,,6
1
Pierre, Bk. XXVI, chap. vii, p. 504.
2

~.,

Bk. IV, chap. v, p. 115.

3

Clarel, Pt. III, canto xii, 11. 65-130.

4

Mardi, I, chap. xiii, 47.

5
6

Clarel, Pt. I, canto xiii, 1. 71.

Koby-Dick, II, chap. lxvi, 26.

Timoleon arraigns
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"heaven as compromised in wrong,,,l and, in Clarel, the Syrian monk sees the
devil as fair, Christ as pale and dim, 2 "but as the shade of Him.,,3

When

the devil and Syrian monk join in colloquy the devil asserts of God:
Yea, yea, and He is everywhere-Now and for aye, Evil and He. 4
Rolfe later remarks:
No, disproportionate is evil
In influence. !!!! do I say?
But speak not evil of the evil:
Evil and good they braided play
Into one cord. 5
Melville does not deny the presence of goodness, but he often sees it as resolving back into evil or else vitiated by its very copresence with evil-Rolfe asks:

"Need'st foul all sweets, thou Beelzebub?,,6

Primarily and

finally, however, Melville seems to view the apparent conjunction of good and
1

Collected Poems, p. 214.

2

This concept of the preponderance of the dark side of reality is
also present in Pierre where the dark Isabel 1s portrayed as provocatively
substantial, as Pierre comes to realize to his own harassment, whereas Lucy-connected with traditional concepts of light, heaven and God (Isabel describes
Lucy'. eyes as "heaven[')s own blue," and Lucy is connected with PlinlimDlon
in that both are Welsh [flforeign" or alien], "pale"-complected, and Plinli.1IIDon
eyes are "blue, bright," Lucy's are blue and "vividlf)--is rather unsubstantial:
she has "delicate feet," "two thin white hands," a "slight, airy, almost
unearthly figure"; "one husbandly embrace would break her airy zone, and she
exhale upward to that heaven whence she hath hither come, condensed to mortal
sight"; she is "fragile" and faints easily; she is described by the "s lightness of her person"; she is compared to lithe highest, and purest, and
thinnest ether."
JClarel, Pt. II, canto xviii, 1. 83.
4

~.,

5

~.,

6

11. 102-103.
pro IV, canto iv, 11. 25-29.

Ibid., Pt. 1, canto xxxiv, 1. 62.
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evil as one of questionable ambiguity; it may be wondered if he was reminded
of this conjunction through the connotations of the names of Phoebe and Maule
as light and darkness respectively when he wrote to Hawthorne that "the
marriage of Phoebe with the daguerreotypist is a fine stroke, because of his
turning out to be a Maule."l
In the quotation from Isa. 45:7, marked by Melville in his Bible and
formerly cited--tlI form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and
create evil: I the LORD do all these things," Melville found biblical justification for his questionings of the ambiguity of the first cause.

Melville's

Lightning-Rod Man, in the short story of the same name, is thus called Jupiter
Tonans because he so stood "in the Greek statue of old, grasping the lightningbolt"; the lightning-bolt is, however, a lightning-rod shaped into "three
keen tines."

The ambiguous combination of good and evil is, therefore, pro-

jected through the sceptre of the likewise ambiguously named "dark l1ghtningking"--a sceptre which is both trident, devil's fork, and bolt of lightning,
the god Jupiter's ensign1a. 2 When Melville dives below the undergirdings
that support the superstructure of reality, he seems to find a fulcral point
that is schizophrenic in nature.

With such a power at the fundament of

reality, it becomes not inconceivable that that reality is deceptive, delusive,
dreaa.
The dream tradition
The epistemological problems articulated by Montaigne lead him
1

Letters, p. 125.

2

The Piazza Tales, pp. 172, 180.
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logically to a consideration of a questionable reality.
"Apology," Montaigne writes:

Near the end of the

"They who have compared our lives to a dream

were, perhaps, more in the right than they were aware of."l Montaigne distinguishes between a waking and sleeping state, but he intimates that the
distinction is,perhaps, more one of degree than of kind:
When we dream, the soul lives, works, ana exercises all its faculties,
neither more nor less than when awake; but more largely and obscurely, yet
not so much, neither, that the difference should be as great as betwixt
night and the meridian brightness of the sun, but as betwixt night and
shade; there she sleeps, here she slumbers: but, whether more or less, 'tis
still dark, and Cimmerian darkness. We wake sleeping, and sleep waking.
I do not see so clearly in my sleep; but as to my being awake, I never
found it clear enough and free from clouds: moreover, sleep, when it is
profound, sometimes rocks even dreams themselves asleep; but our waking
is never so sprightly that it rightly purges and dissipates those whimsies,
which are waking dreams, and worse than dreams. Our reason and soul receiving those fancies and opinions that come in dreams, and authorizing
the actions of our dreams with the like approbation that they do those of
the day, wherefore do we not doubt whether our thought, our action, is not
another sort of dreaming, and our waking a certain kind of sleep?2
One of the most famous formulations of the dream-reality problem occurs
in the first meditation of Descartes, who met the problem with his reading of
Montaigne.

Descartes first describes his locale, then remarks:

How often have I dreamt that I was dressed, and occupied this place by
the fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment, however, I certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; the head
which I now move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and with
express purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so
distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times, I have
been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively considering
those cases, I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by
which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I
feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I
am now dreaming. 3

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. Xii, p. 279.
2Ibid •
3

Descartes, p. 99.
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Although important, the basic question seems not so much to be that of differentiating between ordinary dreaming and waking states, but to define precisely what it means to be awake in a conscious relational encounter with
"reality"--is that which we are encountering substantial, "really real, II or is
it perhaps just hallucinatory, the deceptions and illusions, however sharp and
more keen at times, of a higher degree or layer of dream existence:
indeed, only an "ungraspable phantom"l and Being Nothing?

is life,

That Melville some-

times thought so seems evident.
Sir Thomas Browne, often called "The English Montaigne," remarks:
"The world to me is but a dream or mock-show. tt2

Later, in the same volume,

the following passage appears:
I am happy in a dream. • • • There is surely a nearer apprehension of
any thing that delights us, in our dreams, than in our waked senses •
• • • And surely it is not a melancholy conceit to think we are all
asleep in this world, and that the conceits of this life are as mere
dreams, to those of the next, as the phantasms of the ni~ht, to the
conceit of the day. There is an equal delusion in both.
A few pages later Browne again comments:
Let us call to assize the loves of our parents. the affections of our
wives and children, and they are all dumb shews and dreams, without
reality, truth. or constancy.4
Pascal, who was also familiar with Montaigne and with Descartes, presents the dream argument of the Pyrrhonists and the refutation offered by the
Dogmatists.

The Pyrrhonistic dream-argument is first given:

~obY-Dick. I, chap. it 4.
2

Browne, II, 60.

3

.!!?,g., 111.

4

Ibid., 116.
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A man has no assurance whether he sleeps or wakes; seeing that in his
sleep he does not the less firmly believe that he is awake. than when be
really is so. He sees spaces, figures, movements; he 1s sens1ble of the
lapse of time; he measures it; he acts. in short. as 1f he were awake. So
that as one half of life 1s adm1tted by us to be passed in sleep, in
which, however~it may appear otherwise, we have no perception of truth,
and all our feelings are delusions; who knows but the other half of life,
in which we think we are awake. is a sleep also. but 1n some respects
different from the other. and from which we wake. when we, as we call it.
sleep. As a man dreraa often that he is dreaming. crowding one dreamy
delusion on another.
Pascal next g1ves the Dogmatists' refutation:
The only strong point of the Dogmatists is, that we cannot, consiste~
with honesty and sincerity, doubt our own intuitive principles. We know
the truth. they say. not only by reasoning, but by feeling, and by a
quick and luminous power of direct comprehension; and it is by this last
faculty that we discern first principles. It is 1n vain for reasoning,
wh1ch has no share in discovering these prinCiples. to attempt subverting
them. The Pyrrhonists who attempt this, must try in vain. However unable
we may be by reasoning to prove the fact, yet we know that we do not dream.
And this inability may prove the feebleness of our reason, but not 88 they
pretend. the want of reality and substance 1n the subjects of our knowledge. 2
Pascal. however, commits himself wholly to neither view and asks simply:

I~O

shall clear up this perplexity?,,3
Bayle declares:
of bodies.,,4

"1 therefore have not any good proof of the existence

Kant. on the other hand, clearly attempts to distinguish his

idealism from so-called Empirical Idealism. which, in effect, maintains that
the existence of extended beings is no more true than the existence of dreams:
It would be doing us an injustice, if it were wished to attribute to
us the Empirical Idealism fallen 1nto discredit long ago, which, whilst
1

Pascal, 1835 ed •• p. 529.

2Ibid •
3Ibid •
4Bay1e, 1734-1741 ed., VIII, 596.
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it adaits the proper ~e.lity of space, denies, or at least considers
therein as doubtful, the existence of extended beings, and allows between
dreaaiDg and truth in this point, of no sufficiently demonstrable difference. l
.
Kant continues:
Our transcendental Ideali.. on the contrary adaits, that the objects
of external intuition are also really just so as they are envisaged in
2
space, and all changes in tt.e such as the internal sense represents them.
Kant's assertion is, however, as many philosophers have hastened to point out,
a reasonable assuaption rather than a proven conclusion.
The American dre.
Frederic I. Carpenter's discussion of "The .Aaerican Dre." hinges on
the central notion of democracy and ita optimistic corollaries--nfreedOll,"
"progress," an "ideal new world," "that dre. of a better, richer, and happier
life. ,,3 When Carpenter lists his "four answers to the probl_ of this dre_."
the four separate attitudes all concern the possibility of a perfect democracy~
Carpenter designates that there are those who respond to the "drs.1t in a
negative way--seeing a perfect democracy as nonreali.able, and this includes
Melville, but the discussion of democracy proceeds on the level of a "way"
of existence rather than of existence itself.

It is at this deeper, more

radical level that Melville's search carries him, and in this substratua of
inquiry, the phrase "The .Aaerican Dre." begins to assuae darkly ironic

~t, p. 344.
2

'Ib:1d~,

pp. 344-345.

3Frederic I. Carpenter, _erican Literature and the Dre_ (New York:
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1955), pp. 3-10.
4
.!!!!!!.. p. 7.
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signification.
Richard P. Adams has titled one of his periodical articles "Ataerican
Renaissance: An Epistemological Problem": 1 Professor Ad..s accordingly confines his remarks to the outstanding writers of the period known as the "Ataerican Renaissancen-to Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, Thoreau, Melville, and Whitman.
The epistemological problem and its accompanying ontological problem is,
however, concomitant with American belles-lettres.

Lulu Rumsey Wiley says of

our early Ataerican novelist Charles Brockden Brown (1771-1810) that "he was
essentially a philosopher";

2

he learned French so that he might study French

sources, and he "had read and assimilated so much of European philosophy • • •
that unconsciously he garnered from that material without once reflecting that
it was not originally his own. ,,3 An early biographer of Brown, William Dunlap,
noted his tendency toward scepticism:
Ever fond of analysis, Charles, even in very early life, would take
no opinion upon trust. He found in his own mind abundant reason to reject
many of the received opinions of mankind, and to doubt the reality of
many facts upon which those opinions are founded. Much of his reading at
this time tended to bewilder rather than enlighten and to confirm his
predisposition to scepticism. 4
On

a number of issues, Professor David Lee Clark writes of Brown, "he reflects

the skepticism of David Hume and other eighteenth-century English and French
1

Emerson Society Quarterly, No. 35 (II Quarter, 1964), 2-7.

2The Sources and Influence of the Novels of Charles Brockden Brown
(New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1950), p. 114.
3

Ibid., p. 113.

4

The Life of Charles Brockden Brown: Together with Selections from
the Rarest of His Printed Works, from His Original Letters, and from His
Manuscripts before Unpublished (2 vols.; Philadelphia: Published by James P.
Parke, 1815), I, 69-70.
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philosophers." 1
Brown's novels are marked by a sense of uncertainty, mystery, and
secrecy.

Fraud and deception occur frequently.

On the first page of the

first chapter of Arthur Mervyn, Dr. Stevens sees Arthur for the first time and
"My sight was imperfectly assisted by a far-off lamp,,2_-a vague

remarks:

medium of perception, the questionable situation, the difficulty of knowing
is immediately established.

There is a prevalence of the interrogative fora

throughout Brown's novels; an early question, "What should I infer from this
incident?",3 is indicative of the mood of the book.

The structure of Brown's

novels approaches a dream fora, particularly in the case of Edgar Huntly; or
Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker.

The novel is replete with sleepwalking, gothic

nightmarish qualities, descriptions of a darkness that produces an obscurity
and uncertainty that is underscored in the characters' speeches.

Many im-

portant scenes occur at night, and characters appear and disappear as in a
dream.

4

Brown's world, too, is problematic.
In his perceptively edited organic anthology, Selections from Ralph

Waldo Emerson, Stephen E. Wicher states that Emerson

'~ade

his own final

1

Charles Brockden Brown: Pioneer Voice of America (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1952), p. 55.
2

Charles Brockden Brown, Arthur Mervyn: or, Memoirs of the Year 1793
(2 vols.; Vol. I--Philadelphia: Printed and Published by H. Maxwell, 1799;
Vol. II--New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, 1800), I, 1.
3

Ibid., I, 34.

4

For observations on Edgar Huntly, I am indebted to Mr. Phillip
Northman and to Dr. Harrison Hayford for whom Mr. Northman prepared his paper
on the novel.
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rejection of skepticism very clear."

1

This rejection, however, was directed

against a complete acceptance rather than a partial consideration, for, as
Whicher explains, Emerson had to work to "rescue his old hope from his new
skepticism"; the naive optimism of Nature was gone--he came to assume the
enigmatic nature of the world, and

u

to marry faith and skepticism

...

[became] his settled aim as an author." 2 Whicher reasons that it is the resuIting shock of opposites that makes "Experience" probably Emerson's strongest
essay.

The skeptical element of the essay is evident; in the poem which pre-

faces it, and in the essay itself, "Dream" or illusion is one of the "lords
of life. ,,3

In the essay Emerson writes:

"Dream delivers us to dream, and

there is no end to il1usion.,,4
The dream and nightmare quality found in Brown's early novels also
found its way into the works of Poe and Hawthorne (Hawthorne will be briefly
considered in conjunction with Melville).

W. H. Auden, in the "Introduction tt

to his edition of Selected Prose and Poetry of Edgar Allan Poe, observes that
Poe's characters somehow live outside our normal concepts of space and time,
and. in what Auden calls stories of pure adventure such as Gordon Pym (though
his designation of such a story as "pure adventure" is questionable), be
finds that the "hero is as purely passive as the 1 in dreams." 5 Also
l(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 253.
2Ibido
3Emeraon, Works, 111, 43.
4

1lli..• 50.

5(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. vii.
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noticeable in some of Poe's stories is a "vagueness of description" that
brings a sense of illusion.

1

Poe makes an overt statement of the ontological

dream problem in his poem tlA Dream Within A Dream":
You are not wrong, who deem
That my days have been a dream;

................

All that we see or seem
2
Is but a dream within a dream.

Poe's categorical assertion is, however, changed to a sceptical query at the
end of the poem:

ill that we see or seem 3
But a dream within a dream?

Is

In 1916, a quarter of a century after Melville's death (1891), Mark
Twain's "The Mysterious Stranger" was posthumously pubUshed in Harper's Magazine (May-November. 1916).
Traum, i.e., Dream.

The stranger, Satan, goes by the name of Philip

The Twain scholar Walter Blair has pointed out that the

story was never really finished and that "one cannot know how Twain might
have managed revisions-always important in his writing." 4 Nevertheless, the
fact that Twain wrote the particular type of ending he did at all is significant.

In the final chapter, S Traum and the narrator, Theodor Fischer, meet

for the last time.

Traum announces:

lIbido
2The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. James A. Harrison (Virginia
Edition, 17 vols. in 10 vols.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1902), VII
[in V), 16.
3Ibid •
4Selected Shorter Writinas of Mark Twain, ed. Walter Blair (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. xxi.
SA. B. Paine, Twain's literary executor, found the final chapter

1
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. . .. .. . . . .... . .. . . . . . ....... . .. . .. .

Life itself is only a vision, a dream.

Nothing exists; all is a dream. God--man--the world--the sun, the
moon, the wilderness of stars--a dream, all a dream; they have no existence. l

Although Traum's final explanation is lengthy, it has been elected to cite the
major part of it here because of its relevance to the line of thought and
questioning that characterizes much of Melville's work:
Strange! that you should not have suspected years ago--centuries ago,
eons, ago!--for you have existed, companionless, through all the eternities. Strange, indeed, that you should not have suspected that your universe and its contents were only dreams, visions, fiction I Strange, because they are so frankly and hysterically insane--like all dreams: a God
who could make good children as easily as bad, yet preferred to make bad
ones; who could have made every one of them happy, yet never made a
single happy one; who made them prize their bitter life, yet stingily cut
it short; who gave his angels eternal happiness unearned, yet required
his other children to earn it; who gave his angels painless lives, yet
cursed his other children with biting miseries and maladies of mind and
body; who mouths justice and invented hell--mouths mercy and invented hell
--mouths Golden Rules, and forgiveness multiplied by seventy times seven,
and invented hell; who mouths morals to other people and has none himself;
who frowns upon crimes, yet commits them all; who created man without
invitation, then tries to shuffle the responsibility for man's acts upon
man, instead of honorably placing it where it belongs, upon himself; and
finally, with altogether divine obtuseness, invites this poor, abused
slave to worship him! •••
You perceive, ~, that these things are all impossible except in a
dream. You perceive that they are pure and puerile insanities, the silly
creations of an imagination that is not conscious of its freaks--in a
word, that they are a dream, and you the maker of it. The dream-marks
are all present; you should have recognized them earlier.
It is true, that which I have revealed to you; there is no God, no
universe, no human race, no earthly life. no heaven. no hell. It is all
a dream--a grotesque and foolish dream. Nothing exists but you. And you
are but a thought--a vagrant thought, a useless thought, a homeless though
wandering forlorn among the empty etemitiesl 2
separated from the others and added it (Ibid.).
1

2

Ibid., p. 387.

Ibid., p. 388. The ellipsis marks at the end of the first quoted
paragraph are present in the text.

176
The final sentence is Fischer's concluding remark:

"He vanished, and left IDe

appalled; for I knew, and realized, that all he had 8aid wu true." 1
Not only was the ontological problem in American literature concomitant
and immediately peripheral with Melville's writing, but it has continued with
ever broadening scope into our contemporary era:
later edition of On Native Ground"

in a 1955 p08t8cript to a

first published in 1942, author Alfred

Kuin announces that alienation is dead:

"'nle tension between writer and

outside world has vanished becau8e the contemporary writer no longer believes
in an objective reality outside him8elf.,,2
Melville and a dream reality
The lack of a stable, universal criterion and the consequent state of
nondirectional drifting, the inability to penetrate elusive and shifting appearances to grasp a core of reality, the impossibility of proving, without
doubt, the actual existence of an external world, the possibility of deception
even in the final court of appeals, all lead to the fear that appearance,
' ..

perhaps, i8 all there is and life and reality are merely an illusion and dream.
The idea is incipient in Mardi, where Babbalanja, true to form, is rhapsodizing
Says old Bardianna, "Did I not so often feel an appetite for my yams. I
should think everything a dream";--so puzzling to him seemed the things of
this Mardi. But Alla-Malo1la goes further. Says he, "Let us club together, fellow-riddles: ••• we are air, wind, breath, bubbles; our
being is told in a tick.,,3
lIbido
2See Douglas M. Davis, "The Literary Critic: He Determines the Shape
of Our Literature," The National Observer, October 25, 1965, p. 22.

~frdi, II, chap. xxxix, 160-161.
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In Redburn, Melville mentions a dream-like fascination caused by shifting
ambiances of reality,
a certain wonderful rising and falling of the sea; I do not mean the waves
themselves, but a sort of wide heaving and swelling and sinking allover
the ocean. • • •
1
I felt as if in a dream all the time.
By the time of Moby-Dick, the passing and concluding observation of
the passage from Redburn becomes integral to the over-all structure of the
novel.

Melville did some of his most serious reading in sceptic sources prior

to and during his composition of Moby-Dick as allusions in the novel from
sections of Montaigne, particularly the "Apology," and from Browne and Bayle
show.

Further, Melville's reading of and meetings with Hawthorne seem to

have deeply influenced the crystallization of his own sceptical form, including the corollary dream form.
sense of the word:

Melville saw Hawthorne as a sceptic in the best

in his review of Mosses from an Old Manse, Melville cites

the passage from "The Intelligence Office" ending with the bit of dialogue,
"I seek for Truth,tt 2 to which he prefaces:
I submit it, then, to those best acquainted with the man personally,
whether the following is not Nathaniel Hawthorne; and to himself, whether
something involved in it does not express the temper of his mind--that
lasting temper of all true, candid men--a seeker, not a finder yet. 3

The observation is reminiscent of the note, already cited. in Melville's copy
of Montaigne where the dogmatists, those who claim to have found truth, are
1

Redburn, chap. xiii, p. 81.

2

Nathaniel Hawthorne, Mosses from an Old Manse (New York: Wiley &
Putnam, 1846), Pt. II, p. 87.
3

The Literary World, VII (August 24, 1850), 146.

178
distinguished from the sceptics, those who are still seeking it. l
Melville's first reaction to his reading of Hawthorne's Mosses was
one of dream-like quality:
The soft ravishments of the man spun me round about in a web of
dreams, and when the book was closed, when the spell was over, this
wizard "dismissed me with but misty reminiscences, as if I had been
dreaming of him. ,,2
The dream-like texture of Hawthorne's writing is easily seen in the nightmarish quality of "My Kinsman, Major Molinewe."

Even more to the purpose is

"Young Goochnan Brown" to which Melville makes explicit and extended reference

,

in his review; Seymour Gross calls attention to the "dream logic" of the story:
and Hawthorne himself asks if Goochnan Brown had "only dreamed a wild dream";
if so, it was "a dream of evil omen" and a distrustful man did he become
"from the night of that fearful dream. IA

Whatever the combination of inf1u-

ences,by the time of Moby-Dick, a dream tissue envelops and impregnates the
novel.
Although, in his discussion of Moby-Dick as a work of art, Mr.
Bezanson does not relate the dream texture of the work to Melville's philosophic structure, his discerning comments on the dream form of the novel are
particularly relevant and summary to the present ontological problem.

Mr.

Beaanson writes:

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 231, n. 1.
2The Literary World, VII (August 17, 1850), 125.
3Seymour Gross, ''Hawthorne's 'My Kinsman, Maj or Mo linewe, .. " A Casebook on the H.awthorne Question, ed. Agnes McNeill Donohue (New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell, 1963), p. 61, n. 13.
4

Hawthorne. Pt. I, p. 83.
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Ishmael's predilection for keying his narrative in the symbolic mode
suggests another aspect of structure. Moby-Dick lies close to the world
of dreams. We find the narrator recalling at length a remembered dream
of his childhood. Stubb attempts a long dream-analysis to Flask after he
has been kicked by Ahab. It is not strange, then, that young Ishmael's
moment of greatest crisis, the night of the tryworks when he is at the
helm, should be of a traumatic order. More subtly, numerous incidents
of the narrative are bathed in a dream aura: the trancelike idyll of
young Ishmael at the masthead, the hallucinatory vision of the spirit
spout, the incredible appearance on board of the devil himself accompanied by IIfive dusky phantoms," and many others. The narrator's whole
effort to communicate the timeless, spaceless concept of "The Whiteness
of the Whale ll is an act of dream analysis. "Whether it tJas a reality or
a dream, I never could entirely settle," says the narrator of his childhood dream; and so it was with much of what occurred aboard the Peguod.
Ishmael's tale is to be listened to in terms of a tradition that runs
from Revelation to Finnegan's Wake. Dream sense is an important mood in
Moby-Dlck; and dream form, to the extent there is such a verbal form, is
an inCipient structural device of the book. At regular intervals the
narrator, in his intense effort to explain himself, resorts to a brief
passage in which there is a flashing concentration of symbols that hold
for a moment and then disappear. It is a night device for rendering dayexperience, and in Moby-Dick it happens again and again. l
In an important sense, however, the dream form of Melville's novels differs
from that of the book of Revelation in which the insight is so great, so inexpressible in any ordinary context, that only a vision or dream-setting can
divorce it from ordinary reality and begin to apprOXimate its sublimity and
intensity:

for Melville, the dream is not a means of conveying an illuminat-

ing perception of a greater reality but a designation for the bewildering, unsequential, "ungraspable phantom of life," for an absence of insight and
knowledge about reality that leaves its very existence problematic.

The

dream structure that Professor Bezanson finds so pervasive in Moby-Dick may
likewise be found in equal force in Clare1 with its many references to and
situations involving dreams and sleep.
lwa1ter E. Bezanson, ''!toby-Dick: Work of Art," Moby-Dick Centennial
Essays, edt Tyrus Hi1lway and Luther S. Mansfield (Dallas: Southern Methodist
University Press, 1953), pp. 48-49.
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The erasure of the line between dream and reality occurs in Pierre's
assertion:

"It is all a dream--we dream that we dreamed we dream"l--there

will be occasion to elaborate on this statement in the following chapter on
ethics.

Dream and reality merge into each other and are interchangeable in

significance as Pierre has his "remarkable dream" of Enceladus.

In his "Dia-

logues Concerning Natural Religion," Hume had written of a universe of "hostile" and "insufficient" beings:
The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated
by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without
discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children. 2
Melville compares his "American Enceladus" with Balthazar Marsy's Bassin d'
Encelade with its sculptured leaden Titan and remarks in a similar vein as
Hume:
Marsy gave arms to the eternally defenseless; but Nature, more truthful,
performed an amputation, and left the impotent Titan without one serviceable ball-and-socket above the thigh. 3
When the "phantom" faces him, Pierre no longer sees Enceladus, but on the
Titan's armless trunk Pierre sees "his own duplicate face and features," and
all the dream horror is his actual grief. 4 The fact that reality might be
no more than illusion or dream does not mean that man i8 less vulnerable to
it or suffers less; he may but know the highest suffering of seeing all other
suffering as purposeless.

Among Melville's miscellaneous poems appears a

short verse entitled simply "To----------"; in it, Melville witnesses to the
1

Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 382.

2

HUIle, II. 526.

3Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iv, p. 482.
4Ibid •
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impact of a dream reality:
Ah, wherefore, lonely, to and fro
Flittest like the shades that go
Pale wandering by the weedy stream?
We, like they, are but a dream:
Then dreams, and less, our miseries be;
Yea, fear and sorrow, pain, despair
Are but phantoms. But what plea
Avails here? phantoms having power
1
To make the heart quake and the spirit cower.
It is, in fact, the painful and unreasonable aspect of "reality" that often
argues for its nightmarish, dream quality.

In "The Encantadas" Huni1la,

seated on a high cliff, watches her husband and brother die, "when dashed
by broad-chested swells between their broken logs and the sharp teeth of the
reef, both adventurers perished before Hunilla's eyes,,,2 and the unexpected
and uncontrollable horror of the scene becomes dream-like:
And there, the invisible painter painted to her view the wave-tossed and
disjointed raft, its once level logs slantingly upheaved, as raking masts,
and the four struggling arms undistinguishable among them; and then all
subsided into smooth-flowing creamy waters, slowly drifting the splintered
wreck; while first and last, no sound of any sort was heard. Death in a
silent picture; a dream of the eye; such vanishing shapes as the mirage
shows. 3
Chapter xvi of The Confidence-Man begins:
The sky slides into blue, the bluffs into bloom; the rapid Mississippi
expands; runs 8parkling and gurgling, allover in eddies; one magnified
wake of a seventy-four. The sun comes out, a golden hussar, from his tent,
flashing his helm on the world. All things warmed in the landscape, leap.
Speeds the daedal boat as a dream.
I

Collected Poems, p. 392.

2
The Piazza Tales, p. 223.
3

~.,

pp. 223-224.

4
The Confidence-Man, chap. xvi, p. 100.
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This passage has been called "idyllic"l and praised for its poetic quality!2
the style, however, is appropriately deceptive.
substantial, bluff of a one:
bloom [double entendre]."

The world is a shifty, un-

the "sky slides into blue, the bluffs into

The river runs "allover in eddies It or small

whirlpools and seems to be lacking a main current of direction and suggests
man'. similar plight; it is "one magnified wake of a seventy-four"--a
"seventy-four" is a type of warship and suggests Melville's view of a world
in constant warfare.

The

SUD

is probably a god image (a symbol used fre-

quently in Scripture and used in this sense at the beginning of The ConfidenceMan)--a god in warrior's garb and suggestive of a state of warfare with earth.
Melville's microcosmic world, his ship, is a "daedal" boat; again, as many
times elsewhere in the novel, the term may be used with a double entendre:
"daedal" may lIean "variegated," but also a "cUBningly" formed boat speeding
"as a dream"-the elusiveness and illusiveness of reality.
In Clarel, in the midst of Bacchic carousings at Mar Saba, during
which a number of participants openly violate or mock precepts of their respective creeds, a pensive Clarel stands by a lattice overlooking the Kedron
gulf:
With what sweep
Doubt plunges, and from maw to maw;
Traditions none the nations keep-Old ties dissolve in one wide thaw;
1

Man,"

John D. Seelye, ItTimothy Flint's 'Wicked River' and The ConfidenceLXXVIII (March, 1963). 77.

~,

2Elizabeth Foster writes: "The herb-doctor is ushered onto the stage
by an extraordinary description of natural scenery, extraordinary for its
heightened poetic tone and lushness of poetic ornament unmatched anywhere else
in this novel" (Hendricks House The Confidence-Man. p. Ix).
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The Frank, the Turk, and e' en the Jew
Share it; perchance the Brahmin too.
Deeply impressed by Nehemiah's recent death and jarred by the contrasting
boisterous sceae he asks:
Are these the pilgrims late that heard
The wheeling desert vultures scream
Above the Man and Book interred[?]
The whole bizarre incongruity of the human scene, the apparent lack of all
rational sequence, leads him to ask:
Is life indeed a dream?l
A few cantos later the significantly named Wandering Jew asks in his perplexity:

"Is all but dream?,,2 Melville persisted in this query until the

time of his death; in his last work, Melville has Billy Budd ask:
But aren't it all sham?
• • • it is dreaming that I am. 3
Melville's epistemological quandary brings him to question not only the nature
of existents but existence itself.

1
Clarel, Pt. III, canto xiv, 11. 103-121.
2

~.t

canto xix, 1. 126.

3Bill! Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 349, p. [132].

CHAPTER V
THE ETHICAL PROBLEM
"How can one sin in a dream?"
Pierre.
Ethics and the epistemological view
Montaigne conjectures that because of the lack of certainty, man has
no fixed rule for morals.

Prior to Montaigne and the renaissance, general tra-

dit10Ditl--views saw divine law as eternal. immutable, and good:

as divine law

became manifest to man through his reason, a natural endowment, it became known
as natural law. and this was man's general criterion of ethics as well as a
basis for law; when natural reason acted to reach a particular practical judgment about personal duty, this judgment became conscience--conscience was not
considered as a separate faculty but as an !£! of the faculty of intellect as
reason.

Montaigne, again, reacts against this traditional view:

ftThe laws of

conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom."
Pascal writes poignantly of the lack of a criterion, a "fixed point":
The licentious tell men of orderly lives that they stray from nature's
path, while they themselves follow it; as people in a ship think those
move who are on the shore. On all sides the language is similar. We
must have a fixed point in order to judge. The harbour decides for those
who are in a ship; but where shall we find a harbour in morality.2

~ontaigne, Bk. It chap. xxii, p. 44.
2Pensees,
'"
383.
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Pascal suggests that perspective determines a fixed point of measurement in a
painting and then asks:

"But who shall determine it in truth and morality?" 1

Hume, too, rejects a morality based on natural law and decides instead that
"the experienced train of events is the great standard by which we all
regulate our conduct." 2
In Melville's works, a principal example of the fatal realization of
the lack of a moral criterion occurs in the character Pierre, who, in his
enthusiasm, prays:

'~ay

I, in all my least shapeful thoughts, still square

myself by the inflexible rule of holy right.,,3

The tragedy of Pierre is con-

ceived in the very strength of his belief in and enthusiasm for this criterion or standard, this "inflexible rule."

Like the ftimmemorially admitted

maxims of men" that "slide and fluctuate, and finally become wholly inverted, .. 4
Pierrets "inflexible" rule, too, fluctuates and inverts and leads him into
the "monstrouseat vice." 5 Early in the novel, Pierre crawls under the Terror
Stone, emblematic of an indifferent deity, and invokes the Stone to fallon
him and crush him i f virtue is "unmeaning. ,,6

Later, Melville has Pierre re-

phrase the same invocation to the "stony" walls:

"If ••• the uttermost

Virtue, after all, prove but a betraying pander to the monstrouseat vice,-then close in and crush me, ye stony walls" 7--in the novel's penultimate
1

illS., 381.

2

Hume, IV, 166.
3Pierre, Bk. V, chap. vi, p. 150.
4
5

Ibid. , Bk. IX, chap. i, p. 231.
Ibid., Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 381.

6

.illS. , Bk • VII, chap. v, p. 189.

7

.illS. Bk • XIX, chap_ ii, pp. 380-381.
J
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chapter, Melville's imagery sugge.t. that the stony wall. of

Pierre,~s

situation

have clo.ed in to crush him, for Pierre i •• een .tanding "in a low dungeon of
the city pri.on.

The cUilber.OIIl8 stone ceiling almost rested on his brow;

.0

that the long tiers of ma•• ive cell-galleries above .eamed partly piled on
him. ,,1
Ethic. and the ontological view
Ethics and ontology are reciprocally interdependent:

becau.e of

certain p.ychological factors, a person's view of reality may often depend
upon hi. ethical

~~~e--or

lack of one; logically, however, the ontological

problea, the view of reality, precede. and forms one'. ethical per.pective
of the right and wrong of human action.

Emer.on, with hi. tran.cendental type

of ideali.. exhort. men to "build therefore your own world.,,2

Reality be-

com•• comformable to man a. ethical agent, a. a being po••••• ing the power to
will-for the early !!'aeraon, man wills

realit~:

can reduce under hi. will not only particular event. but gr.at
cla•• es, nay, the whole series of events, and so conform all facts to
his character. • • • the world becames at last only a realized will. 3

He

In such a view, the only "sin" is Imitation. 4 For the man who views reality
as a .trictly moni.tic aaterialist there should logically be no ethical queation, since man, for him, is amoral.

Such a view may be seen in adherent. to

the materialistic Marxi.t ideology existing in the Soviet Union today.
1

~.,

Bk. XXVI, chap. vi, p. 502.

2Eaeraon, Work., I, 76.
3

~.,

39-40.

4See Emerson'. • •• ay ''Fate,'' Works, VI, particularly p. 20: "Fat.
is
known to us as limitation. Whatever l:1JBits us we call Fat•• "
• • •
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Melville, too, was profoundly influenced in his view of ethics by his
more fundamental epistemological and ontological views:

from an epistemo1ogi-

cal standpoint, it may be asked how one conforms to or transgresses against
norms and criterions that are not perceptible or that, at best, remain highly
questionable and doubtful; viewed against the ontological problem, human actions are inconsequential in a world where there are, perhaps, no criterions,
where Being may be Nothing and reality only a dream.

Melville succinctly

places this problem through the question posed by Pierre:
ceeds nothing. • • • How can one sin in a dream?"l

"From nothing pro-

If nihilism is considered

as a doctrine which denies any objective ground of moral principles, the
nihilistic element of Melville's moral probing becomes evident, since he
questions the presence of any objective reality at all.
Melville offers a question, not a conclusion.

Again, however,

If Being is Nothing, then

"Virtue and Vice" become but "two shadows cast from one nothing" 2--so it
"seems" to Pierre. 3 The question is again raised in "Timo1eon":
What basis then? 0, tell at last,
Are earnest natures staggering here
But fatherless shadows from no substance cast?4
An indifferent deity

The lack of clear-cut distinctions, more, a suggested ambiguous connection in the question of truth-falsehood, light-darkness, dream-reality, being1

Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 382.

2Ibid •
3Ibid •
4Co11ected Poems. p. 215.
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nothing, goodness-evil, and especially, virtue-vice, led Melville to attack
the apparent indifference of the "gods."

The insouciance of the gods is

suggested in Montaigne's "Apology" in the quotation from Ennius:
I ever thought tbat gods above there were; 1
But do not think they care what men do here.
The concept of indifference is openly stated in Hume's "Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion":

Philo is allotted the final and extended portion of the

dialogue, and Bume, who had read Bayle, has him question the Hanichean system
as a possible explanation for the "strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life."

2

Philo, however, sees no particular combat between a malevo-

lent and benevolent being and finally rejects the Manichean hypothesis.
decides instead:

Be

"The true conclusion is, that the original Source of all

things is entirely indifferent • • • and bas no more regard to good above ill,
than to beat above cold.,,3

In Book I, chapter iii of Sartor Resartus, whicb

Melville borrowed from Duyckinck in 1850, 4 Carlyle, too, mentions a "godlike indifference."S
For man, vested with inefficient faculties, truth becomes undiscernible
from falsehood, if, indeed, it i8 discernible; light appears to be swallowed
up in darkness or forms an _biguous 11ai80n--a8 in the "dark l1ghtning-

~onta1gne, Bk.
2

lIt chap. xii, p. 238.

Hume, II, S26.

3Ibid ., 526-527.
4

Sealts, No. 123.

5
Bendricks Bou8e Moby-Dick. p. 812, note for 461.13. Carlyle knew
Bume's "Dialogues" (see Faery Neff, Carlyle [New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
Inc., 1932], p. 31).
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king"; 1 reality gives evidence of being no more than dream, Being Nothing.
The quality of indifference does not necessarily contradict earlier Melvillean
designations of the deity as malign, even when that malignity is active:

one

can, in general, be quite indifferent to flies and yet swat or crush one if it
is annoying.

Again, a not incongruous combination of malignity and indif-

ference may be seen in the parental figure who strikes out at a child fortuitously or unjustly, showing, by the very action, a lack of genuine personal
concern and the presence of an underlying indifference--perhaps the final
malignity of them all.
In probing the question inadvertently raised by Descartes and many
ways rephrased by Bay1e- tt ls God the Devil?"--Me1vi11e sought the utmost
example and foundation for the mysterious connection of contradictories, and
he shows a special concern for the question of goodness-evil, particularly
moral goodness and evil or virtue and vice.

In Mardi, there are moral over-

tones in the mysterious connection of Yi11ah and Rautia:

Yil1ah is singularly

gui1e1ess--Taji remarks, "Often I thought that Paradise had overtaken me on
earth, and that Yillah vas verily an angel, and hence the mysteries that
hallowed her";

2

Rautia, conversely, entices, "Come I let us sin, and be

merry.,,3 The question of an indifferent deity becomes full-blown in Moby~.

Several terms come into playas Melville develops this theme of indif-

ference:

again, the vall image is used, particularly a "dead" val1--connoting

unresponsiveness on the part of an indifferent deity, effecting, for man, a
lThe Piazza Tales, p. 180.

~ardi, I, chap. lxiV, 226.
3Ibid., II, chap_ xc, 395.
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lack of communication not stmply with participating beings (if such do exist)
but with Being Itself.

The term "stolidity" is used synonymously:

in his

personal copy of the poem "The Berg." Melville cancelled the words in the
last line, "dead indifference" of walls, and substituted "dense stolidity"
of walls. l

Earlier in the poem, Melville describes the iceberg as "stolid. 1t2

A synonym for "stolid" is "impassive," which means "showing indifference" or
being "insensible," i.e., bereft of emotion or sensation--the narrator says
of the "dead lt wall of the Whale's head:

"I do not think that any sensation

lurks in it.,,3 Also connected with the concept of indifference is that of
the impersonal; Ahab addresses the "supernal power":
personified impersonal. a personality stands here."

"In the midst of the

4

The terms "indifferent,n "stolidity," and "impersonal" are used to
describe the carpenter through whom Melville has Ahab question the nature of
the ugods." Melville invests the carpenter with god-like qualities; he is
called both a "man-maker"S and an Uundertaker. ,,6

Because he is tlone day making

legs, and the next day coffins to clap them in, ,,7 Ahab tells him:
"Thou art as unprincipled as the gods, and as much of a jack-ofall-trades."
1

Selected Poems of Herman Melville, ed. Hennig Cohen (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1964). p. 220.
2

Collected Po.... p. 203.

1Moby-Dick, II, chap. lxxvi, 70.
4

!!!!!!., chap. exile, 281.

5

!h!4., chap. cviii, 237.

6

.!ill., chap. cxxvii. 308.

7Ibid •
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"But I do not mean anything, sir.
"The gods again."l

I do as I do."

Ahab then asks him if he ever sings while working on a coffin, and the carpenter answers, "Oh, I'm indifferent enough, sir, for that." 2 It is said of the
carpenter that he "was prepared at all points, and alike indifferent and
without respect in all,,,3 and he is described by the "indifferent promptitude
of his character." 4 Further, for nothing was the carpenter more remarkable
than for a certain "impersonal stolidity as it were; impersonal, I say; for
it so shaded off into the surrounding infinite of things, that it seemed one
with the general stolidity discemible in the whole visible world. ,,5
Justice, in simple terms, means to give everyone his due.

The presence

of injustice, the lack of any discriminative recognition for virtue and vice,
made Melville question the indifference of the deity--Melville has Ahab say:
"To neither love nor reverence wilt thou be kind; and e'en for hate thou canst
but kill; and all are killed.,,6 And so it is.

Starbuck asks, "Is this the

end of all my bursting prayers? all my life-long fide1ities?",7 and is killed.
Ahab darts his iron and "his far fiercer curse, into the hated whale"
1

!lli. , 309.

2~.
3

.!!l.M. , chap. cvii, 233.

4

.!!l.M. , chap. ex, 248 •

s.!.12.!!!. ,

chap. cvii, 234 •

6Ibid. , chap. cxix,
281.
7
!E..!S.. , chap. ex:x:xv, 364.
8

!l!!!!. , 363.
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declares, "From. hell's heart I stab at thee; for hate's sake I spit my last
breath at thee,,,l and Ahab is killed.

It may be wondered if Melville is pur-

suing something of the same question in Billy Budd, for both the depraved
Claggart and innocent Budd are killed and dropped into the sea.

In Moby-Dick,

the narrator describes "the demoniac indifference with which the White Whale
tore his hunters, whether sinning or sinned against": 2 here, the not incongruous connection of malignity and indifference is evident in the description
of the actively malign actions of the White Whale as "demoniac indifference."
In Pierre, the father figure, who shades into a symbol of the deity,
is himself responsible for the presence of evil.

In the unreasonable world

depicted in the novel, whether reality is more than dream or not, for all
practical purposes it might as well be only dream.

In such a world, ethics

become meaningless; there exists no objective ground for moral principles, and
the only apparent moral is "that there is n2. moral." 3 Pierre's attempted
heroic virtue but leads him into vice, and the theme of indifference is again
sounded:
We learn that it is not for man to follow the trail of truth too far,
since by so doing he entirely loses the directing compass of his _ind;
for arrived at the Pole, to whose barrenness only it points, there, the
needle indiffferently respects all pointa of the horizon alike. 4
The narrator in Pierre observes:
1

lli..!!.,

2

~.,

"Eternally inexorable and unconcerned ia

366.

chap. cxxx, 318.

3Editor Murray's observation in Hendricks House Pierre, p. xvi.
4
Pierre, Bk. lX, chap. i, p. 231.
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Fate, a mere heartless trader in men's joys and woes,,,l and Pierre. as he
hears Isabel's story, remarks:

"My heart was only dark with ill-restrained

upbraidings against heaven that could unrelentingly see such innocence as
thine so suffer."

2

In MobY-Dick. Melville writes of the little negro Pip,

another instance of suffering innocence, that his insanity is like heaven's
wisdom. in which, weal or woe, he feels "indifferent as his God. II 3 The
primary symbol for the indifferent deity in Pierre is stone.
Further, indifference may be a disdainful indifference.

As Knceladus,

representative man, confronts the "majestic mount,lf an analogue for divine
nature, his "stark naked" and "indignant chest" is exposed to the defilements
of the birds (whose significance, in Melville, usually transcends that of
mere natural objects 4 to represent heavenly agents or powers), birds '\mich
1

.ill!.. , Bk. V, chap. v, p. 148 •

2

..!.MS. , Bk. VIII, chap. v. p. 222 •

\.obI-Dick, II, chap. xciii, 170.
4Me1vi1le, however, sees nature, too, as indifferent: in Mardi (I,
chap. lxix, 244), Babba1anja quotes Bardianna on the fact that "if not against
us, nature is not for us"; in Clare 1 (Pt. I, canto XXXVii, 1. 48), Rolfe
speaks of "nature with her neutral mind." Melville often describes the indifference of nature after cataclysmic events--the ripest moment for man's
eternal "Why?": after the sinking of the Pequod, the "sea rolled on as it
rolled five thousand years ago" (Moby-Dick, II, chap. exxxv, 367); in their
edition of Billy Budd (pp. 196-198, note for leaf 334), Professors Hayford and
Sea1ts offer a protracted, because significant, note on the indifference of
nature after Billy's execution.
At a little lower layer, MelVille, like Bayle, seems to be obliquely
demonstrating that contrary to Christian tradition, which sees nature as
ordered, harmonious, and beautiful and then argues a posteriori from effects
to cause, from creation to Creator, to posit like positive attributes in the
Godhead, it is possible to sceptically tilt the scale and argue a posteriori
to far different conclusions because of the existence of evil and indifference
in the world. Melville writes of the "indifferent" carpenter that his "impersonal stolidity" shaded off and "seemed one with the general stolidity
discernible in t e whole visible world" (Koby-Dick, II, chap. evii, 234.
Under1inin mine •
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for untold ages had cast their foulness on his vanquished crest."l
In The Confidence-Man, the supposition that virtue and vice are "two
shadows cast from one nothing" is pushed, with almost Swiftian logic, to its
inexorable conclusion.

The good (e.g., the young Episcopal clergyman and the

charitable lady) and the bad (e.g., the egoistic, greedy Sophomore and stingy
old miser) are both

duped--~

are duped by the devil-god Confidence-Man who

regards all with "indifferent eyes."

2

Those seeking a path of virtuous con-

duct, as the purported husband of Goneril and the honest China Aster, are reduced to nothing; like Pierre, each ia simply the "fool of Virtue.,,3
The theme of indifference is also sounded in Melville's short stories
and poems.

A passage from lithe Encantadas" implies an indifferent deity be-

cause of the random outcome and inconsequence of man's efforts:
But in all things man sows upon the wind, which bloweth just there
whither it listeth; for ill or good, man cannot know. Often ill comes
from the good, as good from ill.4
In his poem "Off Cape Colonna," Melville says of the columns of the Sunium
temple:
Over much like gods! Serene they saw
The wolf-waves board the deck,
And headlong hull of Falconer, 5
And many a deadlier wreck.
As

Hume's Philo understands it, "the original Source of all things is entirely
1

Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iv, p. 481.

2

The Confidence-Man, chap. xlv, p. 336.

3

Pierre, Bk. XXVI, chap. iv, p. 499.

4

The Piazza Tales, p. 227.

5

Collected Poems, p. 248.
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indifferent • • • and has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat
above cold. ,,1
Melville. merit. and the Protestant ethic
Melville was probably helped to his view of an indifferent deity
through his animadversions on success and merit.

In his book The Organization

!!!!!., William H. Whyte, Jr. describes the Protestant ethic

as "pursuit of indi-

vidual salvation through hard work, thrift. and competitive struggle. tl 2 The
industrious man was the virtuous man; if a man grew rich it was because he
deserved to. and "what for centuries had been looked on as the meanest greed.
a rising middle class would interpret as the earthly manifestation of God's
will.,,3 The ethic included a good deal of Old Testament mentality according
to which the ebb or flux of one's success and prosperity was often held to be
indicative of the degree of amity eXisting, in the particular case, between
God and man.

4

"Success was moral as well as practical" -success meant lIlerit.

Melville, too, believed in the ethic of "hard work"-- fl Toi1 is man's
allotment; toil of brain. or toil of hands, or a grief that's more than either,
the grief and sin of idleness tiS_but long before many young and deserving
businessmen at the turn of the century came to the realization that success

~uae, II, 526-527.
2(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 4. Mr. Whyte's use of the
tem "Protestant." is, of course, a not,> entirely warranted generalization.
3
p. 16 •

..!1!.!!!. ,

4

..!1!.!!!. , p. 15.

5Mard!, I, chap. lxiii, 223-224.
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did not necessarily mean merit but only the right personal connections, Melville recognized the dichotomy between success and merit.

Perhaps because

of his training in the tenets of the Dutch Reform Church, Melville was imbued
with a Calvinistic, Old Testament-generated belief that merit should be synonoaous with success--the fact that it was not Melville seemed to find a part
of the general injustice of man's existential plight and but one more clue to
the indifference of the gods.

The concept of success, just previously des-

cribed, appears to be, predominantly, one of financial success; Melville, too,
would have welcomed financial success--he had written to Hawthorne, "Dollars
damn me" 1-but, for Melville, success meant much more:
of good done,

2

sanctions.b.!I!. and

BOW

it meant recognition

for virtue performed.

In "Timoleon" Melville asks in the tenor of the Protestant ethic:
"[Is] God's will avouched in each successful man?,,3

In the POUl, Melville has

just shown that the "successful man," Timoleon's brother Timophanes, is not
the meritorious man but an "egotist.,,4 Melville gives a two line resume of
the events of the poem, Timoleon's eclipse and belated glory, and then asks:
Is that high Providence, or Chance?
5
And proved it which with thee, Timoleon?
Timoleon's choice, seen at the end of the poem, seems to rule out the
1

Letters, p. 128.

~elville, personally, wanted recognition, including financial recognition, for what he recognized as his best writing. He wrote to Hawthorne:
"What I feel most moved to write, that is banned,-it will not pay" (Ibid.).
3collected Poems, p. 209.
4Ibid •
SIbid.
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possibility of tlprovidence" being avouched in the successful man and leaves,
through implication, "Chance" or indifference, for after Corinth condemns
Timoleon the city again acclaims him, but on no more sound reasons than that
"men's moods" again have changed and the world turns "in fickle ways. ,,1 TIle
Corinthians assure Timoleon, "Justice in long arrears is thine, tl 2 and eagerly
recall him to Corinth.

That Timoleon recognizes the chance-like, fortuitous,

and untrustworthy nature of this "Justice" is evinced in the simple assertion
of the closing line, since Timoleon, in exile,
never for Corinth left the adopted shore. 3
Melville's tendency to identify Chance with indifference will be considered
further in the following section on fate and free will.
Melville's recognition of the division existing between success and
merit is evident in Mardi.

Babbalanja remarks:

a thing absolute. ,,4 Later, he again asserts:

"Fame is an accident; merit
"Truth and Merit have other

symbols than success. ,,5 Melville was not so cOlllpletely unrealistic as to
deny all merit to the successful man, but he saw that it was not commensurate
with success, that it could, in fact, be an insignificant entity in the randOlll
formula that culminated in success; he writes of Pierre:
The brightest success, now seemed intolerable to him, since he so plainly
saw, that the brightest success could not be the sole offspring of Merit;
but of Merit for the one thousandth part. and nine hundred and ninety-nine
1

.!lli.•• p. 215. Underlining added.

21bid •
3Ibid •
4Mardi. II, chap. xxii, 88.
SIbid., chap. lxiv, 274-275.
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combining and dovetailing accidents for the rest.

1

Fate and free will
Although Melville was undoubtedly moved toward his view of fate and
free will by his Calvinistic religious background, this predominantly fatalistic view was corroborated by his subsequent philosophical reading.

In Rabe-

lais, Melville would have read the description of the loadstones which open
the gates to the temple of the holy bottle.
right side are the words:

Engraven on the loadstone on the

"Fate leads the willing, and the unwilling draws. If

Cut into the left loadstone is:

"ALL THINGS TEND TO THEIl END • .,2

Speaking of

men's actions, Montaigne says that it is "the gods ••• themselves that put
them [men] in the way and mind to do them • .,3

In the "Apology, II Montaigne

quotes from Manilius:
One mad in love may cross the raging main,
To level lofty Ilium with the plain;
Another's fate inclines him more by far
To study laws and statutes for the bar.
Sons kill their fathers, fathers kill their sons,
And one arm!d brother 'gainst another runs.
This war's not their's, but fate's, that spurs them on
To shed the blood which, shed, they must bemoan;
And I ascribe it to the will of fat%
That on this theme I now expatiate.
Further, Melville's stress on the predominance of fate is a logical
corollary to his conception of reality as possible dream or illusion.
1

Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 472.

2

Rabelais, IV, Bk. V, chap. xxxvii, 249.

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 240.
4

~.,

pp. 205-206.

In the
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preceding chapter, a line from Auden was quoted concerning the hero who "is
as purely passive as the I in dreams";

1

this passivity, this sense of being

maneuvered and controlled rather than of being "in control" strengthens the
sense of being fated rather than of being in possession of free will.
In Mardi, Vee-Vee, the little bugler, falls from the shoulders of a
paddler and nearly breaks his arm.

Babbalanja reasons:

Minus human inducement from without, and minus volition from within, VeeVee has met with an accident which has almost maimed him for life. • • •
Are not all mortals exposed to similar, nay, worse calamities, ineffably
unavoidable 12
The incident leads to a discussion of fatalism.

Babbalanja defines "Fatalism"

as that which "presumes express and irrevocable edicts of heaven concerning
particular events.,,3 Babbalanja argues that if events prophesied of nations
have irrevocably come to pass, this fact bespeaks foreordination, and, moving
from the social aggregate to the individual, he likewise argues:

"Wherefore

our own future is foreknown and foreordained. ,,4 The srgument continues and
reasons that even as these nations were given previous knowledge of the forthcoming events and could not forestall them, so neither can man.
Mohi the historian responds to Babbalanja's argument:

"This whole

discourse seems to have grown out of the subject of Necessity and Free Will.
Now, when a boy, I recollect hearing a sage say that these things were
1

Poe, Selected Prose and Poetry, p. vii.

~ardi, II, chap. xxxi, 120-121.
3

.lli.!!., 121.

4

.lli.!!., 123.
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reconcilable." 1 This remark sparks in Babba1anja the following anecdote of
King Normo and his fool, significantly named Willi:
Now, though Willi ever obeyed his lord, by the very instinct of his
servitude, he flattered himself that he was free; and this conceit it was
that made the fool so entertaining to the king. One day, said Normo to
his foo1,-"Co, Willi, to yonder tree, and wait there till 1 come. tt "Your
majesty, I will," said Willi, bowing beneath his jingling bells; "but I
presume your majesty has no objections to my walking on my hands:--I am
free, I hope." "Perfectly," said Normo, "hands or feet, it's all the
same to me; only do my bidding." "I thought as much, tf said tU1li; so.
swinging his limber legs into the air, Willi, thumb after thumb, essayed
progression. But soon, his bottled blood so rushed downward through his
neck, that he was fain to turn a somerset and regain his feet. Said he,
"Though I am free to do it, it's not so easy turning digits into toes;
I'll walk, by gadl which is my other option. tI So he went straight forward,
and did King Normo's bidding in the natural way.2
It may be that Melville, through Babba1anja's anecdote, is leaving a bare
vestige of option working within necessity, but it may also be that, given
Melville's persistent emphasis on fate, the passage is to be read as an anecdote supporting the view of necessity and demonstrating that the man who
thinks himself free is, like Willi, a fool.

To hazard a contradiction, the

fact that Willi is, as it were, necessarily forced to choose to proceed in
the "natural way," because of the physical eontingency of the blood rushing
to his head, may point ahead to Babbalanja's eonsiderations on man as being
necessitated through the very structure of his nature. :3
Mohi's point is not forgotten, however, and Melville eontinued to
question the reeonei1iation of fate and freedom; even when he does not entire1y rule out the possibility of free will, it is seen, if not as effeetua11y
1

.!.!?!9... 127.

2Ibid •
3Ibid ., ehap. xxxix, 155-158.
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nil, as barely minimal at best and as subservient to and, as it were, playing
into the hands of fate or necessity.

In chapter xlvii of Moby-Dick, "The

Mat-Maker," Melville gives a concise presentation of fate and free will,
reconciling them with each other and with indifference in a tour de force on
the metaphor of a

100m

that would be worthy of the metaphysieal poets.

presentation is set in a dream atmosphere:

The

at the beginning of the chapter

Ishmael describes the strange "dreaminess" that reigns "allover the ship and
allover the sea. ltl A minimal freedom is seen working within necessity_

In

the weaving of the mat on the "Loom of Time," the "unalterable," "straight,"
"fixed threads of the warp"

2

represent fate or necessity.

Ishmael, in an

action representing free will, weaves in the woof, but only as the "unchanging" vibration of the warp admits these threads to interblend.

3

On an actual

loom, a movable bar, called a batten, strikes home the threads of a woof, i.e.,
slides them snuggly into place.
which "drove home every yarn. 1I

4

Melville's batten is Queequeg's oaken sword,
Idly looking off, Queequeg, with his "impul-

sive," tfindifferent" sword, plays god "carelessly and unthinkingly" hitting
the woof slantingly, or crookedly, or strongly, or weakly.5 This indifferent
sword "finally shapes and fashions both warp and woof,,6_-both fate and free
will.

It is further maintained that the "indifferent sword must be

~obY-Dick, I, chap. xlvii, 269.
2Ibid ., 269-270.
3
!!?!,g,., 269.

4Ibid •
5

.!!!!.!!•• 269-270.

6

~.,

270.
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chance. ,,1
Melville offers a concluding summary:
The straight warp of necessity, not to be swerved from its ultimate course
--its very alternating vibration, indeed, only tending to that; free will
still free to ply her shuttle between given threads; and chance, though
restrained in its play within the right lines of necessity, and sideways
in its motions directed by free will, though thus prescribed to by both'2
chance by turns rules either, and has the last featuring blow at events.
Ishmael asserts:

"Ay, chance, free will, and necessity-no wise incompatible

--all interweavingly working togE>ther." 3 Melville concludes, however, by
giving even greater precedence to Fate in the heavily fated tragedy of Moby-

~:

the "ball of free will,,4 drops from Ishmael's hand, and, as he des-

cribes the Indian Tashtego standing nloft in the cross-trees and crying out for
whales, his terms recall Babbalanja's discussion of "prophets," "seers," and
"Fatalism" in Mardi:

"You would have thought him some prophet or seer behold-

ing the shadows of Fate, and by those wild cries announcing their coming. ItS
The idea of free will working within or playing into the hands of fate,
1

!h!!.. Melville's thought apprOXimates Hume's: "A perfect and total
indifference is essential to chance" (Hume, It 171). Melville's alignment of
indifference with chance is suggested in "Timoleon," cited, in part, in the
preceding section. Timoleon addresses his "quarrel" to the gods and, in
language that is reminiscent of the stone imagery of Pierre, challenges them
on their indifference:
Your marbles in the temple stand-Yourselves as stony and invoked in vain?
(Collected Poems, p. 214).
To the question of Providence or Chance presiding in the events of Timoleon's
life, the terms of the poem tend to lean heavily toward Chance.
2!lli..
lIbido
4Ibid •
5

~.,

270-271.

Compare with Mardi, II, chap. xxxi. 121-124.
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weaving and "interblendingft :with the "given threads" of necessity, l se_s, in
a certain senae, exemplified in the person of Allab.

Allab' s purpose to dis-

_..ber his disa..berer is, finally, unsuccessful, but his attempt to ..sail
Moby Dick is a will act:

"I've willed; and what I've willed, I'll doJ,,2 Yet,

even as he pursues his own "determinate, uusurrenderable wilfulness,,,3 he is
fulfilling the part of "the Fates' lieutenant."

4

It lIay be argued that Mel-

ville is showing that, in the end, the whole business just resolves to fatalism
anyway.

But there is evidence that something more cClllplex is occurring.

Kel-

ville may be endeavoring to reconcile two disparate views, both of which be
needs in tbe epic struggle of Moby-Dick.

Like Sbakespeare's use, in Otbello.

of two different time sequences, whicb, tbougb inconsistent with each otber,
add to the effectiveness of tbe draaa, so, too, does Melville, consciously or
unconsciously, sea to allow two inconsistent views, one of fate and one of
free will, which add to tbe draaatic tension and impact of the novel:

first,

Allab's "quarrel witb God" (to borrow Thompson IS pbrase) largely owes to tbe
fact that God or UPate is the bandspike" wbich turns .an around in this world;5
Abab reasons that it i8 God who does the "thinking" and "living" in him, like
a "cozening, ••• cruel, remorseless emperor....aking him do what he would not
dare do in hie "own proper, natural heart. ,,6
1

llli,., 269-270.

2

llli,., chap. xuvii, 210.

3

~.,

chap. xxviii, 154.

4
llli,., II, chap. cxxxiv, 352.
5

!ill., chap. exuii, 330.

6Ibid •

On

the other hand, Allab is free

204
to fight.

A robust element of free will seems to be present in the "defiance"

exhibited by both Ahab and Pierre:
ness."

1

both possess an "unsurrenderable wilful-

The impression comes through that Ahab is destroyed but not conquered,

Pierre crushed but unyielding.

Ahab, like the great burnt pine mentioned in

Clarel, remains IIGigantic--killed, not overthrown."

2

Even after Ahab declares

that all is "immutably decreed\! and he is the "Fates' lieutenant," he announces
to the crew that it is ItAhab's hawser [that] tows his purpose yet.,,3

Mel-

ville uses the concept of fate to offer a motive of defiance, and the concept
of freedom for the quality of defiance, a freedom that allows the old man to
remain, in spirit, the indomitable hero that he is.
In Pierre, fate and free will are no longer spoken of as interblending
or weaving together, but as of being in debate.

It is said that Pierre was

not arguing Fixed Fate and Free Will; rather, "Fixed Fate and Free Will were
arguing him, and Fixed Fate got the better in the debate.,,4

Some inconsistency

remains, however, for even as Pierre becomes the "fool of Fate," 5 he remains
"immovable" and wilfully defiant.

6

In Clarel, it is, again, the predominance of fate that is stressed in
Rolfe's story of a mariner, the master of a ship, whose night-watch conversattD
1

~.,

2

chap. cxix, 281 and Pierre, Bk. XXVI, chap. vi, p. 502.

C1are1, Pt. II, canto xvi, 11. 1-4.

3

Moby-Dick, II, chap. cxxxiv, 352.

4
5
6

Pierre, Bk. XI, chap. i, p. 254.
Ibid., Bk. XXVI, chap. iv, p. 499.

~.,

chap. vi, p. 502.
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with a aubaltern are described:
The master ever spurned at fate,
Calvin'a or Zeno's. Always still
Man-like he stood by man's free will
And power to effect each thing he would,
Did reason but pronounce it good.
The subaltern held in humble way
That still heaven's overrulings sway
Will and event. 1
When the master is the sole survivor from an ensuing wreck, he declares, "I
willed it.,,2
b ow. ,,3

But on his next venture "a whale I Of purpose aiming, stove the

After this event, reminiscent of the action of Moby Dick, the mariner

is a marked man:

Jonah-like, he is thought to be 11l-omened and cannot secure

a place on another ship.

He becomes a night patrolman on the quay, works in

every kind of weather and is grateful for a crust.

No longer "Man-11ke," he

meekly puts his trust in Calvin's deterministic creed:

the mariner

Praised heaven, and said that God was good,
And his calamity but just. 4
Ironically, Melville's point is that it is unjust; he resents the .fact that
man must feel compelled to recognize the preponderance of fate and that "God"
will not allow the new American religion of individualism--of an actively
willed self-reliance spiritually subsidized by the deity.
Melville seriously considered the question of man's being fated in
and by his individual nature, his particular metaphysical make-up.
1

Clarel, Pt. It canto xxxvii, 11. 30-37.

2

Ibid., 1. 74.

3

~.,

4

~.,

11. 83-84.
11. 104-105.

In Mardi,
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Babbalanja declares that men "are governed by their very natures" and are
saints or sinners according as they are Itconstitutionally" constructed. 1
Professors Hayford and Sealts have treated this question in the "Notes &
Commentary" section of their edition of Billy Budd and have brought together
the following examples.

2

In addition to the above example from Mardi, which

Hayford and Sealts also include, they mention, from White Jacket, the ship
Neversink's master-at-arms, Bland, who is by nature nan organic and irreclaimable scoundrel,,;3 in his copy of Arnold's Essays in Criticism Melville wrote
that men are "influenced • • • by the very fibre of the flesh, & chalk of the
bones.

We are what we are made";

4

Mortmain, in Clarel, considers whether

human wickedness may lie
Nearer the core than man can go
Or Science get--nearer the slime
Of nature's rudiments and lime
In chyle before the bone. Thee, thee,
In thee the filmy cell is spun-The mould thou art of what men be:
Events are all in thee begun-By thee, through thee,5
Clagg art , in Billy Budd, is said to be possessed of "an evil nature • • • born
wi th him and innate, in short 'a depravity according to nature. ",6

In such a

view as the foregoing, if strictly adhered to, moral accountability, sin,

~ardi, II, chap. xxxix, 156.
2Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, pp. [162-163], note for leaf 130.
3White Jacket, chap. xliv, p. 234.
4
5

6

Sealts, No. 17.
Clarel, Pt. II, canto xxxvi, 11. 96-103.
Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, p. [76], leaf 134.
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virtue and vice, and consequent retributive justice become, in effect, meaningless, although antecedent Justice may come under serious attack.
Melville and the sense of sin
Melville's attitude toward sin in the sense of a culpable wrong action
against right reason (and ultimately against God, whose divine law is manifested through right reason),

I

not just as wrong action performed unwittingly,

is particularly difficult of precise definition.

The question turns partly on

Melville's view of free will, since, for a man to be culpable or guilty of
sin, he must possess a power rendering him responsible for the sinful action.
Inversely, a sense of personal responsibility might point to a concept of
free wilL

It may be objected that free will, as Melville sees it, is so

negligible as to be effectually nonexistent--even as it plays into the plans,
or weaves into the warp, of fate.

Melville's notion of merit, however, would

seem to be incompatible with a rigid view of fate in which man, pawn-like,
would not be capable of individually earned merit:

this may be an incompati-

bility, however, which Simply exists, reasonable or not.
There is limited and questionable evidence of a possible sense of sin.
In Mardi, Taji kills Aleema, Yillah's priest-custodian.
the act extenuate the element of guilt:

Taji does not realize what he is

doing--"Ere I knew it, my cutlass made a quick lunge,"
I

Early descriptions of

2

and neither are his

This concept of sin is, again, the traditional, Christian one:
divine law manifested through right reason is natural law; therefore, to act
contrary to right reason is to act contrary to natural law and the divine law
which it manifests. As evidenced in Montai8ne, the sceptic challen.ges the
notion of "right reason" and natural law.
2

Mardi, I, chap. xli, 154.
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motives clearly defined:
Remorse smote me hard; and like lightning I asked myself, whether the
death-deed I had done was aprung of a virtuous motive, the rescuing a
captive from thrall; or whether beneath that pretence, I had engaged in
this fatal affray for aome other, and selfish purpose; the companionship
of a beautiful maid. l
Later, however, a sense of wrong is evident.

Taji says of his soul:

At bottom guilt brooded. Sifted out, my motives to this enterprise justified not the mad deed, which, in a moment of rage, I had done: though,
those motives had been covered with a gracious ~retence; concealing myself from myself. But I beat down the thought.
In the end, the matter is left with a question mark; Taji asks, as he contemplates the stars:

"But how your mild effulgence stings the boding heart.

Na I a murderer, stars?")

Possible culpability is, however, lessened even

more when, later in the novel, Babbalanja challenges the presence of responsibility in the fated man. 4
There ia a sense of sin in Pierre's observation that "his father must
have becOlle insane from a sin-grief irreparable. ,,5

The quotation, again,

offers only tenuous evidence, since the "father" image in Pierre merges into
that of the deity, and the epithet of "insane" may not be completely implausible as applied to the deity, since Melville questioned the source of an unreasonable world.
In Clarel, it is Mortmain who considers that events are begun in the
1

n.!.!t. , chap. xlii, 157.

2Ibid. , chap. xliv, 162.
3

.lli!t. , chap. lviii, 208 •

4

.lli!t. , II, chap. XXXi, 124.

.5Pierre, Bk. XXI, chap. ii, p. 400.
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very "mould" of man,l but it is also Mortmain who questions the "sins refined"
of the malefactors who brought down destruction upon the cities of the plain.
He follows the traditional view, exemplified in Dante's Infemo,2 that sins
of the spirit are more deadly than sins of the flesb.

The ghosts of the male-

factors seem to be crying out, "Conjuring yet to spare, but spare!,·3 Mortmain's answering reflections are accusatory, seemingly denoting responsibility:
Fie, fie, that didst in formal will
Plot piously the posthumous snare. 4
Melville's use of "fot'llal" in the above quotation is questionable:

if Melville

means, by "fot'llal," that an action is done according to the nature of the
inner fot'll or essence of a thing, it may be wondered if he has in mind a sort
of fata1is. by the metaphysical make-up of a person's inner nature, a point
discussed in the preceding section.

The accusatorial tone of the passage,

however, seems incongruous with such a view.

There is a possibility that

Melville used "fot'lla!" in the sense of "done in due form, ceremonial," i.e.,
an action done as something carefully planned and voluntarily performed with
deliberation:

the ghosts are said to have plotted their own posthumous snare.

Two spirits debate over Mortmain's deliberations.
asks:
Be it far from me to impute a sin,
But may a sinless nature win
Those deeps he knows'S
1

Clare1, Pt. II, canto xxxvi, 1. 101.

~elvi1le owned Dante's work--see Sea1ts, No. 174.
3C1arel, Pt. II, canto xxxvi, 1. 58.
4

~.,

S

11. 59-60.

Ibid., 11. 121-123.

The first spirit
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The second spirit demurs:
Sin shuns that way;
Sin acts the sin, but flees the thought
1
That sweep a the abyss that sin has wrought.
2
Mortmain's heart is declared to be innocent and true.
The necessity for the
sinner to "flee the thought" points back to the guilt-ridden Taji's admission:
"But I beat down the thought. tI
The sense of ain in Melville's works is, however, more often blended
with hia sense of fatalism and neeessity.

Melville, reinforced by his read-

iugs in scepticism, is apparently reacting against the seeming inanity of the
Calvinist paradox in which God ordains man's nature. state, and actions, but
in which, nevertheless. man is held responsible for God'. fortuity.

Speaking

of men's actions, Montaigne saya that it is "the goda ••• themselves that
put them [men] in the way and mind to do them.,,3
sin, He becomes guilty of the sin:

By making God the author of

this thought is many ways rephrased in

Bayle, who uses it to argue, at least ostensibly, for two principles, one good
and one evil.

Hume's argument for necessity is as follows:

The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who
first bestowed motion on this immen8e machine, and placed all beings in
that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable
nece8sity, must result. 4
Hume continues from this hypothesis to question the nature of the "ultimate
Author" and the source of moral evil:
1

~.t

2

~.,

11. 123-125.
1. 126.

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 240.
4

Hume, IV, 116.
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Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as
proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they must
involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be
their ultimate cause and author. l
Because of his greater tendency toward a fatalistic view, Melville,
too, was inclined to impute guilt where, in such a view, it ultimately resides.

Melville had fairly well formed the core of his argument in Mardi.

After arguing, with an eye on Old Testament history, that prophecies made
about certain nations have come to pass, he has Babbalanja reason:

"Now, if

things foreordained concerning nations have in times past been revealed to
them previous to their taking place, then something similar may be presumable
concerning individual men now living. tt2

Babbalanja asks if a foreordained

event, namely suicide, in some way supernaturally revealed to him could by
any means be avoided and concludes:
If not possible, then that suicide would not be mine, but Oro's [God's).
And, by consequence, not only that act, but all my acts, are Oro's. In
sum, • • • he who believes that in times past, prophets have prophesied,
and their prophecies have been fulfilled; when put to it, inevitably must
allow that every man now living is an irresponsible being. 3
In Moby-Dick, Ahab, who is pondering the question of fate, addresses
Starbuck:
Look I see yon albicorel who put it into him to chase and fang that
flying-fish? Where do murderers gOt man? Who's to doom, when the
judge himself is dragged to the bar1 4
Melville again reasons, through Ahab's analogy of the
lIbido

~ardi, II, chap. xxxi, 123.
3

.Th!!!., 124.

4

Moby-Dick, II, chap. xxxii, 330.

~lbicore,

that beings
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act according as they are constituted and asks how the judge (the final judge)
can doom. a murderer when he is guilty for making hilll one.

The argument point.

back to Babbalanja'. like argument in Mardi:
Tell a good man that he i. free to ca.ait murder.--will he murder?
Tell a murderer that at the peril of hi. soul he indulge. in murderous
thoughts,--will that make him a saint?l
Media warns Babbalanja that he is "on the verge" of relieving man of ttmoral
accountability" with his theory.

2

Pierre, tempted to commit incest, declares:

"Let the lode look after their own cClllbustibles.

If they have put powder-

casks in me-let th_ look to itl,,3 Melville's uae of the victita, his portrayal, for __ple, of two leading protagonists, Allah and Pierre-Kneeladus.
as mutilated, truncated, ultimately lIIpotent individuals, shows man as a
victim more sinned against than ainning.

Traditional pre-Renaissance and also sCllle versions of contemporary
Scholastic philosophy4 baaes ethics, ult1mately, on the Divine Law:

law is

an ordinance of reason, and, because the divine reason is eternal, its ordinances are etemal1m,.
of essences.

The eternal law lIlay be seen in the objective order

Government or direction to an end is the effect of law.

Providence or the plan of government for the common good of the whole world

~ardi, II, chap. xxxix, 158.
2Ibid •
3Pie II!, Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 381.
4

The following brief schema is based on the medieval philosophertheololian Aquinas' a "Treatise on Law. tt Summa Theololica, Ia IIae, Qq. 90108, particularly 90-97, and on Paul J. Glenn, A Tour of the Summa (St.
Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1960), pp. 166-171.

213
1s in the mind of God.

God is the perfect Govemor.

The divine law directs

all things to their proper ends, and all movements in the universe are subject
to the etema1 law working through divine providence and divine lovernment,
but man is directed in a special way since he is rational and can become
aware of the order of things and his own purpose for existing, his own proper
end.

Eternal law manifest to lIan through right reason is natural law:

natural law is promulgated through the growth and deve1op1lent of rilht reason.
Eteraa1 law manifest to this individual lIan through his particular reason is
his natural law or ethical criterion.

Although the exact line of natural law

cannot be drawn, its basic principles are evident--the first moral principle
is "Do good, avoid evil. II

Human, t_pora1, or positive.!!!!. is fomed when

human reason interprets and applies natural law in particular eases.
law declares natural law but does not establish it.

Positive

HUlian laws are fomed to

control differences in individuala (e.g., to restrain evil lien) and to;'supplement the natural law.

Because just hUlllan laws derive, through the natural law,

from the eternal law, they bind a man in conscience.

linally, because the

mind's grasp of the precepts of the natural law is not dependable beyond first
CGllllon principles, revelation, i.e., divine revealed law, is necessary to
insure against human deficiency.
Sceptical objections to the foregoing traditional view are manifold.
lirst, there mayor may not be a divine law, and, if there is such a law, it
aight not be reasonable.

Secondly, how can the divine law be seen in the

nature of objective reality when this reality may not even exist.

In view

of the physical and moral evil in the world, is there a divine providence?
Again, the fallibility of reason would be appealed to:

1f reason 1s as veak
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and variable as sceptics claim it is, how much confidence can be placed in an
eternal law manifested through that reason? Man is supposed to do good and
avoid evil, but is it really possible to clearly discern what is good, and
what is evil?

If eternal law and reason and, therefore, natural law remain

in such a questionable state, how sound is human positive law that is fomed
around particulars and circumstances of greater relativity?

How can revela-

tion insure against human deficiency when revelation itself is subject to
contrary interpretation?
Among sceptical sources with which Melville was familiar, Rabelais
and Montaigne, in particular, soundly berate the law.

A generous portion of

Rabelais's satire is directed against law, lawyers, and justice, and the element of sc,pticism is in evidence. I

Book III, chapter xxxix is entitled "HOW

PANTAGRUEL WAS PRESENT AT mE TRIAL OF JUDGE BRIDLEGOOSE, WHO DECIDED CAUSES
AND CONTROVERSIES IN LAW BY THE CHANCE AND FORTUNE OF THE DICE." Most legal
cases are thought to be too tlambiguous, intricate, abstruse, perplexed, and
obscure." 2 Any judgment turns out to be all right because sCllle kind of
reason can be argued on either side:

the uncertainty of judicial judgments

is everywhere attested to.
Montaigne, who frequently commented on the capricious nature of
ethical codes, was also quick to see the corresponding imperfection of law:
Since the Ethic laws, that concern the particular duty of every one in
himself, are so hard to be taught and observed, as we see they are, 'tis
no wonder if those which govern so many particular men are much more so.
Do but consider the form of this justice that governs us; 'tis a true
1
2

See, e.g., Rabelais, III, Bk. III, chaps. xxxix-xliii.
Ibid., chap. xliii, 89.
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testimony of human weakness, so full is it of error and contradictionl l
If one cannot find a criterion for ethics, much less can one expect to find
one for law.

Montaigne, reacting as usual to traditional concepts, challenges

the concept of a natural law foundation for human or positive law; the inconstancy of reason is a prime factor in his argument:
But they are pleasant, when, to give some certainty to the laws, they say
that there are some firm, perpetual, and immovable, which they call
natural, that are imprinted in human kind by the condition of their own
proper being; and of these some reckon three, some four, some more, some
less: a sign that is a mark as doubtful as the rest • • • •
It is credible that there are natural laws for us, as we see them in
other creatures; but they are lost in us, this fine human reason every
where so insinuating itself to govern and command, as to shuffle and confound the face of things, according to its own vanity and inconstancy.2
On

the foundation of the justice of laws, Montaigne makes reference

to Protagoras and Aristo, who "gave no other essence to the justice of laws
than the authority and opinion of the legislator."l Montaigne also sees the
authority of law supported only by a mystique:
Now the laws keep up their credit, not because they are just, but because they are laws; that is the mystic foundation of their authority;
they have no other of any service. They are often made by fools; more
often by men that, out of hatred to equality, fail in equity; but always
by men who are vain and irresolute authors. There is nothing so much,
nor so grossly, nor so ordinarily faulty, as the laws. 4
Montaigne further emphasizes the element of relativity in law as in
ethics (which he sees primarily as custom):
Truth ought to have a like and universal visage: if man could know equity
and justice that had a body and a true being, he would not fetter it to

~onta1gne, Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 496.
2

~.,

Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 271.

3Ibid •
4

Ibid., Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 497.
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the conditions of this country or that; it would not be from the whimsies
of the Persians or Indians that virtue would receive its form. There i.
nothing more subject to perpetual agitation than the laws • • • • There is
not any thing wherein the world is so various as in laws and customs. l
In his later essay entitled "Of Experience," Montaigne writes of law that
"there is as much liberty and stretch in the interpretation of laws, as in
their fashion.,,2
In

~.

Melville's comic presentation of the law in the farcical en-

counters between Wilson and the seamen after the Lucy

~

revolt suggest that

hi. mind was probably well attuned and susceptible to such sceptical treatments of the law as he was soon to meet in Rabe1ais and Montaigne.

In Mardi.

when a group of islanders petition Media, who is sitting in judgment, and
ask for a jury of twelve men to decide alleged offenses, Media retorts in a
sceptical vein:

"If upon a thing dubious, there be little unanimity in the

conflicting opinions of one man's mind, how expect it in the uproar of twelve
puzzled brains?,,3 Melville also satirizes the lawyers of isle of Minda who
are masters of extortion rather than justice.

4

In Moby-Dick, Melville treats the vagrancy of law in his chapter called
"Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish,,:5
power of possession.
1
2

justice, so-called, becomes aligned with the

It is also in Moby-Dick that Melville most noticeably

Ibid., Bk. II, chap. xii, pp. 270-271.
Ibid., Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 493.

~ardi, I, chap. lx, 215.
4

Ibid., II, chap. xl.

5Moby-Dick, II, chap. lxxxix.
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b eg i ns to p1ough up to t he " pr i mary roc k

0f

t he matter, ,,1 i.e., to question

the very foundation of law, of justice.

If human, temporal, or positive law

derives through natural law from divine or eternal law, Melville questions
the nature of this law by questioning the nature of the Lawgiver.

Although

the passage has been cited which questions the guilt of a murderer "when the
judge himself is dragged to the bar,,,2 it is again relevant because of its
legal phrasing; the question is, in fact, a logical consequent of the thesis
of fatalism or determinism.

The idea of a governing benevolent providence

with God Himself as the Supreme Governor is questioned by Stubb, who, like
Timoleon, sees this governing power as "compromised in wrong":
Damn the devil, Flask; do you suppose I'm afraid of the devil? Who's
afraid of him except the old governor who daren't catch him and put him
in double-darbies, as he deserves, but let's him go about kidnapping
people; ay,and signed a bond with him, that all the people the devil
kidnapped, he'd roast for him? There's a governor!3
Justice, or--properly--injustice, is a major theme of Israel Potter.
Israel works for two hundred acres of land in New Hampshire, but his employer

.

proved "false to his contract."
--becomes another's.
mission to France:

5

4

Israel's sweetheart--the "dear, false girl"

He does not receive the "compensation" for his dangerous

"The Brentford gentleman had flattered him with the pros-

pect of receiving something very handsome for his services
1

!ill. t 146.

2

.!ill. , chap. cxxxU, 330 •

3Ibid. , chap. lxxiii,
58.

4Israel Potter, chap. U, p. 9.
5

..!l?!!. , p. 12.

8S

courier.

That
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hope was no more."

1

Unlike Paul Jones, Israel receives no glory, no swords

or medals for his efforts:
old age, Israel
of law.")

'~as

"His scars proved his only medals."

2

Finally, in

repulsed in efforts after a pension by certain caprices

In the "Dedication" to Israel Potter, Melville somewhat snidely

intimates that he is unable to conclude Israel's tale with poetical justice
because of Providential injustice:
I forebore anywhere to mitigate the hard fortunes of my hero; and particularly toward the end, though sorely tempted, durst not substitute for
the allotment of Providence any artistic recompense of poetical justice;
so that no one can complain of the gloom of my closing chapters more
profoundly than myself. 4
Although Melville recognizes the fallibility and relativity of human, positive
law--his "caprices of law"--his remarks on the "allotment of Providence" show
that his thrust at inequity goes much deeper.
In "Bartleby the Scrivener," another image joins the phalanx of Melville's terms and imagea for the impasse of encounter, for the cold, solid,
and unresponsive--terms and images such as "indifferent," "impersonal,"
"stolidity," "iceberg,1f "stone," "marble," "dead walls."
"Tombs," is closely related in suggestiveness.

The additional image,

The entire short story is, in

fact, intricately connected and interwoven with the word "dead" and its imp11cations.
The story, whatever its other implications, is concerned with justice
and law:

Bartleby is a law-copyist working for a lawyer, and the setting is
1

ill!. , chap. xiii, p. 110.

2

.!!M. , chap • xxvii, p. 225.

3Ibid •
4

Ibid. , p. vi.
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a law-office and the Halls of Justice.

That Melville again goes beyond the

proximate expression of law to test its foundation is first intimated by the
lawyer-narrator's foreshadowing remark that he knew very little of Bartleby
beyond what he saw with his own eyes "except, indeed, one vague report, which
will appear in the seque1. tll

In the sequel, the vague report is revealed to

be that Bartleby had worked in the Dead Letter Office where he had seen man's
missives of love, pardon, and hope come to nothing.

2

Against this larger back-

ground of injustice, Bartleby's vision of futility in the endless copying of
foundationless and meaningless laws is comprehensible as are, also, his "deadwall" reveries 3 in the law-office on "Wall Street" 4 with its commanding view
of two walls.

5

In his search for a criterion of conduct, for an objectively

founded and benign system of justice and law, man, in his universal stymie, is
again balked by the unresponsive walls of apparent inSignificance.

When

Bartleby himself becomes the subject of justice, he is conveyed to the "Halls
of Justice," significantly named "the Tombs. ,,6

He is found it, a yard sur-

rounded with walls so thick that they "kept off all sounds behind them.,,7
Bartleby finally dies "at the base of the wall,
1The Piazza Tales, p. 19.
2

Ibid. , p. 65.

3

.!ill. , pp. 41, 45, 53 •

4

.!lli. , p. 20.

5

Ibid. , p. 21.

6

!!?!S. , p. 61.

7

Ibid. , p. 64.

. . • his head touching the
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cold stones"l of lithe Tombs" or the "Halls of Justice."
"Bartleby" first appeared in the latter part of 1853.

Among the many

incursions into the question of justice in The Confidence-Man, published in

1857, the image of the "Tombs" again appears in the account of "A Soldier of
Fortune. ,,2

The soldier, when asked at what battle he had been crippled--

"Resaca de la Ps.lma?"--ans\1ers, "Resaca de la Tombs," 3 thereby giving the
credit for his lameness to the Halls of Justice.

The soldier explains that,

in a case of law, he, the innocent party, had been imprisoned in a wet, damp
cell of the "Tombs," while the murderer went free.
co~nterargument

The story recalls Bayle's

to the reasoning which sees Adam's fall and the subsequent

sins of man as permitted in order to give occasion for God's justice and mercy
--Bayle replies:
This is to compare the Deity to a Father who should suffer his children
to break their legs on purpose to show to all the City his great Art in
setting their Broken Bones. 4
~felville

goes one better:

his "Natural Bone-setter ft or "Happy Bone-setter,"

as the devil-god Confidence-Man calls himself,S leaves the duped Soldier of
Fortune with his disabled legs--another of Melville's victim figures.

Mel-

ville again challenges the justice of Providence or "divine" government and
the "human government" or system of laws which is "subordinate" to the divine
--the Confidence-Man addresses the crippled Soldier:
lIbido

2
The Confidence-Man, chap. xix, p. 122.
3Ibid •
4
5

Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2488.
The Confidence-Man, chap. xix, pp. 123, 124.
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Grant, for the lIoment, that your experiences are as you give them; in
which case I would admit that govenua.nt lIight b. thought to have 1I0re or
le.s to do with what .e... und•• irabl. in thea. But it is never to be
forgotten that human government, being subordinate to the divine. IIU.t
ne.ds. therefore, in its degr... partake of the characteri.tics of the
divine. That i., while in general efficacious to happin.s., the world'.
law lIay yet, in some case., have, to the eye of reason, an un.qual op.ration. just as, in the s •• 11Ip.rfect view, sOlIe in.qualiti. . . .y appear
in the op.rations of heav.n's law;l
th.r. ta..diat.ly follow. th.

Confidence~an's

unctious and ironic .tateaant,

"n.v.rth.l•••• to on. who has a right confidence, final benignity i •• in .very
in.tance, as sur. with the on. law as the oth.r. ,,2 Th. lack of final benignity
in human law, particularly in the concrete case of injustic. rendered the
.oldi.r. lIakeS clear the conclusion about the "other" law.
The r.lativity of law is al.o .vident in M.lville's later works.

In

Clarel (1876), Iolfe speaks of "laws .cribbled by law-br.aker•• ,,3 T11Ioleon
beii.:
If lIore than one., as annals tell,
Through blood without compunction spilt,
An egotist arch rule has .natched
And st_ped the .eizure with his .abr.'. hilt,
And, legalized by lawyer., .tood • • • • 4
A "central question" of Billy Budd (1924), as Rayford and S.alt. have not.d,
is that of ''ailitary expediency verau. justice. ,,5 Several prominent questions
already .een in Melville'. writing. including the que.tion of justice, are
presant in Billy Budd.

Th. capability of the Creator for .vil i ••uggest.d

lIbid., p. 129.
2Ibid., pp. 129-130.
3Clar.l, Pt. II, canto xxvi. 1. 130.
4Collect.d Poeaa, p. 209.
SBilly Budd, .d. Hayford-Sealts. p. [28].
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in the consideration of "the scorpion for which the Creator alone is responsible."l The idea of an indifferent deity is suggested when the "topm.en"
are compared to ftlazy gods" who are frequently "amused with what was gOing on
in the busy world of the deck. below." 2 The question of fate and determinism.
thread. its way through the novella.
"Billy made no demur.

When "elected" by the boarding officer,

But, indeed, any demur would have been as idle as the

protest of a goldfinch popped into a cage.,,3
ice.

His is an "enforced enlistment. ,,4

Billy is "impressed" into serv-

Billy is called a "Fated boy. ,,5

After being condemned, Billy lies between two guns, "as nipped in the vice of
fate." 6 Sometim.es Claggartfs expression showed that he "could even have loved
Billy but for fate and ban.,,7
Man seems to be fated not only from. without but from within (though
the respcnaibility lies without):

Melville again investigates man's indi-

vidual metaphysical m.ake-up as a determinant of his actions.
story the narrator remarks:
the physical make."

8

"The moral nature was seldom out of keeping with

Billy's endowments are presented as being constitutional

1Ibid. , leaf 142, p. [78] •
2

Ibid. t leaf 104, p. [68] •
3Ibid. , leaf 12, p. [45].
4Ibid. , leaf 31, p. [49].
5Ibid •• leaf 226, p. [99].
6

.!!!.!!. , leaf 303, p. [l19} •

1

!lli. , leaf 118, p. [88].

8

Early in the

.!!!.!!. , leaf 9, p. [44].
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or according to nature.

Billy has no "sinister dexterity • • • • To deal in

double meanings and insinuations of any sort was quite foreign to his nature,,;l
there is no "conceit or vanity in his c01lposition,,;2 further, "by his original
constitution aided by the cooperating influences of his lot, Billy in many
respects was • • • much such perhaps as Adam presumably might have been ere
the urbane Serpent wriggled haself into his company"; 3 Billy is "essentially
honest"

4

and his nature is marked by "innocence."

predeterminately!!t.

5

Claggart t too,

~

Claggart's is a "depravity according to nature." 6

gart has "no power to annul the elemental evil in han:

as he
Clag-

the narrator asks

what recourse is left to a nature like Claggart's, but "like the scorpion for
which the Creator alone is responsible, [to] act out to the end the part
allotted it.,,7

That Melville probably sees Vere under a similar consideration

of fixed nature is revealed in such sentences as the following:

"But con-

siderateness in such matters is not easy to natures constituted like Captain
Vere's.,,8
Further, Melville's image of a man-of-war world seems to be conjoined
with his idea of fate:

Billy is transferred from the merchantman Rights-of-

1
Ibid. t leaf 30, p. [49]. Underlining added.
2
Ibid. t leaf 35. p. [SO]. Underlining added.
3
.!!!.M. , leaf 44. p. [52]. Underlining added.
4Ibid •• leaf 220, p. (98]. Underlining added.
5Ibid. , leaf 111, p. [70].
6
Ibid., leaf 130, p. [75].
7
~.t leaf 142, p. [78] •
8
leaf 87, p. [63].
~.,
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!e. to a seventy-four, a warship named 8ellipotent, "Warpower," with its
accompanying concept of sartial power and law in which man ia controlled,
fated, rather than controlling, free.

Vere aska:

"But in natural justice ia

nothing but the prisoner's overt act to be con8idered?,,1 The answer, in the
case of natural justice which recognize8 moral

accountabili~,

is, of course.

no--but, Vere claims, their allegiance is not to natural justice (that which
man ought to have) but, in this man-of-war world (the world as Melville most
frequently sees it), to a martial "justice" which aeema closely aligned to
fate:

Vere aaya that in receiving their cOllllll1.ssions they "ceas.d to b.

natural free agents."

2

In place of p.rsonal respon.ibility and recognition

of the rights of man, V.re •••• '.artial law operating through us. • •• For
that law and the rigor of it, we are not re.pon.ible.,,3
In a fated world--to reason in r.verse from the u.ual sequence of this
study--man doea not, in fact, need a criterion:

fat.d, he n••ds no .tandard

againat which to m.aaur. his nonexistant reapon.ible actions.

The lack of

clear criteriona ia evident in the judicial proceedings againat Billy, proceedings which, in a certain 8ense, are marked by uncertainty.

Like Rabelaia'a

law case., the aituation is too tI_biguous, intricate, abatruse, p.rplexed,
and obscure. ,,4 The nub of thia _bigu1ty ia. as V.re aaya, a "mystery of
iniquity"S which ia _bodied in the person of Clauart; the narrator, in fact,
1

leaf 267, p. [110].

2

leaf 268, p. [110].

~.,
~.,

3Ibid., leaf 269, pp. [110-111].

Underlining added.

4aabelais, III, Bk. III, chap. zliii, 89.
58illy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealta, leaf 259, p. [108].
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claims that lithe point of the present story ••• [turns] on the hidden
nature of the master-at-arms" 1--and since Melville, by comparing Claggart to
the scorpion for which the Creator is responsible, questions the Creator as
being responsible for Claggart's evil nature, he questions, because of this
presence of evil in creation, the ultimate foundation of justice and law.
good and evil, including moral and legal good and evil, are in Cod

If

indiffere~.

then it is perhaps even more accurate to speak of nonjustice rather than of injustice.

The immediate element of uncertainty includes the question of the

captain's sanity:

"Was he unhinged?,,2

The manner of conducting the proeeed-·

ings is questionable and "criticized by some officers."l The members of the
drumhead court are marked by a questionable ability to eope with the case4 and
they are filled with "troubled indecision. tlS

But the core of uncertainty lies

in the fact that proximate law seems to have no foundation in ultimate justice.
The transactions of the trial are marked by a singular dichotomy between morality and legality.

Conventionally, as based on the same natural and

divine law, the two should ideally be fused, but, in actual historical practice, they were becoming more and more irrelevant to each other.

Law, too,

gave strong evidence of the inroads of scepticism, and the uncertainty of
previously unquestioned criterions turned lawmakers to the expediencies of
pragmatism.
I

Oliver Wendell Holmes, jurist son of Melville's physician and

!!!!S. , leaf ll5, pp. [76-77].

2Ibid. , leaf 235, p. [102] •
3Ibid. , leaf 241, p. [103].

4Ibid. , leaves 246-247, pp. [104-105] •
5

!!!!S. , leaf 261, p. [109].
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friend the elder Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote in his The Common Law (1881)
that law is based on the necessities of the time, that the substance of law
is what is "convenient. ,,1

On the conjunction of morality and legality Holmes

writes:
So far from its being true, as is often assumed, that the condition of
a man's heart or conscience ought to be more considered in determining
criminal than civil liability, it might almost be said that it 1s the
very opposite of truth. 2
And later:
Law only works within the sphere of the senses. If the external phenomena,
the manifest acts and omissions, 8l.e such as it requires, it is wholly
indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience. A man may have as
bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules. In other
words, the standards of the law are external standards, and, however much
it may take moral considerations into account, it does so only for the
purpose of drawing a line between such bodil, motions and rests as it
permits, and such as it does not. What the law really forbids, and the
only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the line, be that
act blameworthy or otherwise. 3
With an almost ruthless intensity of logicality Melville pushes a
similar line of thinking to its conclusion in the trial scene of Billy Budd.
Vere judges quite logically within the novel's proposed terms for the human
situation:

if man is indeed fated, any consideration of personal morality is

superfluous.

Man's motives flow from his individual nature which is predeter-

mined; therefore, how can he be responsible for his motives?
divorces legality from morality.

Vere subsequently

The narrator sets the stage:

The essential right and wrong involved in the matter, the clearer that
1Oliver Wendell Holmes, The COIIDIon Law, ed. Mark De Wolfe Howe
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1963), p. [5].
2

~ ••

p. [42].

3;bid., F. [~8}.
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might be, so much the worse for the responsibility of a loyal sea commander.
inasmuch as he was not authorized to determine the matter on that primitive
basis. l
Vere insists:

"Quite aside from any conceivable motive, • • • a martial court

must • • • confine its attention to the blow's consequence." 2 As for the
"mystery of iniquity," Vere say. it is a problem for psychologic theologians,
the court is to be concerned only with the "prisoner's deed--with that alone
we have to do. ,,3 As in the rising element of pragmati81ll in contemporary law,
Budd is not to be judged by his individual conscience; neither is he given his
rights as man--that is, independent, unfated man (it is significant that Budd
is initially removed from the ship Rights-of-Man).
is to be judged.

Vere says:

Only Budd's manifest act

"But for us here, acting not as casuists or

moralists, it is a case practical,"

4

and he maintains that "Budd's intent or

non-intent is nothing to the purpose.,,5

Law becomes connected with the neces-

sities of the time and, in a broad sense, with what is, in Holmes' term,
convenient:

if Billy is given a clement sentence, "Will they [the sailors}

not revert to the recent outbreak at the Nore?,,6
1

That sentence must be

Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 240, p. [103]. However Melville
sees this "primitive" order, whether within the context of "primitivism,"
s01la Golden Age or prelapsarian state, it seems to include some notion of
pristine justice, the rights of man (individual man, the "self") and the notion of independenca--Ahab speaks of the "man born in once independent Man,
and now ull1llanned of Man" (Hoby-Dick, II, chap. cxxv, 300).
2

~.,

leaf 256, p. [107].

3

ill.!!. , leaf 259, p. [108].

4Ibid., leaf 266,
p. (110).
5
ill.!!. , leaf 274, p. [112J.
6
ill.!!. , leaf 277, p. [112].
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avoided which might "provoke new troubles" and be "deadly to discipline."l
To the question, "Is nothing but the prisoner'. overt act to be considered?",2
Vere, in effect, answers "yes."
The inexorableness of Vere's path toward Billy's destruction has the
cauterizing power of a Swift's "Modest Proposa!."

It se81lls difficult to read

the story as any sort of test_ent of acceptance.

If the "point of the pre-

sent story" tums "on the hidden nature of the master-at-at'llls, ,,3 who 18 respon.ible for this nature? and who is responsible for the individual conflict
between Budd and Clagg art arising from these conflicting natures--a particular
conflict that concretizes the larger conflict of a whole warring world that
would not be possible without the presence of evil.

Many men like the obtuse

puraer and surgeon argue about proximate physical laws (whether or not Billy's
hung body should have twitched) when they would do better to question the
ultimate metaphysical foundation of law--so Melville subtly suggests.

Vere

actually points the direction of Melville's question when he assigns the
"mystery of iniquity" to the realm of the "theologians,·.4 Melville's earlier
tlclerical proficients" in his superseded chapter, "Lawyers, Experts, Clergy,"
a chapter he later chose to suppress in favor of dramatizing its material.

5

The only character who comes near being a hero in Billy Budd is Nelson,
and, in the heavily fated atmosphere of this story, there is, again, the
1

.!!?!!!. , leaves 277, 278, p • [113].

2

.!!?!!!. , leaf 267, p. [110] •

3

!k!!. , leaf 135, pp. [76-77] •

4

.!!?!!!. t leaf 259, p. [l08J.

5

!k!!., pp. [36-37].
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contradictory suggestion of free will.

Like Ahab, who claims to the "im-

personal" that a "personality" stands before him, Nelson, too, is a "declarer
of his person. ,,1

In a man-of-war world Nelson is the great fighter.

Nelson,

too, like Ahab, is a victim: he is "adorned ••• for the altar and the sacrifice,,2_-but he is his own priest. 3 His is an "heroic personality";4 he has
"jewelled vouchers of his ~ shining deeds,,5--Melville's selection of matter
and rhetoric are significant:

he sounds the note of the independent, free

man capable of accountability and personally ascribable merit.

Nelson is a

man, like Allab, who is capable of standing up for the "Rights-of-Man," for
justice, in a world that is apparently void of justice.
To the end, Melville questioned the universe around snd within him.
The narrator in Billy Budd claims that B111y is no "conventional hero, tI
neither is the story s "romance" 6--this is for real.

Later in the story it

is again claimed that this story is "a narration eSBentially having less to
do with fable than with fact. n7 Vere says of Budd's motive:
Assizes it shall acquit.
I

But how here?" 8 As we shall investigate in the next

.!ill. , leaf 65, p. [58] •

2Ibid. ,
leaf 67, p. [58].
3

.!ill- , leaf 66, p. [58].

4

~-,

leaf 72, p. [59].

5

.!!!!!!- , leaf 67, p. [58] _ Underlining added •

6

.!ill- , leaf 48, p. [53] •

7ll.!,g,., leaf 335, p. [128].
8

"At the Last

.!l!.!!. , leaf 273, p. [111] •
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chapter, this is precisely what Melville questions--if man, including his
motives, is fated, how shall these motives acquit or not acquit? and, if man
cannot expect justice in this world, what can he expect in the next?

CHAPTER VI
THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY AND THE RETRIBUTIVE RATIONALE
nAnd life once over, who shall tell the rest?
Life is, of all we know, God's best"
Battle-Pieces.
Melville's sceptic sources and the problem of immortality
Melville's presiding view of ethics, his predominant fatalism, caused
him to doubt seriously the possibility of sanct1ons, i.e., rewards and punishments, in a state of immorta11ty in an eternal afterlife.
closely follows that of Montaigne:
soul" that

tI, tis

Again, his thought

Monta1gne says of lithe immorta11ty of the

the part of human sc1ence that 1s treated of with the

greatest doubt and reservation." 1 For Melville, as for Monta1gne, if life
is only illusion or dream, an unreasonable maze of unsubstantiality, an
"ungraspab1e phantom" through which man is moved by an indifferent, fortuitous
force outside hiBself (and is, therefore, neither responsible for virtue nor
for vice), then rewards and punishments, retributive sanctions are meaningless.
In a section entitled "The foundation of rewards and punishments in another
11fe," Montaigne argues from the premise of fatalism:
Moreover, upon what foundation of their justice can the gods take notice
of or reward man after his death for his good and virtuous actions, since
it was themselves that put them in the way and mind to do them? And
why should they be offended at or punish him for wicked onces, aince
themselves have created in him 80 frail a condition, and when, with one

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 257.
231
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glance of their will, they might prevent him from falling?

1

As Kontaigne's statement shows, the idea of justice, including final

justice and recompense, is related to and consequent upon the concept of
ethics--the possible right or wrong of freely performed human actions.

Kon-

taigne thrusts even deeper and questions the nature of justice in the t'gods. It
showing at the same time his own inclination for a secular ethics:

'~ow

[can] justice, which distributes to every one what appertains to him. a thing
begot by the society and community of men, how is that in God?ft 2
Given his sceptical outlook on epistemology, ontology, and ethics,
the inconsequence of a retributive rationale led Montaigne to argue,
against the possibility of immortality.

rationall~

He argues further from the premises

of man's weakness and transienc:y--he asks:
Can we believe that Plato • • • believed that the weak holds we are able
to take were capable, or the force of our underatanding sufficient, to
participate of beatitude or eternal pains?3
Of the transiency of man, Montaigne remarks:

"It were an unreasonable dis-

proportion • • • to assign an eternal recompense in consequence of so short
a life.- 4 In what is perhaps an echo of this thought, Melville has Babbalanja
quote Bardianna (through whom some of Montaigne's thought is distilled) on the
presumptuous fact that "we demand eternity for a lifetime. ,,5
Montaigne had already concluded in Book I of the essays that "the
1

lh!J!.•• p. 240.

2

1l!!!!•• p. 229.

3

.ill!!. , p. 239 •

4

1l!!!!. , p. 255.

5

Kardi, II, chap. lui, 299.
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. 1

deadest deaths are the best."

Perhaps even more significant for Melville was

Hulitt's observation in a footnote to the foregoing statement:

"Death is

here considered as the introduction and actual passage to a state of insenaibility which puts a period to our life.- 2 Montaigne quotes from the ancients
who speak of the death of the soul as well as the body and image death as
sleep in a sense that is close to MelVille's use of the metaphor, i.e., in
a more restricted, negative sense, with implications of annihilation, rather
than in the more common, general and loose application of the metaphor of
"sleep" for death:
Moreover, they [philosophers] perceived the soul tending towards death,
as well as the body • • • which, according to Zeno, the image of sleep
does sufficiently demonstrate to us; for he looks upon it "as a fainting
and fall of the soul, as well as of the body.tt 3
Later, in Book III, Montaigne presents Socrates' thoughts on death as they
are contained in his plea before his judges:
If it [death] be an annihilation of our being, 'tis yet a bettering of
one's condition, to enter into a long and peaceable night; we find nothiUB
more sweet in life than a quiet and profound sleep without dreams. 4
After showing the variety of opinion and the uncertainty and inconelusiveness of human reasoning on immortality, Montaigne offers a fidaistic
solution to the problem in a section of the "Apology" entitled "It 1& by revelation we are ..sured of the soul's immortality. ft Montaigne writes:
It was truly very good reason that we should be beholden to God only, and

~ontaigne, Bk. I, chap. xix, p. 30. This statement may have inspired
Melville's:
255).

"Death ••• is the deadest of all things

2

rug.,

n. 2.

3

Bk. II, chap. Xii, p. 257.

4

Bk. III, chap. xiii, p. 488.

~.,

~.,

I. (Hardi,

II, chap_ !ix,
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to the favour of his grace, for the truth of so noble a belief, since
from his sole bounty we receive the fruit of imaorta1ity, which consist.
in the enjoyment of eternal beatitude. 1
The .eriousne•• of Montaigne's fidei. tic .tatements--often lurching up, as
they do, incongruously--i. a debated que.tion, and it i. likely that Melville
did not take them .erious1y, particularly since the.e statement. do little to
diminish the force of hi. negative arguments.
Sir

ThOllas

Browne, too, relies on a fideistic answer and maintains

that "faith, not phi1o.ophy, hath yet thoroughly disproved" the mortality of
the sou1. 2 Browne explains how the devil tries to estab1i.h that there i. no
God by "extinguishing in minds the caapensation of virtue and Vice, the hope
and fear of heaven and hell. tt3
The impr.ssionab1e Pascal wrote with an anguished passion on the .ubject of imaorta1ity:
This i. not a que.tion about the petty interest. of SODle strang.r. Ourse1ve. and our all are involved in it.
The immortality of the soul is a matter of such main importance, .0
profoundly int.resting to us. that we must be utterly dead to every good
feeling. if w. could be indifferent about it. And all our actions and
thoughts would take .0 diff.rent a cours., according as we keep this
point ever in view, as our main and ultimate object.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
It requires but little elevation of .ou1 to discover. that h.r••
there is no substantial delight; that our pleasures are but vanity, that
th. ills of life are iMua.rab1e; and that, after all, death, which
threatens us every mCII.nt, must, in a few years, perhaps in a few days,
place us in th••terna1 condition of happiness, or mi••ry, or nothingn••••
B.tween us and heaven, hell or annihilation, no barrier i. interpo.ed
but life, which is of all thing. th. mo.t fragile; and as they who doubt
the fmaortality of the .ou1, can have no hope of heaven. they can have
no prospect but hell or nonentity.
1

Ibid., Bk. II. chap. xii, p. 258.

2

Browne, II, 11.

3

lW., 248.
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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

It is vain for men to turn aside from this coming eternity, as if a
bold indifference could destroy its being. It subsists notwithstanding.
It hastens on; and death, which must soon unveil it, will, ina short time,
infallibly reduce them to the dreadful necessity of being annihilated for
ever, or for ever wretched.
Here then is a doubt of the most alarming importance; to feel this
doubt is already, in itself, a serious evil. But that doubt imposes on
us, the indispensible duty of inquiry.
Re, then, who doubts, and yet neglects inquiry, is both uncandid and
unhappy. 1
The rankling element of doubt in the foregoing presentation would not have
escaped Melville if he was acquainted with this section of Pascal's Thoughts.
Melville's doubt and consequent "inquiry" concerning man's condition after
death developed into a lifelong inquiry.
Bayle, like Montaigne, and probably influenced by him, shows the
logical inconsequence of the concept of retribution issuing from a theory of
fatalism:
The Ancient Poets • • • ascribed • • • all sorts of Crimes to Jupiter and
the other Gods, and even ••• that of inducing Men to Bvil, yet wi!hout
saying that the same God who moved them to it punished them for it.
Hume, in his essay "On the Immortality of the Soul," offers several
arguments against the soul's immortality.
knew this essay.

It is highly probable that Melville

Re did know Hume's essay "On Suicide,,;3 the essay liOn the

Immortality of the Soul" accompanied the essay "On Suicide" in print, and
Melville's continued interest in the problem of immortality would seem surely
to have led him to read it.

Following Montaigne and Bayle, Rume also argues

~ascal, 1835 ed., pp. 530-531.
2

Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2495.

3The Confidence-Man, chap. xxiv, pp. 180-181.
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from foreordination to the rationally inconsequential theory of rewards and
punishments:
As every effect implies a cause, and that another, till we reach the first
cause of all, which is the Deity; every thing that happens is ordained by
him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or vengeance.-By
what rule are punishments and rewards distributed?l
Melville and the retributive rationale
A passage in Mardi gives evidence that Melville was overtly aware
that a theory of sanctions does not logically issue from a fatalistic position
in ethics.

The passage comes from the section of Mardi, previously discussed,

in which Babbalanja reasons that man is fated and hence an irresponsible being.
Melville has Media remark:

"Do you take me, then, for a fool, and a Fatalist?

Pardie! a bad creed for a monarch, the distributor of rewards and punishments.'
It is also in Mardi that Melville first mentions annihilation.

William Bras-

well has shown how Melville, in Mardi, makes use of Seneca's Morals by Way of
Abstract. 3 After reading from this antique pagan, Melville's Babbalanja
comments:
And is it not more divine in this philosopher, to love righteousness for
its own sake, and in view of annihilation, than for pious sages to extol
it as the means of everlasting felic1ty?4
Babba1anja, however, 1s not "content" with Seneca's way of 11fe--or death. S
Melville's growing interest in the problem of immortality may be traced in
1

Hume, IV. 572.

~ardi, II, chap. xxxi, 121.
3t'Melvi11e's Use of Seneca,"
4

Mardi, II, chap. xx, 79.
5
~., 80.

&, XII (March, 1940), 98-104.
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the numerous references to it in Mardi, 1 and his interest is probably indebted,
in significant measure, to his readings in sceptic sources.
Calvinistic influence on Melville's view of imaorta1ity.--In his view
of immortality, Melville was, again, probably affected by his Calvinistic
background.

Although Melville reacted against his Calvinistic childhoOd train-

ing, his thought was greatly shaped by it.

His views on merit and success

have been discussed previously in the light of the "Protestant ethic," as
it is called:

with a Calvinistic. Old Testament mentality, Melville believed

that the meritorious man should be the successful man, should receive his
sanctions here and
his election.

~

in this present world almost, as it were, as a sign of

Because he felt that these sanctions were not given, he ques-

tioned the justice of God and sometimes argued that if justice were not
rendered in this world, a fortiori, one should not look for it in the next.
Babba1anja seriously questions the often presented contrary argument that the
injustices of this world will all be rectified in the world to come.

The

oblique but basic thrust is, again, at God's justice:
Yet vain our surmises. Still vainer to say, that all Mardi [earth] is
but a means to an end; that this life is a state of probation; that evil
is but permitted for a term; that for specified ages a rebel angel is
viceroy.--Nay, nay. Oro delegates his sceptre to none; in his everlasting reign there are no interregnums; and Time is Eternity; and we live in
Eternity now. Yet, some tell of a hereafter, where all the mysteries of
life will be over; and the sufferings of the virtuous recompensed. Oro
is just, they eay.-Then always,--now, and evermore. But to make
1

In addition to references given in the text of this chapter, eee,
e.g., Mardi, I, chap. lxii!, 224-225; chap. lxix, 243-245; chap. lxxv!i, 272;
chap. lxxvi!i, 275-277; chap. xciv, 335-336; chap. xcv, 337-338; chap. xcix,
348-353; II, chap. ix, 32-34; chap. xxiii, 93; chap. 1i, 214; chap. lxxi,
299-300, 302; chap. lxxiv, 314-315; chap. lxxx, 353-354; chap. lxxxi, 356-358.
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restitution implies a wrong; and Oro can do no wrong. 1
A passage, in Mardi,. on merit and immortality has a general relevance
to the preceding chapter and the present one in their considerations of free
will, fate, merit, and immortality.
dianna:

Babbalanja reads from his favorite, Bar-

"And if, after all, we should be no more forever;-far better to

perish meriting immortality than to enjoy it UDIleritorious." 2 Ever aince Aclaa,
when accused by God of having eaten from the Eorbidden tree, blamed Eve for
having given him the fruit, part of human frailty--from which Melville waa
not exempt--has been to lay guilt at someone else's door but to claim merit
aa one's own, advantageously, if not logically, dividing the theory of responsibi1ity.

Impressed by, but reacting against, Calvinistic determinism, Mel-

ville was quite willing to trace guilt and culpability back to "Oro," i.e.,
God, but while impressed with the Calviniat ethic that aaw imaediate. proxiaate sanctions in this world as the hallmark of the "elect" or the aeritorious,
and apparently piqued at God's injustice when these sanctions were not forthcoming, he was not so willing to credit "Oro" with the ndeteraining" of aerit
but claims it as aan' s own.
The fear of annihilatiop.--Running through a number of Melville's works
is a persistent and dark strain of negativism concerning the prospect of
immortality.

In Moby-Dick. Ahab looks into the vacant eyes of the deranged

Pip and exclaims:

"Oh God I that man should be a thing for immortal

1

1h!!., II, chap. lxxxi, 359.

2

llWl., chap.

lxxi, 303.

80uls

to
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sieve through!"l

The word "immortal" is the significant word.

Even this

brief concession to the prospect of eternal survival is deflated but a few
pages later as Ahab contemplates the unused coffin which has been converted
to a lifebuoy:
A life-buoy of a coffinl Does it go further? Can it be that in some
spiritual sense the coffin is, after all, but an immortality-preserver I
I'll think of that. But no. So far gone am I in the dark side of earth,
that its other side, the theoretic bright one, seems but uncertain twilight to me. 2
In Pierre, the hero's invocation to the Stone to fallon him--an
action which emblematically occurs--includes the condition that he wishes the
Stone to crush him .!f. there are no subsequent sanctions, if virtue is "unmeaning and unsequelled with any blessing
and unpunishable to man." 3

• and all things • • • allowable

In Melville's next novel, Israel Potter, his

tendency is, again, to argue from the premise of the lack of justice in this
world to the lack of justice in the next.

In view of the many inequities dole

out to Israel during his lifetime (see the section on "Law" in the previous
chapter), the narrator, in his dedication to the Bunker Hill Monument, comment
that Israel, now dead, "may never have received other requital than the solid
reward of your granite."

4

Granite is associated with Melville's images of

"stone" and "marble," the "primary rock of the matter," and carries with it
all the previous connotations of indifference and unresponsiveness on the
part of the deity.

~obY-DiCk, II, chap. cxxv, 301.
2

~.,

chap. cxxvii, 310.

3

Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. v, p. 189.

4

Israel Potter, vi.
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The Confidence-Man,written from the depths of Melville's darkest
period and thick with lacerating irony, contains several barbed references to
immortality and the afterlife.

The Sophomore, the "wise-fool," says:

shall all be happy after we are no more."l

"We

The Confidence-Man calls the

husband of Goneril a "Lucky Dog."
To wbich the merchant replied, that he earnestly boped it might be so,
and at any rate he tried his best to comfort himself with the persuasion
that, if the unfortunate man was not happy in this world, he would, at
least, be so in another.
His companion [the deceiving devil-god Confidence-Man1 made no question of tbe unfortunate man's happiness in both worlds. 2
The stock that the Con-Man offers for sale in The Black Rapids Coal Co. (bell)
and the New Jerusalem (heaven) are both hoaxes.

Finally, in the closing

Chapter,) an, "old man," who is Simeon-like, is reading a Bible.

Simeon, the

New Testament priest, waited for the coming of the Savior that he might die.
At this juncture, it is tbe Con-Man wbo enters.

The gospels, which the old

man is reading, contain the promise of eternal life aud reward; The Con-Man
remarks to the old man that he is reading "good news" (the etymological meaniug of gospel), and a voice from a "curtained berth" (suggestive of death)
calls out, "Too good to be true."

4

The narrator remarks that those in the

berths already only want to sleep, not see.

The Con-Man learns (if he needs

to "learn") that tbe old man has his savings on him, and he offers to show him
to his "berth."

He turns out the light baving the symbols of the Old and New

1
The Confidence-Man, chap. ix, p. 63.
2

.!k!4. , chap. xiii, p. 86.

)

Ibid. , chap. xlv.

4

.!!!!!. , p. 322.
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Testament on it--this action and the remark that the gospels are "too good to
be true" show that, unlike Montaigne, Browne, and Bayle, who, at least, paid
lip service to revelation, Melville, in the present novel, rejects it, and,
with it, its promise of immortality.
away.

The Con-Man then leads the "old man"

Melville ends by saying that something more may come of this masquerade

--but the impetus of deception of the entire novel hurries the picture along,
and the "old man" is seen left in the dark with nothing.
questioned whether the novel ends,

1

Some critics have

but it may have one of the most final of

all endings, an ending in which nothing is left but nothing.

In "The Conflict

of Convictions," one of Melville's civil war poems published in the 1866
volume Battle-Pieces, he writes:
And death [shall} be busy with all who strive-Death, with silent negative. 2
Because of his somber considerations on man's mortality, Melville
seriously considered the possibility of annihilation.

During his 1856 visit

to Hawthorne in England, he confided that he had "pretty much made up his
mind to be annihilated, t1 although he did not seem able to "rest in that anticipation.,,3

In the sceptical self-argument that Melville conducted with

himself, when he was not considering man as a fatherless shadow "from no

~ewis Mumford, Herman Melville (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company,
1929), p. 252; Richard Chase, Herman Melville: A Critical Study (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 205; Howard C. Honford, "Evidence of Melville's Plans for a Sequel to The Confidence-Man," £" XXIV (March, 1952),
85-89.
2

Collected Poems, p. 7.

3

Nathaniel Hawthorne, The English Notebooks, ed. Randall Stewart
(New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1941), p. 432.
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substance cast,"

1

his variant speculations often brought no added reassurance.

Melville saw a certain kind of immortality granted to life in general as
contained in Time, but he seriously doubted the preservation of the individual in Eternity.

In Mardi, he writes:

"Through all her provinces, nature

seems to promise immortality to life, but destruction to beings.,,2
~,

Melville says of the whale:

I~e

In Moby-

account the whale immortal in his

speCies, however perishable in his individuality." 3

But it is precisely in-

dividual, personal survival with which Melville is concerned.
Somewhere in his philosophical wanderings or delvings into physics,
Melville seems to have met the argument on the eternity or indestructibility
of matter.

He writes of the force of leviathan's tail:

occur to matter, this were the thing to do it.,,4

"Could annihilation

But Melville is not so con-

cerned with man's material "stuffn"'-if man is so composed and 1s not merely a
fatherless shadow "frOl'll no substance cast"--as he 1s with the survival of
personal consciousness.

His fear of annihilation after death, probably in

the sense of this loss of personal consciousness, seems to be contained in the
metaphor of sleep which he frequently uses when writing of death.
Mardi, claims that mortals are too apt to talk in the dark.

Media, in

Babbalanja

ans~

"Ay, my lord, and we mortals may prate still more in the dark when we are
dead; for methinks, that if we then prate at all, 'twill be in our sleep.n S
1

Collected Poems, p. 215.

~ardi, I, chap. lxix, 244.
3Moby-Dick, II, chap. cv, 228.

4

~.,

chap. lxxxvi, 119.

SMardi, II, chap. xxxi. 128.
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In Moby-D1ck, Stubb interprets the zodiac on the Doubloon as "one round
chapter" on man's life; in Aquarius the Water-bearer he sees symbolized death,
i.e., drowning, and winding up "with Pisces, or the Fishes, we sleep."l

In

I1The Haglets," the ship is wrecked and the Admiral of the White is drowned:
Imbedded deep with shells
And drifted treasure deep,
Forever he sinks deeper in
Unfathomable sleep.2
In both Moby-Dick and "The Haglets," the imagery of sinking to sleep in the
sea, suggestive as it is of a "state of insensibility which puts a period to
our life"--to borrow Hazlitt's note--seems to point ahead to the closing
lines of "Billy in the Darbies l1 in Billy Budd:
Fathoms down, fathoms down, how I'll dream fast asleep.
I feel it stealing now. Sentry, are you there?
Just ease these darbies at the wrist,
And roll me over fairl
3
I am sleepy, and the oozy weeds about me twist.
The imaging of death followed by annihilation as a sinking in the sea "forever
and aye" is prepared for in one of 11elville's early poems in Mardi; although
Melville does not specifically mention the metaphor Hsleep ," night imagery is
employed and the absence of personal awareness is suggested in the line "The
dead reck not of aught":
We drop our dead in the 8ea,
The bottomless, bottomless sea;
Each bubble a hollow sigh,
As it sinks forever and aye.
We drop our dead in the 8ea,--

~ObY-Dick, II, chap. xcix, 192.
2

Collected Poems, p. 193.

3
Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 351, p. [132].
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The dead reck not of aught;
We drop our dead in the aea,-The sea ne'er gives it a thought.
Sink, sink, oh corpse, still sink,
Far down in the bottomless sea,
Where the unknown forms do prowl,
Down. down in the bottomless sea.
'Tis night above. and night all round.
And night will it be with thee;
As thou sinkest, and sinkeat for aye'l
Deeper down in the bottomless sea.
Death is not seen as a sleep from which man may be again recalled; Clarel, in
dream, sees Greek pilgrima shipwrecked on their return home, and he describes
them aa
Asleep upon beach Tyrianl
Or is it sleep? no. rest--that rest 2
Which naught shall ruffle or molest.
In some of his later poems. e.g. "Buddha,1t Melville may have been endeavoring
to gild the pill of possible extinction by enfolding the fear with the more
positive ambiances of oriental nirvana.
unfinished poem "Rammon."

Buddha is again mentioned in the

The prince R8IIIIDon, who desires the "cessation of

being,"] and the iaporter lardi discuss death:

this general background gave

rise to the only finished segment of the poem published in Melville's lifetime, nThe Enviable Is1ea.'.4 Melville's concern over the possible loss of
consciousness may be reflected in the image of sleep in the poem, for it is

~ardi. I, chap. xcix, 352.
2

Clarel, Pt. I, canto v, 11. 130-133.

3collected Poems, p. 411.
4

~.,

see ed. Vincent's note pp. 472-473.
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said that in these enviable isles myriads lie "unconscious slumberers mere."l
The "hope against hope."--Melville's dark meditations on mortality
were, again. but one side of his expression, albeit the weightier side.
lines from Clarel provide a point of transition.

Two

Like the Greek pilgrims to

the Holy Land, the pilgrims from India also die,
Arrested, with the locusts sleep,
2
Or pass to muster where no man may peep.
In the first line, the image of sleep, though a fairly common image for death,
is probably used with Melville's more specifically limited and dark connotations of annihilation.

But, because he simply does not know with certainty,

an alternative is offered ("Or pass to muster") though still shrouded with
uncertainty ("where no man may peepl1).

Melville was capable of positive

statements and hope, a hope that, if not always active, was at least latent.
He wrote in a letter to Sophia Hawthorne, 8 January 1852:
Life is a long Dardanelles, • • • the shores whereof are bright with
flowers, which we want to pluck, but the bank is too high; & so we float
on & on. hoping to come to a landing-place at last--but swoopl we launch
into the great seal Yet the geographers say. even then we must not despair, because across the great sea, however desolate & vacant it may look,
lie all Persia & the delicious lands roundabout Damascus. 3
In the poem "The Battle For the Mississippi tl Melville declares:
There must be other, nobler worlds for 1hem
Who nobly yield their lives in this.
I

2

Ibid., p. 204.
Clare1, Pt. I, canto v, 11. 197-198.

3

Letters, p. 147.

4

Collected Poems, p. 44.

246

Concerning the hope of a future life, Melville speculates, possibly with the
help of Montaigne's observations on animals, that there is no "creature, fish,
flesh, or fowl, so little in love with life, as not to cherish hopes of a
future state."l

In Mardi, Babbalanja contemplates the account of Lazarus's

resurrection from the tomb and concludes:

"At best, 'tis but a hope," but

goes on to declare that such an instinct 1s not necessarily a guaranteed "preservative. 1I2
Unlike the endings of Hoby-Dick, Pierre, and The Confidence-Man, the
closing lines of Clarel, positive and hopeful in tone as they are, may seem
like something of a

~

sequitur to the ponderous doubt and gloom of the poem

itself; nevertheless, beautifully hopeful they are:
But through such strange illusions have they passed
Who in life'. pilgrimage have baffled striven-Even death may prove unreal at the last,
And stoics be astounded into heaven.
Then keep thy heart, though yet but ill-resigned-Clarel, thy heart, the issues there but mind;
That like the crocus budding through the snow-That like a swimmer rising from the deep-That like a burning secret which doth go
Even from the bosom that would hoard and keep;
Emerge thou mayst from the last whelming sea,
3
And prove that death but routs life into Victory.
Melville, however, sometimes saw even hope as a harrowing thing,
particularly the Christian hope of immortality.

Before the dominance of

Christianity, man could accept or steel himself aga.inst the prospect of
mortality, but with the yearning caused by an alluring hope of immortality

~ardi, I, chap. xciv, 335.
2

~.,

3

chap. lxxviii. 276-277.

Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxxv, 11. 23-34.
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came the accompanying unsettling fear of its unfulfillment.

In "The Age of

the Antonines" Melville writes
The sting was not dreamed to be taken from death,
No Paradise pledged or sought. l
In Clarel, Celio thinks of Chr1st-Even he who in the pastoral hours,
Abroad in fields, and cheered by flowers,
Announced a heaven's unclouded days;
And, &h, with such persuasive lips-Those lips now sealed while doom delays-Won men to look for solace there;
But, crying out in death's eclipse,
When rainbow none his eyes might see,
Enlarged the raargin for despair-!!l: God, !!I. God, f orsabs t me '1
Upbraider! we upbraid again;
Ill!! we upbraid; our pangs constrain
Pathos itself to cruelty.
Ere yet thy day no pledge was given
Of homes and man.ions in the heaven-Paternal homes reserved for us;
Heart hoped it not, but lived content-Content with life'. own discontent. 2
The hope and the

fear.-~?n

a final appraisal, the problem of immortal-

ity, a. in other areas of Melville'. inquiry, ends with a question mark.
the present world is so little known, how
dare
To pledge indemnifying good
In worlds not known[?]3
Because of attending uncertainty, neither fear of annihilation nor hope of
heaven can be precluded from Melville's query about man's condition after
1Collected Poems, p. 235
2

Clarel, Pt. I, canto xiii, 11. 38-55.

3Ibid ., Pt. III, canto iii, 11. 14-16.

If
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death.

He asks in Clarel:
If Luther's day expand to Darwin's year,
Shall that exclude the hope--foreclose the fear?l

After the burial of Nehemiah two opposing natural signs, one of fear and one
of hope, suggest an ambiguous aftermath:

an avalanche of rock falls

"horribly," but a "counter object" and "thing of heaven" is revealed, a "frail"
rainbow--symbol of hope. 2 At Mar Saba, crowning s crag and surrounded by a
desert "waste whose king is Fear," stands an isolated palm, symbol of hope. 3
Though hope is frail and solitary, it does, nevertheless, remain.
The eleaent of uncertainty surrounding immortality exhibits itself in
the form of questions.

In hia poem "At the Canon's Mouth" Melville asks,

And life once over, who shall tell t~e rest?
Life is, of all we know, God's beat.
In Clarel is asked
How then? Is death tbe book's fly-page?
Is no bereafter?S
In one of the more extended considerations of immortality, also in Clarel,
Melville eaploys a aeries of six questions.

Of coaparative significance in

tbe same section is tbe fact tbat, whereas, in Mardi, tbe proposal of a
"bereafter, where all tbe mysteries of life will be over" is, in effect.
negated, in Clarel it is couched in a question:
1

.lli!!. , Pt. IV, canto xxxv, 11. 1-2.

2

.lli!!. , Pt. II, can to xxxix, 11. 139, 151-152.

3Ibid. , Pt. III, canto x,
1. 26.
4

5

Collected Poems, p. 83.

Clarel, Pt. It canto XViii, 11. 36-37.

249
'W:h.;at reveries be in yonder heavell
Whither, if yet faith rule it so,
The tried and rana.ed natures flow?
If there peace after strife be given
Shall hearts r ....ber yet and know?
Thy vista, Lord. of havells dear,
May that in such entranc..ent bind
That never atarts a wandering tear
lor wail and willow left behind?
Then wherefore. chaplet. quivering throw
A dusk e' en on the martyr' a brow
You crown? Do seraphim ahed balm
At last on all of earnest aind,
Unworldly yeamers, nor the palm
Awarded St. Teresa, ban
To Leopardi, Obermann'l
Translated where the anthea's sung
Beyond the thunder, in a strain
Whose haraony unwinds and solves
Each mystery that life involves;
There shall the Tree whereon He hung,
The olive wood. leaf out againAgain leaf out. and endles. reilll
1
Type of the peaee that buds fro. sinless patn?
It se..s somewhat aisleading to speak in senatorial tone. of Billy
~

as Melville's final stat_ent, a label whieh almost unwittingly begin.

to infer that the work is a stallation. culaination. and conclusioll of all
Melville's thought and there would simply be no more to say if he had lived
another hundred years.

It is the last work he wrote before he died. but one

wonders what he would have written a year later, or, given Melville's aercuria
moods, an hour later.

It has been observed that the many separate works

written in an author's lifetime are so illterconnected as actually to fora one
Ireat work:
dom.

if IlOt pushed to extraes, this observation contains aucb v1s-

While certainly bavilll ita own individuality as a work of art, Billy

Budd is, ill many re.pects, a continuation of Melville's life's work; it asks
1

~ ••

Pt. III, canto i, 11. 1-24.
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many of the same questions. including that on immortality, that Melville pursued in earlier works and, while typically tending toward the darker side,
leaves as many questions, finally, unanswered.
The closing lines of "Billy in the Darbies," discussed earlier in
this chapter. use imagery that is suggestive of annihilation.

Conversely,

the dedication to Jack Chase mentions that he may be "harbored in Paradise. ,,1
Without necessarily evincing belief or disbelief in such a state, Melville
saaetime. use. the term "Paradise" rhetorically as he does in his "The Paradi.e of Bachelors and Tartarus of Maids." a story in which he subtly considers woman's difficult role under the burden of gestation.

Such a rhetori-

cal use is also present in Pierre in the de.cription of Isabel'. face a.
"hovering between Tartarean misery and Paradiaaic beauty.,,2 Melville does,
however. use the tera in the sen.e of a state of reward or happiness after
death-as in the "Paradise pledged" of "The Age of the Antonine.... 3 His
manner of using the term in the dedication is at least a moot question.
Writing to James Bill.on as late a. 20 December 1885, about the time of the
inception of Billy Budd,

4

Melville .ays of Jame. Thom.on:

"It is good for me

1ailly Budd. ed. Hayford-Sealts, p. [42].
2Pierre, Bk. III, chap. i, p. 58.
lCollected Poems, p. 235.
4In their edition of Billy Budd Hayford and Sealts write: "The 'unfinished work' of 1885 may have included the short poem of three or four
leaves on which he was working early in 1886, the poem that ultimately became
the ballad "Billy in the Darbies" with which the novel concludes. The novel
it.elf developed out of a brief pro.e headnote .etting the .cene and introducing the speaker of this POetll"--p. [1].
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to think of such a mind--to know that such a brave intelligence has been-and may yet be, for aught anyone can demonstrate to the contrary."l

As

in

earlier works, the signs of nature after a death, in this case

Billy's, are significant:

Professors Hayford and Sealts have devoted a long

note to an investigation of possible meanings, and their findings lean toward
a dark view of possible survival. 2 As an added observation, the serene air
is cOllpared to "81Ilooth white marble," an image which may be another in Mel-

Ville's long line of images utilizing stone, rock, marble, and granite to
connote a cold, impenetrable, and indifferent deity--perhaps Melville's
"marble-dealer" in the same paragraph. 3 Possibilities seem negative, but Melville does not leap frOll appearance to conclusion.

Appearance is often decep-

tive, and deception works both ways; another part of his total sceptical selfargument was stated earlier in Clare1--of deception and illusions he writes:
But through such strange illusions have they passed
Who in life's pilgrimage have baffled striven-Even death may prove unreal at the lfst,
And stoics be astounded into heaven.
Such a statement is rare, but, like the bobbing buoy on the dark oceanic
vastness, it's there and cannot be ignored without ignoring the total Melville.

1

Letters, p. 281.

2

Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, pp. [196-l98J.

3Ibid., leaf 334, p. [128].
4

Clare!, Pt. IV, canto xxxv, 11. 23-26.

PART III
MELVILLE:

SCEPTIC

CHAPTER VII
MELVILLE:

SCEPTIC

"Faith 1s to the thoughtless,
doubts to the thinker"
Mardi.
Melville's sceptic sources correspond in varying degrees to some of
the most outstanding figures in the history of scepticism.

Thought stated in

various ways and with various intentions, the ingredients of common metaphysical problems, beginning with the epistemological problem. emerge frota the page
of these writers.

The problems undergo a process of augmentation even in thos

philosophers, like Descartes and Kant, who endeavor rather to answer scepticis
but whose answers, for some, are not intellectually convincing.
blems became Melville's own.

These pro-

Melville's scepticism does not seem to derive

from any single philosopher but from the aggregate of his sources, although
Montaigne and Montaigne's disciple Pierre Bayle give evidence of effecting a
more pronounced influence on him.

Special emphasis has been given to Mon-

taigne because of his influence, direct or indirect, on almost all of the
sceptic writers considered as Melville's sources in the present study and,
more importantly, because of his direct and abiding influence on Melville,
who owned Hazlitt's edition of Montaigne.
Melville probably read much of Montaigne and Bayle ironically, and
it would be highly questionable that he considered them fideists.
made it sufficiently clear that his

own

MelVille

scepticism did not lead to fideism.
253
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Like the "willful boy" of Mardi, he would "climb high Ofo with hope, not
faith," 1 that is, not an anti-rationalistically structured and externally
imposed creed.

In Mardi, when Melville writes the dictum used as an epigraph

to the present chapter, "Faith is to the thoughtless" it is probably this
anti-rationalistic, organized and imposed faith that he is considering. 2

For

Melville, who so aought a faith unmistakably and integrally subatantiated by
reason and experience, a faith so demonstrably certain that it merged into
knowledge rather than faith, such a position was untenable.

With his great

regard for reason, ltaited as it was. to be a fideiat, for Melville. would be
equivalent to making reason the thrall of faith.

But to 8ay that Melville did

not have faith in the sense of an established creed is not to imply that he
void of all faith:

wag

he admired Hume's faith, a "firm, creedless faith that

embraces the spherea. ,,3 William Braswell writes that "when Melville read in
his New Testament St. Paul's counsel to the Romana, 'Hast thou faith?

Have

it to thyself before God,' he annotated, 'The only kind of faith--one'a own. ,II
Hume had taught that the baais for religion was fear,5 and, in "The LightningRod Man," Melville rejects the dark lightning-king who tries to drive fta brave
trade with the fears of man" and insists upon standing on his own hearth.
Melville's scepticism did not devolve to libertiniam:

~rdi, II, chap. v, 19.
2

Ibid., II, chap. xxxi, 126.

3Redburn, chap. lviii, p. 377.
4Braswsll, Melville'. Religious Thought, p. 19.
5

Hume, IV, 449, 498.

6

The Piazza Talea, pp. 180, 173.

6

many of hi. questions,
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in fact, arose from his great moral preoccupation, and his own keen sense of
justice caused him to question an apparently unjustly governed universe.
The basic problem of scepticism is epistemological.

In the treatment

of Melville's sceptic epistemological problem in Chapter III of this study
some distortion is admittedly inflicted on Melville as artist by subordinating
his themes, dialogue, and images to a predominantly philosophical schema (although this concluding chapter endeavors to resolve this difficulty).

This

approach has the advantage, however, of enabling one to see, with some facility,
what the implications of scepticism are in order to see Melville's works in
relation to them, and since the present thesis concerns Melville as sceptic,
it is necessary to see scepticism in more detail than is usually offered in
the broad designation of scepticism as simply doubt.

kmay be asserted that

this approach does, finally, effect greater appreciation of Melville as artist
by enabling the reader to bring to Melville's often predominantly sceptical
themes and imagery a richer understanding of their implications and connotations.

Some of these themes and images will be discussed in the conclusion of

this concluding chapter on Melville as sceptic, since they offer some of the
most consistent and compelling clues to his scepticism.

Melville briefly

touches then vaults over many of the particular arguments of scepticism to
subsume scepticism's more general tendencies and attitudes in his own works.
Nevertheless, as the third chapter endeavors to show, Melville's works give
evidence that he did explicitly reject the final trustworthiness of all man's
faculties, the senses, reason, and intuition.

Because of their dependence on

a fallible sense knowledge and reason, the disciplines are also undermined.
Man himself is shown to be an inconstant and variable subject, and from this
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fallibility and variability no universal consensus, no criterions or stable
truths can be elicited.

Melville's world is wrapped in doubt.

The epistemological problem gave rise to an ontological problem.
Because ultimately and transcendentally Truth and Being are convertible, if
the very existence of Truth is doubted, it is but one step further to doubt
the existence of Being--even one's
he declares:

"I am a nothing." 1

own

being.

Pierre comes to the point where

In his effort to know, Ahab wants to strike

through the wall of phenomenon or appearance and voices his suspicion:
times I think there's naught beyond. ,,2

"Some-

Pierre, looking for "subs tance," be-

gins to see the whole world as
nothing but surface stratified on surface. To its axis, the world being
nothing but superinduced superficies. By vast pains we mine into the
pyramid; by horrible gropings we come to the central room; with joy we
espy the sarcophagus; but we lift the 1id--and no body is there!--appa1lingly vacant as vast is the soul of a man!3
"Surface" or appearance, for Melville, is not "substance," and he suspects
that unsubstantial appearance itself is delusory.

Melville probably knew

Bayle's question quoted previously:
Ever since the beginning of the World all Men, except, perhaps, one in two
hundred Millions, do firmly believe that Bodies are coloured, and yet 'tis
a Mistake. I ask, whether God deceives Men with respect to those Colours?
If he deceives them in thal respect, what hinders but he may deceive them
with respect to Extension.
In Moby-Dick, Melville considers thia theory of the natural philosophers and
I,ierre, Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 382.

~Oby-Dick. I, chap. xxxvi, 204.
3Pierre, Bk. XXI, chap. i, p. 397.
4

Bayle, 1710 ed., IV, 2620.
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remarks that
earthly hues--every stately or lovely emb1azoning--the sweet tinges of
sunset skies and woods; yea, and the gilded velvets of butterflies, and
the butterfly cheeks of young girls; all these are but aubt1e deceits,
not actually inherent in substances, but only laid on from without. 1
In the above quotation from Moby-Dick, "surface" or appearance is found to be
deceptive, and the last given quotation from Pierre shows Melville doubting
the existence of substance.

In The Confidence-Man, subtitled His Masquerade,

appearances are shown to be deceptive due to the machinations of the devil-god
Confidence-Man.

Melville's metaphor of the "dream" became a vehicle through

which he concretized and projected his abstract, metaphysical query on the
possible nonexistence of objective reality, of being.
difficulties contributed toward this dream query:

His epistemological

the sceptic does not find

the permanent beneath the transient, the ultimate beyond the proximate and
without criterions. the world seems to be drifting and shifting directionlesa1y as in dream; it is a world that, like the dream-wor1d, is precarious,
incalculable, unreasonable, and unaequentia1; phantasms (Melville 's ttphantoas n
simply appear and then as inexplicably disappear.

In Clarel, Melville writes

of illusions that they are "void ••• I As phantoms which accost in dream." 2
The average man of the street judges the inconsequence of his subjective
dream-reality by measuring it against objective reality.

But what is the man

to do who seriously questions objective reality itself as being void?

Against

what is he to measure his fears?
The epistemological and ontological problems, in Melville, gave rise

~obY-Dick. I, chap. xlii, 244.
2

C1are1, Pt. IV, canto xvi, 11. 135-136.

258
to an ethical problem.

Man must perceive truths, standards, guides, or cri-

terions with which to measure his actions and in order to be self-directive,
to act freely.

Ontologically, man is not responsible in a dream world--it is

not really meaningful.

Man becomes anchorless, suspended and passive in dreams

and feels fated or controlled rather than free and controlling.
has Pierre speak out on how the world and self

tt

all a dream--we dream that we dreamed we dream."
"From nothing proceeds nothing.

When Melville

seem" to him, he says:
1

"It 18

His next ques tion is:

How can one sin in a dream?,,2

A sense

of sin, if it exists at all, is rare in Melville's works; he returns again and
again to the idea of man as fated, both within and without.

A certain inc on-

gruent dichotomy exists in Melville's view of fate or determinism, however.
Influenced by, but reacting against, Calvinism, he lays man's "sin" at God's
door as having determined man; conversely, he blames God for not recognizing
and rewarding man's merit here and now, a merit which he frequently implies is
freely man's own.

Both sides of the issue therefore provide cause for him to

find fault with God's justice, a justice and Providence that is further questioned because of the presence of evil in the world.
Melville's doubts concerning survival and sanctions in an afterlife
are consequent to his view of ethics.

Since ethics are meaningless without

criterions and objective reality (man is not responsible for "sins" committed
in dreams), ethical sanctions also become meaningless.

Because of his predomi-

nant fatalism, Melville questioned why the gods should reward or punish man for
1
Pierre, Bk. XIX, chap. i1, p. 382.

2~.
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acts they determined him to?

Also, because Melville did not see justice being

rendered in this world, he argued a fortiori not to expect it in the next.
In the end, however, immortality remains an open question; as Melville wrote
to James Bi11son 20 December 1885,1 it cannot be demonstrated that immortality
is not any more than it can be demonstrated that it is.
The preceding sequence of prob1ems--epistemological, ontological,
ethical, and retributive--is not only a logical sequence, but it is suggested
by Melville himself.

In Pierre, where truth is elusive

2

and criterions and

maxims fluctuate and invert,3 Pierre asks "if tife be a cheating dream, and
virtue • • • unmeaning and unsequelled with any blessing • • • and all things
• • • allowable and unpunishable to man." 4

Earlier in this study a skeletal

sequence of these problems was presented, and it may again serve as a recapitu1ation here:

the fundamental thesis of this study is that Melville's basic

problem (logically) is epistemological, a lack of noetic certitude which gave
rise to an ontological difficulty concerning the nature of a consequently uncertain reality, which, in turn, engendered an ethical question, since ethics
depends on one's view of being or reality, and finally, the ethical inCODsequence which Melville envisioned rendered the retributive rationa1e--immortality and sanctions--meaningless, until nothing was left but nothing.
course of reasoning is Melville's predominant one.
1
2

Letters, p. 281.

Pierre, Bk. XXV, chap. ii1, p. 472.

3

~.,

Bk. IX, chap. i, p. 231.

4~., Bk. VII, chap. v, p. 189.

While the element of

This

260

nihilism (also the existential Angst over meaninglessness) is evident, in the
end, Melville no more trusted the powers of a fallible and' limited reason to
reach negative dogmatic conclusions than to reach more positively sanguine
ones, and, for Melville the sceptic, the case of the universe ends with a
question mark.
Some of the most compelling clues to Melville's scepticism are to be
found in his artistic imagery.

Pyrrhonistic scepticism is a quest for truth.

All philosophy is, of course, a quest for truth.

Scepticism differs in the

area stressed--in a certain sense, the "quest" is more emphasized than the
"truth. tI

Doubt is cultivated:

the adequacy of man's cognitive faculties is

questioned, and a system of polarities is set up.

Impregnated with doubt,

scepticism's quest is unceasing and never rests in truths or dogmas positive
or negative.

Thus Ahab, though blinded, continues to grope.

"truth" is seen to be countered by an equally apparent truth.

Each apparent
Sceptic doubt

with its quest has affinities to and is one of the progenitors of existentialism:

like Sisyphus rolling his rock, the sceptic pushes his quest toward an

immovable position on the pinnacle of truth or significance.

Though always

checkmated and never reaching the apex, the quest is not abandoned.

Early

Greek Pyrrhonistic sceptics attempted to achieve a median position between
opposites and find rest in an indifference to both extremes.

As Pyrrhonistic

scepticism was adapted by later writers such as Bayle, it was often used to
construct a position of sceptical polarity against an opposite position which
was, it was felt, receiving too much unwarranted adherence.

In writers such

as Bayle, scepticism became the devil's advocate in the canonization process
of established and assumed truths--as such, it often apparently lost sceptical
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balance by overemphasizing the opposing position.

Actually, however, it

assURed the already existing strength of the position being opposed.

Some

hint may be given of Melville's own efforts to provide a counterpoise to existing attitudes by his remarks to James Billson. in a letter of 22 January 1885,
on the poet James Thomson:

As to his pessimism, altho' neither pessimist nor optomist [sic] myself,
nevertheless I relish it in the verse if for nothing else than as a
counterpoise to the exorbitant hopefulness, juvenile and shallow, that
makes such a bluster in these days--at least, in some quarters. l
It is highly probable that Melville, as his observation of Thomson suggests,
purposely cultivated the darker questions of existence to balance Victorian
complacency.
gical toll.

This constant delving into darkness, however, took its psycholoNevertheless, his efforts toward a counterpoise and suspension

of judgment are evident not only in his remark to Billson, but in such statements as that in his poem "Pontoosuce":
Light and shade are equal set
2
And all revolves, nor more ye know.
The theme and symbol of the constant quest are of significant recurrence in Melville's works.

The action and significance of Mardi are, finally,

dOll1inated by the quest or hunt.

Taji, the hero, becomes "the hunter that

never rests! the hunter without a home."l
described as a colossal hunt:

The business of Moby-Dick might be

"Ahab had purposely sailed upon the present

voyage with the one only and all-engrossing object of hunting the White
1

Letters, p. 277.

2

Collected Poems, p. 398.

1Mardi, II, chap. lxxxv, 382.

262
Whale,,;l Ahab is described as "the scheming, unappeasedly steadfast hunter of
the White Whale.,,2

111e action of Moby-Dick is climaxed by the three days of

the chase or hunt.

Ahab dies still engaged in the hunt.

Among the many

,

different kinds of "hunters" aboard the Fidele in The Confidence-Man are the
"truth-hunters.,,3 Much of the action of Clarel occurs during a pilgrimage or
spiritual quest for truth.

A "major pattern of the poem," according to

Bezanson, is "the lost hero in search of a guide. ,,4
The sceptic quest for truth or knowledge is beset with doubt.

Melville

sublimates the physical act of seeing to symbolize the intellectual act of
knowing, and he frequently uses the symbol of mist, fog, cloud, or haze to
connote uncertainty and doubt, the difficulty of knowing without criterions
and directives.

In Moby-Dick, during the first lowering for the "hunted sperm

whale" the boat runs through a "suffusing wide veil of mist." 5 Melville
launches into universal dimensions:

as the night grows darker with "driving

scud, rack, and mist," Queequeg holds a lantern stretched on a significantly
named Itwaif-pole"--"There, then, he sat, the Sign and symbol of a man without
faith, hopelessly holding up hope in the midst of despair. ,,6

Half stupefied

after discovering that he has an illegitimate half-sister, Pierre watches

~obY-Dick, I, chap. xli, 232.
2

Ibid., chap_ xliV, 252.

3111e Confidence~an, chap. ii, p. 8.
4

Clarel, p. liv.

5

Moby-Dick, It chap_ xlviii, 283.

6

.!ill., 284.
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while the "morning dawned in1llist. ,,1 After resolving to help his half-sister
Isabel, Pierre remains in uncertainty concerning his future relationship with
Lucy:
Standing half befogged upon the mountain of his Fate, all that part of the
wide panorama was wrapped in clouds to him; but anon those concealings slid
aside, or rather, a quick rent was made in them; disclosing far below, half
veiled in the lower mist, the winding tranquil vale and stream of Lucy's
previous happy life; through the swift cloud-rent he caught one glimpse
of her expectant and angelic face peeping from the honeysuckled window of
her cottage; and the next instant the stormy pinions of the clouds locked
themselves over it again; and all was hidden as before; and all went confused in whirling ~ and vapour as before. 2
It is predicted of Israel Potter that be will end by "wandering forlorn in the
coal-fogs of London. ,,3 Israel drifts directionlessly through life and, as an
old man, is, in fact, seen wandering in "fog so dense" that "the dimmed and
massed blocks of houses, exaggerated by the 100m, seemed shadowy ranges on
ranges of midnight hills.,,4

"Benito Cereno," published in 1855,S is close in

time and tenor to The Confidence-Man, which Melville finished writing in 1856.
In both works, Melville's concentration upon the epistemological problem is so
intense as to seem, at times, verging on an obsession.

6·

The aura of ambiguity

1rierre. Bk. V, chap. iii, p. 129.
2

lh!d., chap. v, p. 147. Underlining added.

3Israel Potter, chap. i. p. 6.
4

~.,

chap. XXVi, p. 219.

SHerman Melville, Piazza Tales, ed. Egbert S. Oliver (New York:
Hendricks House, Farrar Straus, 1948), p. 230, n. 55-140.
6The vocabulary of "Benito Cereno" is almost surfeited with such terms
.s "suspicion" (pp. 79, 85, 92, 104, ll4--pagination given here and throughout
this note is that of the Hendricks House edition of Piazza Tales), "secret"
(pp. 80. 89, 90). "mysterious" (p. 80), "seem" (and forms of "seem"-pp. 56,
57, 85. 86, 87, 89, 93, 99, 103, 107), "trust" (pp. 79, 80). "distrustful" and
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and uncertainty, the fear of deception, is prepared for in the initial paralJ'aphs of "Benito Cereno" with Melville's images of mist:
culty of seeing syaboUzes the difficulty of knowing.
with "troubled aray vapours";

1

again, the diffi-

Gray fowl are mixed

Captain Delano haa difficulty studying the

approaching ship because of the "vapours partly mantling the hull, through
which the far matin light frOil her cabin streaed equivocally enough," 2 and
"fog here and there [was] raggedly furring her. ,,3 In Clarel, the riders begin
another day of their pilgrimage in
The gray of daw. A tr_or sliaht:
The trouble of imperfect liaht
AIln begins. In floating cloud
Midway suspended dow the gorge,
A long mist trails white shreds of shroud. 4
"distrusts" (pp. 81, 114), "mistrust" (p. 77), "certain" (p. 80), "deceive"
(pp. 80, 116), "el11ga88" and "enigmatical" (pp. 81, 115, 83), "delusive" (p.
81), "equivocally" (p. 56), "illusory" (p. 77), "subterfuge" (p. 82), "dUplicity" (p. 77), "apparent" (and fol'lU of "apparent"-pp. 56, 82, 104, lU, 116,
117), "appearance" (and forms of "appearance't--pp• 56, 57, 83, 113, 121), "obscure" (p. 85), "inquisitively" (p. 85), "thought" (pp. 85, 93, 105), "confidence" (pp. 87, 88, 92, 111), "images" (p. 88), "puzzled" (p. 90), "eoaprehend"
(p. 90), "1Ieaning" (p. 90), "1I8I1ifest" (p. 92), "speculative" (p. 93), "contradictory" and "contradictions" (pp. 94, 115), "vagary" (p. 101), "incredulity" (p. 102), "credible" and "credence" (pp. 103, 123), "11Iagined" (p. 103),
"1apressionu (p. 109), "dubious" (p. 123), "deceptions" (pp. 56, 139), "baffling" (p. 56), "uncertainty"' (p. 56), "suntising" (p. 56), "scrutiny" (p. 59).
"inkling" (p. 65), "imposture" (p. 76), "suppositions" (p. 76). Also present
are many turns of phrase such as "what was the truth?" (p. 82); "if there was
ground for mistrusting his veracity" (p. 82); ''What .eant this?" (p. 89);
"puzzled to cOIIlprehend the aeaning of such a knot" (p. 90). The above list is
by no 1Ieans exhaustive and could be multiplied 1Iany ti1les in the longer work
of !be Confidence-Man.
lrhe Piazza Tales, p. 66.
2

Ibid., p. 67.

3

llli.,

4

p. 68.

Clarel, Pt. III, canto xxxii, 11. 1-5.
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Again using sight to represent insight in the quest for truth. Melville
symbolizes the intensity of the quest by portraying the strain placed upon the
eyes or by portraying near blindness in the effort to "see."
cussing blind Haaeric bards, Babbalanja, in Mardi, reaarks:

To a cOlllpany dis"Few grand poets

have good eyes; for they needs blind must be. who ever gaze upon the sun. ,,1
In a letter to Evert A. Duyckinck 3 March 1849, Melville, after praising Emerson for diving into truth, praises the

'~hole

corps of thought-divers, that

have been diving & coming up again with bloodshot eyes since the world began." 2 In Moby-Dick. the spout of the White Whale is connected with "deep
thoughts" and "incOfllDlunicable cont_plationa," and the observation is made:
"I have heard it aaid, and I do not much doubt it, that if the jet is fairly
spouted into your eyes, it will blind you ... 3 The captain of the Samuel Enderby
(a ship also "hunting" the whale) tells how he and his crew tried to capture
Moby Dick.

They are accidentally drawn right next to the Whale. and the cap-

tain declares:

"I was blind as a bat-both eyes out--all befogged and be-

deadened with black foam. ,,4

In language that points back to the sun image of

Mardi included in the quotation given at the beginning of this paragraph, Ahab
says:

"Cursed be all the things that cast man's eyes aloft to the heaven,

whose live vividness but scorches him, as these old eyes are even now scorched

~rdi, II, chap. lxxvi, 320.
2

Letters, p. 79.

~Oby-Dick, II. chap. lxxxv, 116.
4

~.,

chap. c, 199.
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with thy light, 0 sunt"l And in "The Candles" chapter of Moby-Dick, Ahab
accosts the fiery "supernal powertf:

"Thou canst blind; but 1 can then grope.

• • • Take the homage of these poor eyes. • • • The lightning flashes through
my skull; mine eye-balls ache and ache. • • • Yet blindfold, yet will 1 talk

to thee."

2

The sun is a

COlllDon

symbol for God, the Whale is Melville's own.

In his first close encounter with the Whale

on

the three climactic days of

chase, Ahab comes off with "blood-shot. blinded eyes. ,,3

On

the third and last

day of the chase, in statements that show the integration of "The Fountain"
and ItThe Candles" chapters, it is said that nAhab was fairly within the sUloky
1Iountain mist" of the Whale's spout;4 shortly after, Ahab cries:

"I grow

blind; handa t stretch out before me that 1 may yet grope my way." 5 The indOl1litable Ahab refuses to give up the quest.
warns Pierre:

In Melville's next novel, Isabel

"Thou shalt not strain thine eyes in the tw1light.,,6 After des-

cribing Pierre's search for truth-"the deeper and the deeper that he dived,
Pierre saw the everlasting elusiveness of Truth,,7_-the narrator tells how
Pierre's "incessant application told upon his eyes. • _ • Sometimes he blindly
1

Ibid. , chap. cxviii, 274.

2

.!.lUJ1. , chap_ c:xix, 282.

3

.!.lUJ1. , chap. c:xxxiii, 338 •

4
Ibid. t chap. c:xxxv, 363.
5Ibid. , 364.
6Pierre. Bk. XXII, chap. ii, p. 420.
7

Ibid. , Bk. XXV, chap. iii, p. 472.
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wrote with his eyes turned away from the paper."

1

The mysterious spirit spout
2

of Moby-Dick becomes, in Pierre, the "1Ilysterious tap-rooms" --with a double
entendre; finally, while winding in and out of the "obscurest warehousing
lanes," Pierre is afflicted with "blindness, and vertigo, and staggering,,3 and
he falls.

The Lawyer in "Bart1eby" notices that Bartleby' s vision is becoming

impaired, and, in a bit of dialogue that is rich in both humor and dark implications, Melville has the Lawyer ask Bart1eby:
business suit you?

"How would a bar-tender's

There is no trying of the eye sight in that. ,,4

According to Melville, man, for all his efforts to "see," is not able
to come to unquestionable stable truths, to standards and criterions that he
may

and, what is perhaps even more important for Melville, that he may

~,

use as guides to correct, moral action.

This inability to come by criterions,

guides, and directing principles, whether natural or supernatural, is also
symbolically expressed in Melville's art:

it is the "chartless" voyage of

Mardi;5 it is the "infallible" guidebook of Redburn that turns out to be a
"delusion. ,,6

In his "Apology," Montaigne wrote:

tlWhere the compass, the

square, and the rule, are crooked, all propositions drawn thence • • • must,
1

.!lWt. ,

p. 473 •

2

lli!. , p. 474.

3

lli!. , pp. 474, 475.

4The Piazza Tales, p. 59.
5

Mardi, II, chap. lxv, 276.

6

Redburn, chap. xxxi, pp. 192, 193.
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of necessity, be also defective."l Although Melville's mariner's compass is
of a different kind than Montaigne's there is an affinity of thought in their
use of the example of fallibility in the two instruments.

In an episode that

probably points shead to Pierre and the wholly "inverted" thought and maxims
of men that are due to the capricious "heavens, f1 2 Ahab's instruments of direction, his compasses, are exactly "inverted" by an electrical storm (often connected with heaven and the deity by Melville), so that the Pequod is

unwittin~

going in the opposite direction from that of her intention. 3 Melville again
uses the figure of the inverted compasses in "The Haglets" and in Clarel, and,
in both poems, the wrecked ships are presided over by the Fates symbolized by
three birds 4--symbols of heaven.

The numerous references to "wrecks" in Mel-

ville's works probably derives from his view that man is voyaging through life
without guides.

The other means of ascertaining the course of the Pequod are

also ineffective:
he wants to know,

Ahab tramples his quadrant because it cannot tell him what
S

and the sea snaps the log-line and the log is lost.

6

Ahab

then makes his own instruments, but, in the end, the quest is not resolved but
simply ends with Ahab's destruction.

Melville, in The Confidence-Man, plays

up the inefficacy of the Counterfeit Detector.

The Simeon-like old man of the

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 281.
2

Pierre, Bk. IX. chap. i, p. 231.

3

Moby-Dick, II, chap. exxiv, 296.
4
Collected Poems, p. 187; C1arel, Pt. III, canto Xii, 1. 97.
SMoby-Dick, II. chap. CKviii, 275.
6

~.,

chap. cxxv, 301.
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closing chapter remarks of the Detector:

"I don't know, I don't know • • • •

There's so many marks of all sorts to go by, it makes it kind of uncertain. ttl
Man has no infallible faculties, no flawless instruments, no "incontestable
vouchers"

2

by which to steer his course.

Melville's world is a wildly wandering one without direction or criThe ship, Melville's microcosmic world, is "chartless" voyaging: 3

terions.

in Melville's view, there are no sure maps, no routes laid out for man's unquestioning adherence.

At the beginning of Moby-Dick, Ishmael, the signifi-

cance of whose name, for Melville, includes the concept of an orphan,4 embarks
on the world-ship Pequod, whose wake is described as "the devious zig-zag
world-circle of the Peguod's circumnavigating wake,,;5 at the end, he is picked
up by "the devious-cruising 'Rachel, ,tI as just "another orphan. ,,6
the novel comes full circle with Ishmael's uncertainty intact.
Clarel follows a like pattern:

Sceptically,

The quest of

the pilgrims reach,

At last, Jerusalem! 'Twas thence
They started--thither they return,
Rounding the waste circumference. 7
1
2

The Confidence-Man, chap. xlv, p. 331.
Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. viii, pp. 195-196.

~ardi, II, chap. lxv, 276.
4

See Pierre, Bk. V, chap. i, p. 125. Pierre has an "orphan-like"
feeling like Ishmael without a maternal Hagar.
5
Moby-Dick, It chap_ xliv, 251.

Underlining added on "devious."

6Ibid., II, "Epilogue," [368]. Underlining added.
tions are in italics in the Standard edition.
7
Clarel, Pt. IV, canto xxix, 11. 11-13.

These two quota-
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111e microco81D.ic world of "Benito Cereno," the ship San Dominick, is marked by
the "uncertainty of her movements."l

In -the Confidence-Man, the ship Fidele

wends her way through eddies. 2 Melville also used symbols of forests, woods,
and wilderness to show man's plight.

Pierre is seen "wandering through the
3
forest, his eye pursuing its ever-shifting shadowy vistas."
111e hero of

Israel Potter is fitly named Israel, "since, for more than forty years, poor
Potter wandered in the wild wilderness" of the world. 4 Like the traveler in
"The Piazza," man follows a Itzigzag, perilous road." 5

In the enigmatic world

of "Benito Cereno" Melville joins his sea and ship imagery with that of the
forest:

"The San Dominick had been battledored about by contrary winds, 1n-

veigled by currents, or grown weedy in calms.

Like a man lost in woods, more

than once she had doubled upon her own track." 6 Melville's world is traveling
blind, all ships devious cruising, man an IShmael, a spiritual nomad wandering
through a wilderness of contradictions.
tions of the human intellect.
If

Melville was well aware of the l1mita-

The narrator in Pierre declares that it is only

the miraculous vanity of man" that would allow him to think he has "come to

the Ultimate of Human Speculative Knowledge ... 7 Even when man does seem to find
1
2

The Piazza Tales, p. 68.
111.

Confidence~an,

chap. xvi, p. 100.

3

Pierre, Bk. VII, chap. Viii, p. 196.

4Isra.l Potter, chap. i. p. 5.
5The Piazza Tales, p. 12.
6

~.,

7

p. 81.

Pierre, Bk. IX, chap. it p. 233.
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significance, it is an "unconfirmed Significance."l
Finally, all is left in a state of doubt.
his .planation of PyrrhoniS1R:

Montaigne had asked during

"Can any thing be proposed to us to grant, or

deny, which it shall not be permitted to consider as ambiguous?"

2

Melville's

Pierre, which, like his other philosophically influenced novels, questions the
nature of God, man, and nature, is significantly subtitled Or, The Ambiguities.
Further, in Rabe1ais's chapter on the Pyrrhonian philosopher Trouillogan, the
"abnegation of both extraes" is called "neuter.,,3 Ephraim Chambers, in his
article on scepticism, says that one of its maxims is "neutrality. ,,4 Pascal
proclaimed in his Pensees that "he who would think to remain neuter, is a Pyrrhonist par excellence.

This neutrality is the very essence of Pyrrhonl81ll. ,,5

In the penultimate chapter of Pierre, Pierre entirely claims neither Lucy nor
Isabel with what they symbolically represent (light and darkness, goodness and
evil), and he declares:

"Pierre is neuter now!"

6

In the "Apology," Montaigne explains that it is practically impossible
for a sceptic to speak without making a judgment whereas he is supposed to
suspend jud&llent and maintain doubt.

Therefore, i f the sceptic says, "I know

not" or "I doubt," he is accused of maklng a judgment or of being sure that he
I

Clarel, Pt. I, canto xllv, 1. 31.

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 231.
31labelus, III, Bk. III, chap. xxxv, 50.
4Chaabers, p. 31.
5Pascal, 1835 ed., p. 529.
6Pierre, Blt. XXVI, chap. vi, p. 503.
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does not know or that he doubts.

Montaigne suggests that the sceptic would

be less vulnerable to such accusation and that it would be more accurate if
he used the interrogative form to express his doubt; instead of saying "1
know not" or "1 doubt," he would ask ''What do 1 know?"l

It seems, however,

a rather picayunish philosophical quibble to assert that the sceptic should
logically not make any statements at all; statements may be made that are still
unconfirmed and highly doubtful to a much greater degree than like statements
made by a man who is unquestioning in intention and attitude.

Further, in the

dialectical approach of scepticism, with its consideration of polarities,
statements are often made on both sides of an issue in the sceptic's se1fdebate, an approach which exemplifies his pervading and final questioning and
doubtful attitude.

An example of these counter considerations may be seen in

Melville's short but significant chapter "Sailing On" in Mardi, Melville's
first novel to give evidence of his growing scepticism.

Melville writes in

nautical terms of launching off and sailing on in the "world of mind" toward
the attainment of truth--the "golden haven."

His first consideration or

statement is quite positive:
Those who boldly launch, cast off all cables; and turning from the common
breeze, that's fair for all, with their own breath fill their own sails.
Hug the shore, naught new is seen; and "Land ho!" at last was sung, when
a new world was sought. 2
A few lines further he considers the negative prospects:
So, if after all these fearful, fainting trances, the verdict be, the
golden haven was not gained;--yet, in bold quest thereof, better to sink
in boundless deeps, than float on vulgar shoals; and give me, ye gOGS, an

~ontaigne, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 244.

~ardit II, chap. lxv, 276.
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utter wreck, if wreck I do. 1
The particular emphasis of the sceptic quest is, however, best expressed in
the form of the question.

In accordance with Montaigne's suggestion, Mel-

ville places many of his most prominent and persistent doubts in the interrogative form:

"Where is the Ultimate?"; "What think you lies beyond?"; "Have

we mortals naught to rest on, but what we see with eyes?"; "To what end your
eternal inquisitions?"; "And what are men?"

"What is it, to be something?";

"To what final purpose do I walk about, eat, think, dream?"; "What is death? ft 2
"Where lies the final harbour, whence we unmoor no more?"t "Where is the
foundling's father hidden?"; "Great God, where art Thou?"; "Faith?

w'hat's

"How can one sin in a dream?,,4 "Can !!£. final good h!. wrought?"; "Is

that?")

life but !.. dream?"; "And life once over, who shall tell the rest?"; "Have we
gamed and lost?"; "Is that high Providence, or Chance?"; "Yea,
"What basis then?,,5

~

ye, gods?";

"How long wilt make us still to doubt?"; "What for

earth?"; "What is stable?"; "Is life indeed a dream?"; "What clew, what clew?";
"What may man know?,,6
1

"But aren't it all sham?,,7

Finally, to the question,

Ibid., 277.

2~., chap. xx, 81,. chap. xxix, 115, 116; chap. xxxi, 126; chap.
xxxii, 131; chap. xxxix, 159, 160; chap. 11x, 255.

~obY-Dick. II, chap. exiv, 264; chap. cxxiii, 293; chap. cxxvii, 309.
4

Pierre. Bk. XIX, chap. ii, p. 382.

5Collected Poems, pp. 62, 65, 83, 88, 209, 215.
6

Clarel, Pt. I, canto xiii, 1. 74; canto xxxiv, 1. 35; Pt. II, canto
iv, 1. 93; Pt. III, canto xiv, 1. 118; canto xx, 1. 42; Pt. IV, canto iii, 1.
109.
7

Billy Budd, ed. Hayford-Sealts, leaf 349, p. [132J.
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"What is truth?", Uelv1l1e the sceptic remarks through Babbalanja:
That question is more final than any answer. l

~ardi. 1, chap. xciii, 329.
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Xenophon's Works, Translated, complete In 1
Fox's Speeches, new edition, 1 vol. R. 8vo. 11'7. 8",.$2.
~.
"
.
. Nellon (Lord), Life of, 8vo. eloth. $1 50•. j nl.8Yo. fl 00. , . . . .
.....
.
••• Old edlliOll . . priced at abolli P. .,.:', ,'.' i l<'
..
'.
. . ;." ' "
.. "
. l_d,I847,
" ".
:., In ....''''.......J 1".' J.. -l.r.

....N
\0

280

,_,,'
,; whereas every other-thing, , '
whether an animal Of a vessel, which enters into the
, dreadful gulph of this mon~tcr~s mouth, i~ ins!antly',.
'lost and swallowed up, tillS little fish retlfes mto It, '
"with the greatest'security,
and.there - sleeps, :----_ _'-"___.
-,-- _""'_,,".1"

~...,.,"_~~.,~_~';",,

-.~-

,-""~-~--

----~,-~

[,paasage,from 1811 Essaya, II, 100.]

l

"., " ,whereas all the
other things,' whether bea.,t or vessel, that enter·
into the dreadful gulf of this monster's mouth,
are" I,' m,,mediatelY lost and s,wallow, ed up, this little
fish retires into it in great security, and there
.!~eps,··
'

[Passage from 1842 and 1845 Haz1itt edition of
Montaigne's Works, Bk. II, chap. xii, p. 219_]

" And whcl'eas nIl the olh,,( things, "hcth". ')e~,st or ,"esse],
that enter into the Jrentitill g,llf ()f this mon~l"J"s (whale's)'
mouth, are immediately lost nnd swallowed up, l;IC liea-gudgeon
retires into it in great secnrity, and there slceps/'
MONTAIGNE.-.•Jpo[0.'l!l for Raim(Jlld Schond. '

[Extract from 1851 first American editiOD of Melville's Moby-Dick, p. xii.]
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